Opinion
B230620
12-21-2011
KEWEN LI, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BEILIN YIN YIN ZHAO, Defendant and Respondent.
Law Office of Roland Ho and Roland Y. Ho for Plaintiff and Appellant. Law Office of Max C. Chiang and Max C. Chiang for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. KC056624)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Dan T. Oki, Judge. Reversed with directions.
Law Office of Roland Ho and Roland Y. Ho for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Office of Max C. Chiang and Max C. Chiang for Defendant and Respondent.
Kewen Li appeals from a judgment entered after a court trial in which the trial court found in favor of Beilin Yin Yin Zhao against Li on her motion for judgment in Li's action against her for recovery of gifts made in contemplation of marriage. Li contends that the court abused its discretion in denying his motions to continue the trial, the judgment was not supported by substantial evidence, and the court abused its discretion in denying his motions to vacate the judgment and for a new trial. We conclude that the court erred in granting the motion for judgment because it incorrectly interpreted Civil Code section 1590 to require an express agreement by Zhao to marry Li in order for Li to recover gifts made "in contemplation of marriage." Li was prejudiced by the court's interpretation because a reasonable trier of fact could find that Zhao's acts and conduct and acceptance of gifts supported an implied promise to marry for purposes of section 1590.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code.
We reverse the judgment and remand the matter for a new trial. Accordingly, we need not address the challenged orders.
BACKGROUND
Li filed a first amended complaint (complaint) against Zhao for quiet title, partition by sale, recovery of gifts made in contemplation of marriage, and conversion. The complaint alleged that Li had met Zhao through a friend on March 12, 2008, and proposed marriage to her after a week of courtship. Subsequently, "in contemplation of matrimony," Li and Zhao searched for a home together. On June 23, 2008, Li and Zhao purchased a home in the name of Zhao "as a single woman." Li contributed $173,417 and Zhao $30,000 toward a down payment on the house. Li bought household items totaling $30,000, made real property improvements of $70,000, and gave personal property to Zhao worth $25,000 in expectation of marriage to Zhao. Li and Zhao had intimate relations five times. Zhao demanded $350,000 and a five-karat diamond ring as wedding gifts prior to marriage. When Li told Zhao he could not obtain the money and the ring, Zhao discontinued the relationship and refused to return the money and property previously given to her by Li.
A court trial was set for September 28, 2010. On September 24, 2010, Li's attorney, Roland Ho, filed an ex parte application for a continuance on the basis that Li was not available for trial because he was in China for business. Judge Peter J. Meeka denied the ex parte application. On September 27, 2010, Ho filed another ex parte application for a continuance based on Li's absence and the absence of material witness Jack Wong. That ex parte application was denied by Judge Dan T. Oki.
On September 28, 2010, the day of trial, Ho renewed his request before Judge Oki for a continuance on the basis that Li was in China, which the trial court characterized as an "impermissible motion for reconsideration of a prior court order." Judge Oki stated that although the unavailability of a material witness "might have been good cause if [] Li was available," he agreed with Judge Meeka that Li's decision to conduct business in China instead of appearing for trial was not good cause for a continuance.
The trial then commenced. The parties stipulated that Li had given Zhao $173,417 toward a down payment for the purchase of real property and $571 for an iron balcony fence.
Lian Hu testified that she was Li's friend. Li had told Hu that he was "really interested" in Zhao and that they would be married "soon." But Li did not tell Hu that they had set a wedding date. The first time Hu met Zhao, Zhao told her that the age difference between her and Li was not a barrier and that it did not bother her that Li had a daughter from a previous marriage who was close to her own age. Zhao also told Hu that she had not told her parents about the relationship. Hu subsequently invited Li and Zhao for dinner, where Zhao referred to Li as "'my husband'" in Chinese. Also, Li and Zhao attended Hu's son's wedding. On one occasion, when Hu asked Zhao when she was getting married, Zhao said that she was not "ready" because she had not received a wedding gift. Hu could not recall if Zhao had ever told her that she had agreed to marry Li. Hu testified that after Li and Zhao broke up, Hu unsuccessfully tried to encourage Zhao to marry Li. Niann Hua Teng, an employee of Li, testified that Li had told him he was going to marry Zhao.
Zhao testified that she had met Li through Wong when she was trying to make new friends in the United States. She began working for Li at his company in July 2008. She started a relationship with him in August 2008, which turned into a sexual relationship. Zhao testified that she had never promised Li that she would marry him.
When asked by the trial court if Ho had any correspondence from Zhao to Li showing her understanding that she was engaged to be married to him, Ho replied in the negative. Ho again requested a continuance in order to allow Li to testify, which the court denied as an improper motion for reconsideration.
After Ho rested, Zhao made a motion for judgment, which was granted by the trial court. The court stated that if Li had testified that Zhao had "promised to marry him for the home and other items of purchase," he could have avoided a motion for judgment. Instead, Li chose to remain in China to pursue a business opportunity. The court noted that Ho had presented evidence only that Li and Zhao had a dating relationship and were intimate, that even Hu had testified that Zhao had told her she was not ready to marry Li because he had not given her cash and a wedding ring, and Ho had not presented any witnesses who could testify that Zhao had promised to marry Li or said she was engaged to be married to Li. The court said to Ho, "You have made a clear record as to what the circumstances are. And I am assuming, and tell me if I am wrong, that you have no other evidence to prove [] Zhao promised to marry [] Li other than the circumstantial evidence of the nature of the hearing all day?" The court noted, "I have no doubt that it was [] Li's hope that they would marry." The court, interpreting section 1590, stated that "there has to be an engagement in the first place" and, relying on the lack of evidence that the parties "were actually engaged," concluded Li failed to "prove that [] Zhao promised him that she would marry him."
Li subsequently made a motion to vacate the judgment and a motion for a new trial, arguing that a call from the potential client who had wanted to meet Li in China may have been part of a ruse perpetrated by opposing counsel in order to keep Li in China. Also, he argued for the first time that Li had become ill while he was in China and could not attend the trial. The trial court denied Li's motions.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
A. The trial court incorrectly interpreted section 1590
Li contends that the judgment should be reversed because the trial court erred in granting a motion for judgment in concluding that Li needed to show that Zhao had expressed an agreement to marry Li in order to defeat Zhao's motion for judgment. Li contends that the evidence showed that Zhao addressed Li as "'husband,'" Li gave her substantial gifts, and there appeared to be a "close, intimate and steady relationship between the parties." We conclude that the court incorrectly interpreted section 1590 to require an express agreement by Zhao to marry Li in order for Li to recover gifts made "in contemplation of marriage." Li was prejudiced by the court's interpretation because a reasonable trier of fact could find that Zhao's acts and conduct and acceptance of gifts supported an implied promise to marry for purposes of section 1590.
Statutory interpretation is a question of law which we decide de novo. (California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 699.) In statutory construction cases, our fundamental task is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute. (Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, 272.) "We begin by examining the statutory language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning." (Ibid.) If the terms of the statute are unambiguous, we presume the lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain meaning of the language governs. (Id. at p. 272.)
Section 1590 provides that "[w]here either party to a contemplated marriage in this state makes a gift of money or property to the other on the basis or assumption that the marriage will take place, in the event that the donee refuses to enter into the marriage as contemplated or that it is given up by mutual consent, the donor may recover such gift or such part of its value as may, under all of the circumstances of the case, be found by a court or jury to be just."
In interpreting section 1590, the trial court concluded that Li had to show that Zhao had expressly agreed to marry him. But the statute refers to only a "contemplated marriage" and does not require that the donor must show the existence of an express agreement to marry by the donee. (§ 1590.) It also states that the gifts must have been given on the "basis or assumption" that the marriage will take place. (§ 1590.) It does not state that a wedding must be an established certainty. Further, section 1590 allows the donor to recover such gift "as may, under all of the circumstances of the case, be found by a court or jury to be just." (Italics added.) In Stienback v. Halsey (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 213, the plaintiff successfully sued the defendant under section 1590 for recovery of property made to the defendant after she agreed to marry him. On affirming the lower court's judgment, the opinion noted that "[t]he court specifically found, from the facts related, that defendant, by her acts and conduct and the acceptance of gifts, implied a promise to marry 'without further delay' and that it was defendant's intention 'to extract as much property from the plaintiff as possible without, at any time, having any intention of entering into the marriage relation.'" (Id. at p. 219, italics added.) Accordingly, the court's rejection of the "circumstantial evidence of the nature of the hearing all day" was error under the statute.
Li was prejudiced by the court's interpretation because a reasonable trier of fact could find that Zhao's acts and conduct and acceptance of gifts supported an implied promise to marry for purposes of section 1590. The evidence is undisputed, as the trial court noted, that Li hoped to marry Zhao. Li told Hu that Li and Zhao would be married soon and Li told Teng, an employee of Li, that he was going to marry Zhao. The record also shows that Zhao referred to Li as her "'husband'" on a social occasion in Li's presence. They also bought a house together, with Li paying $173,417 and Zhao paying $30,000. That Zhao had told Hu she was not yet "ready" to marry Li because he had not yet given her a wedding gift supports the inference that a marriage was contemplated by the pair. Under these circumstances, Li may have been led to believe by Zhao that she would marry him, and Li may have given gifts to her on the basis or assumption that the marriage would take place. Notwithstanding Zhao's testimony that she had never promised Li that she would marry him, we conclude that the evidence could support the inference that Zhao's acts and conduct and acceptance of gifts implied a promise to marry Li. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting the motion for judgment.
We reverse the judgment. Therefore, we need not address the challenged orders.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded for a new trial. Kewen Li is entitled to costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MALLANO, P. J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, J.
CHANEY, J.