Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ review. Hugo J. Loza, Commissioner. Super. Ct. No. JJV064722.
Thomas John Moholt for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Kathleen Bales-Lange, County Counsel, and John A. Rozum, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
OPINION
Before Wiseman, Acting P.J., Cornell, J. and Franson, J.
Petitioner seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a contested six-month review hearing terminating reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing as to his daughter N.D. He argues he was not provided reasonable mental health services. We will deny the petition.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
Petitioner’s daughter will be referred to by her first and last initials because of the uniqueness of her name. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.401(a)(2).)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
N.D. first came to the attention of the Tulare County Health and Human Services Agency (agency) in April 2010 when she was born with a positive toxicology for amphetamines. Her mother and petitioner’s girlfriend, Rhonda, identified petitioner as N.D.’s father but stated he was not permitted to sign the birth certificate because Rhonda was married to another man.
Petitioner denied a history of drug abuse, stating he had only experimented with marijuana prior to serving four years in the Army. He disclosed that he may be on probation for a vandalism charge. His criminal record revealed he had two arrests for being under the influence of a controlled substance, one in October of 2008 and one in January of 2007, to which he pled no contest.
Petitioner told the investigating social worker, Cynthia Mendes, that he was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). He was receiving mental health counseling through the Veterans Administration (VA) but was not taking medication because it adversely affected him. Petitioner said he was arrested years earlier on a vandalism charge and was ordered to take mental health medication and participate in drug treatment. However, he was not allowed to take his medication while receiving drug treatment. The drug treatment program requirement was subsequently dropped by the court in October 2009.
The agency offered petitioner and Rhonda voluntary services, which they accepted. Their voluntary services plan required them both to submit to random drug testing and to complete a parenting class. Rhonda was additionally required to complete inpatient drug treatment and petitioner was required to continue receiving counseling services through the VA. It was explained to them that N.D. would be taken into protective custody if they failed to comply with their services.
On May 12, 2010, the agency took N.D. into protective custody after Rhonda was arrested for being under the influence of methamphetamine and petitioner was arrested on an outstanding warrant. N.D. was placed into foster care.
The agency filed a dependency petition on N.D.’s behalf pursuant to section 300, alleging Rhonda and petitioner were incapable of caring for N.D. because Rhonda exposed N.D. to drugs in utero and continued to use methamphetamine, petitioner failed to protect N.D. from Rhonda’s drug use and petitioner and Rhonda exposed N.D. to domestic violence.
On May 17, 2010, prior to the detention hearing, the bailiff subdued petitioner in the courthouse lobby because he was loud and inappropriate towards Ms. Mendes. Thereafter, at the detention hearing, the court appointed counsel for petitioner and Rhonda. Both parents entered denials of the section 300 petition and petitioner requested paternity testing. The court deferred ordering paternity testing to give the agency time to inquire if there was an existing paternity judgment. The juvenile court ordered N.D. detained.
On June 24, 2010, at a combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the juvenile court exercised its dependency jurisdiction, ordered N.D. removed from Rhonda’s custody and ordered the agency to provide Rhonda services. Petitioner was still awaiting paternity testing results, but requested visitation. The court denied him reunification services, including visitation, because of his alleged father status but stated the matter would be calendared immediately upon receipt of the paternity test results. The six-month review hearing was set for December 2010.
In late June 2010, paternity test results were released, indicating that petitioner was N.D.’s biological father. In July 2010, the agency filed a motion of paternity in which it recommended petitioner receive weekly supervised visitation, be referred for a drug and alcohol assessment, be subject to random drug testing, and receive domestic violence/anger management counseling. By this time, petitioner and Rhonda were no longer living together and N.D. was receiving methadone to treat her withdrawal symptoms.
On July 6, 2010, at the hearing on paternity, the juvenile court declared petitioner N.D.’s presumed father and ordered her removed from his custody. The court also ordered the agency to provide the services recommended in its motion of paternity. The six-month review hearing remained set for the December date.
Petitioner appealed from the juvenile court’s removal order, which this court affirmed (F060552).
The day after the hearing, petitioner telephoned social worker Irene Martinez who inquired when he was available for visitation. Petitioner stated he did not want visitation, he wanted custody of N.D. He asked “if a child [had] ever been abducted from a visit.” Asked if he was making a threat, petitioner said he was not, he “was just asking.” He argued N.D. should be placed with him. He said he did not want a visit that week but wanted a visit scheduled for the following week. Ms. Martinez advised petitioner that visits would be scheduled twice a week for an hour each time beginning the following week. Petitioner agreed.
During the month of July 2010, the social worker scheduled three visits for petitioner. He did not attend any of them. Several times he asked the social worker how he could terminate his parental rights as he did not believe he had any. He continued to state his belief that N.D. should be returned to his custody and he did not understand why she could not be. Meanwhile, N.D. had been placed with a maternal relative in Los Angeles County and was being transported for the visits.
In late July 2010, the agency filed a section 388 petition asking the court to terminate petitioner’s visits given his failure to attend, threats to abscond with N.D. and the hardship of traveling on N.D. The court set a hearing on the petition for August 4, 2010.
In an addendum report filed for the hearing on the 388 petition, the agency informed the court of petitioner’s erratic behavior during visitation. On July 27, 2010, Ms. Martinez and Barbara Gross, R.N., supervised a visit. Though petitioner was advised not to talk about the case, he persisted in doing so. He said he was going to file a lawsuit because N.D. was on methadone. He asked if the foster parents were being paid to care for N.D. and if so, he said they should be drug tested. During the visit, petitioner became increasingly agitated and asked to terminate the visit so he could contact his attorney. At other times, he said he did not want to terminate the visit and responded positively when Ms. Gross directed his attention to the baby. However, he was unable to sustain his attention toward N.D. Petitioner stayed for the entire visit but, at one point, the security officer cautioned petitioner that he was being verbally aggressive toward Ms. Martinez and he would have to leave if she terminated the visit.
On July 28, 2010, petitioner contacted lead social worker Michael Hauser and questioned N.D.’s placement with a relative, the assessment process, and the investigation that led to N.D.’s removal. He stated numerous times that Ms. Mendes violated his civil and legal rights as a father and lied during her investigation. He accused the agency of kidnapping N.D. from him. He said he would take matters into his own hands to ensure people were held “accountable.” He denied that this was a threat. He asked if he could speak to Ms. Mendes and was told he could not. He said he felt he was getting the “run around” and did not believe the agency should be involved in his or N.D.’s life.
On July 29, 2010, Gloria Solario, a case aide, supervised visitation with the assistance of Barbara Gross. Petitioner held N.D. for a few minutes and then began telling Ms. Solario that he was getting a new attorney and could sue the county for giving N.D. methadone. Ms. Solario attempted several times unsuccessfully to redirect petitioner’s attention to N.D. Meanwhile, he became increasingly loud and uncooperative. He repeatedly stood up abruptly from a seated position, pulled at his pants, and sat down. He clenched his fists and moved his arms about.
Social worker Joel Arevalo was supervising the visit from the next room through a two-way mirror and observed petitioner’s interaction with Ms. Solario and N.D. In addition, the door to the visitation room was slightly open and social worker Melissa Hall could hear petitioner raising his voice and stating N.D. was being given drugs so the agency would get more money. Meanwhile, Ms. Gross was attempting to console N.D. who was crying. Finally, after Ms. Solario told petitioner multiple times that the visit would be cancelled if he did not control his behavior, petitioner pointed his finger toward her face and told her to “Shut Up!” in a threatening manner. At that point, Mr. Arevalo entered the room and informed petitioner the visit was terminated. Petitioner asked “Who the fuck are you?” By this time, the police had been summoned. Petitioner continued to argue but finally agreed to leave the building. As he did, Ms. Hall was also leaving to make contact with the police in the parking lot. Petitioner walked abruptly behind her, causing her to feel threatened. She positioned herself behind a vehicle and warned him to get away from her. At that point, a police officer arrived and told petitioner to stay where he was. Petitioner had a pocket knife in his pocket with a blade estimated to be approximately four inches long with a red swastika on it. Several times while ranting about the agency, petitioner called Mr. Arevalo a “wetback.” Petitioner was allowed to leave on his bicycle.
On August 3, 2010, the agency filed a section 388 petition asking the juvenile court to order petitioner to participate in a psychological evaluation as part of his reunification plan and as a precondition to resuming visitation. On that same date, Ms. Mendes petitioned the court for a restraining order against petitioner. In her declaration, she stated petitioner threatened her repeatedly, accusing her of lying. He called the agency office several times a day, asking to speak to her. She said he filed a civil rights complaint against her, accusing her of being Hispanic and causing him problems and stating he is a skinhead and a national socialist. She said he identified himself as being affiliated with the skinhead gang and had gang paraphernalia in his possession.
On August 4, 2010, the juvenile court issued a temporary restraining order and suspended petitioner’s visits pending further order of the court. The court set a hearing for August 12, 2010, to consider the section 388 petitions and the permanent restraining order.
On August 12, 2010, the juvenile court convened a hearing on the section 388 petitions and the restraining order. After petitioner informed the court he needed new counsel, the court cleared the court room and conducted a Marsden hearing. Petitioner told the court his attorney, Mr. Moholt, was ineffective in helping him regain custody of N.D. Mr. Moholt told the court petitioner wanted him to file a restraining order against the agency but he could not find any basis for doing so. Other than that, he said, petitioner had not made any requests that he denied. Petitioner asked the court either to appoint him new counsel or allow him to represent himself. The court advised petitioner of the consequences of representing himself, relieved Mr. Moholt and reconvened the hearing.
People v. Marsen (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).
Back in session, the court again advised petitioner that, in representing himself, he would be held to the same standards and rules of evidence as counsel and asked if he understood. Petitioner responded and the following exchange occurred:
“PETITIONER: So I can lie like they’ve lied?
“THE COURT: Sir, answer my question.
“PETITIONER: I’m asking
“THE COURT: That is not appropriate.
“PETITIONER: Do you want me to leave or--because I mean you’ve already taken
“THE COURT: Sir, do you understand my question?
“PETITIONER: I don’t understand. I’m leaving. Sorry.
“THE COURT: Mr. Moholt, I’m going to call you back. The [c]ourt has a question as to whether or not you believe [petitioner] is competent at this point
“PETITIONER: Well, I don’t believe the [c]ourt is competent.
“THE COURT: Excuse me, sir. At this point to assist counsel in his defense and participate in these proceedings.
“MR. MOHOLT: Your Honor, I’m uncertain; however, [petitioner] will I’m sure not agree that he is incompetent, and I feel I can represent his interests. He has given me enough information that I can represent his interests.
“PETITIONER: It’s too late at this point.
“MR. MOHOLT: That’s all I can tell the [c]ourt.
“PETITIONER: It’s always too late to do anything, because I always have a different attorney and my rights are always
“THE COURT: Sir, can you stop talking, please.
“PETITIONER: I can leave.
“THE COURT: I’m not ordering you to leave.
“PETITIONER: I would like to leave. I would like to be with my daughter.
“THE COURT: The [c]ourt is vacating the appointment of the order relieving Mr. Moholt at this time. It does not appear to the [c]ourt at this time--”
At that point petitioner left the courtroom and did not return. The court found petitioner was not competent to represent himself.
The court proceeded to address the section 388 petitions and the restraining order. Mr. Moholt informed the court that petitioner was being seen by a psychiatrist at the VA and had recently been prescribed medication. He did not know if petitioner was taking it. He also said petitioner had spoken to Bob Brown at the agency and said he would sign a release so Mr. Brown could discuss petitioner’s case with the VA psychiatrist. Mr. Moholt felt that should satisfy the agency’s concerns with respect to a psychological evaluation but county counsel advised the court that the agency requested an evaluation through the agency’s Special Case Investigations Unit (SCIU). The court granted the agency’s request for a psychological evaluation. The court also granted the agency’s request to suspend visitation with discretion to place the matter on calendar after the psychological evaluation was completed. The court also issued an order restraining petitioner from having contact with Ms. Mendes and allowing him contact with only four designated agency employees, including Mr. Brown and petitioner’s social worker, Jennifer Decker.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court stated its understanding that petitioner was participating in Veterans Court, which the court explained was a specialty criminal court that assisted veterans when they had mental health issues. The court asked whether there would be any objection to the court providing the presiding judge of the Veterans Court with sealed copies of the restraining orders in petitioner’s case so that the Veterans Court could better serve petitioner. Mr. Moholt objected so the juvenile court stated it would not pursue that avenue.
On August 20, 2010, Jennifer Decker petitioned the juvenile court for a restraining order after petitioner threatened her if the court did not give him custody of N.D. Based on his statements, she felt he might attempt to harm her and/or her children. The court issued an order restraining petitioner from having contact with Ms. Decker.
On August 31, 2010, the juvenile court conducted a second Marsden hearing and denied the motion. That same day, petitioner met with John Ikerd, his agency contact person. They reviewed petitioner’s reunification plan and Mr. Ikerd gave petitioner a copy of the case plan. Mr. Ikerd summarized petitioner’s services in a letter. Petitioner was required to submit to random drug testing and complete domestic violence and drug/alcohol assessments and a psychological evaluation through the SCIU. Mr. Ikerd also reminded petitioner that “[o]n July 6, 2010, the [c]ourt ordered [him] to continue to receive and participate in counseling services through the Veterans Administration.” The appellate record does not reflect that the court made such an order.
In his letter to petitioner, Mr. Ikerd also summarized petitioner’s progress in completing his reunification plan. Mr. Ikerd stated that petitioner registered in the drug testing system and had an appointment in September 2010 for a domestic violence assessment. Petitioner completed a drug/alcohol assessment and was referred for outpatient substance abuse treatment through New Heights outpatient program. However, petitioner contacted the evaluator at New Heights and stated he could not participate in the program because of a conflict with his medications. He said he was enrolled at the VA for concurrent treatment and stated he had the court’s orders modified to allow him to receive services through the VA. Mr. Ikerd stated in his letter, “This has not occurred” and told petitioner “ you are still required to complete a substance abuse treatment program.”
On September 9, 2010, the SCIU met to discuss conducting petitioner’s psychological evaluation. After reviewing petitioner’s behavior with the agency staff, the SCIU decided it could not conduct the evaluation and attempted to arrange an evaluation through a private psychologist. However, she was unavailable. As a result, the SCIU advised the juvenile court in a letter dated October 4 that it would not conduct the evaluation.
In October 2010, Mr. Ikerd received petitioner’s domestic violence assessment. In a letter dated October 14, the assessor stated she did not find any evidence that petitioner is a perpetrator of domestic violence but questioned whether he might be using drugs given his erratic behavior. Petitioner told the assessor of his bipolar disorder but stated he was not receiving treatment or medication for the disorder. The assessor recommended that petitioner be required to drug test and if the results were negative, that he be referred for a psychiatric evaluation.
In its six-month report, the agency recommended the juvenile court terminate petitioner and Rhonda’s reunification services. Rhonda had not complied with any of her services and had not visited N.D. since the day of detention. Meanwhile, N.D. had been taken off of methadone and was reportedly doing well but was delayed because of her exposure to drugs. She had bonded to her foster parents and they were committed to adopting her.
The agency also reported that petitioner was not in compliance with the substance abuse treatment and drug testing requirements of his case plan. In addition, the agency reported that, on June 24, 2010, the court ordered petitioner to participate in VA mental health counseling and receive his medication. The record does not reflect that the court issued such an order on that date.
The agency further reported that, on August 31, 2010, petitioner signed a release for the agency to obtain medical information from the VA but the VA required additional consent forms which petitioner refused to provide. Consequently, the agency did not know whether petitioner was in compliance with his mental health counseling. After petitioner declined treatment at New Heights, he was given a referral for another assessment but did not keep the appointment. He was referred to Dr. Middleton on November 9, 2010, for a psychological evaluation and Dr. Middleton was contacted on November 17, 2010.
The agency further reported that Mr. Ikerd met monthly with petitioner beginning in August 2010 to review his case plan but petitioner refused to sign it. During their meetings, he complained that his civil rights were violated and the agency was not helping him reunify with N.D. During their meeting in September, petitioner complained that he had not completed his psychological evaluation and refused to drug test, asking “What’s the point?” He said a VA psychiatrist managed his medication and he last saw the psychiatrist on July 29. He refused to sign a release so the agency could contact his psychiatrist. Petitioner continued to be argumentative and uncooperative with Mr. Ikerd. During an October meeting, petitioner called Mr. Ikerd a “dickhead, ” and a “liar.” Mr. Ikerd had to terminate their telephone conversation in November 2010 after petitioner told Mr. Ikerd Rhonda was prostituting and she might give Mr. Ikerd a “good deal.” Throughout this time, petitioner also demanded to know N.D.’s confidential location and had to be told to stop contacting family members in an attempt to locate her.
On November 29, 2010, petitioner met with psychologist Thomas P. Middleton, Ph.D. Petitioner told Dr. Middleton that he was not taking any psychotropic medication and that he was being treated at the VA for adult ADHD. He had been prescribed Adderall but did not take the medication consistently. He did not have a prescription for Adderrall but was taking samples that had been given to him. He denied participating in any mental health services in the community and denied any inpatient psychiatric treatment. He did not mention having been diagnosed with bipolar disorder. Petitioner denied any use of drugs other than occasional use of marijuana in the past. He said he occasionally drank alcohol. He was unemployed and homeless at times. At the time of the evaluation, he was living with his mother.
Dr. Middleton issued a written report of his findings and recommendations. He diagnosed petitioner with severe bipolar disorder with psychotic features, stating that petitioner showed evidence of mania and depression and reported a variety of delusional beliefs. He diagnosed petitioner with ADHD based on the history provided but stated that petitioner’s symptoms “clearly exceed those that would be associated with a history of ADHD.” He also diagnosed petitioner with unspecified substance abuse because of the uncertainty surrounding petitioner’s drug use.
Dr. Middleton recommended petitioner receive ongoing individual counseling to assist him in stabilizing his behavior. He also stated petitioner needed appropriate medication to control his bipolar symptoms. He did not believe Adderall was sufficient and opined petitioner may need a mood stabilizer, antidepressant and antipsychotic medication. However, Dr. Middleton said he would defer to petitioner’s psychiatrist to prescribe the appropriate medication. Dr. Middleton stated that petitioner showed “little ability to participate with counsel and cooperate with any orders by the court.”
Dr. Middleton advised that petitioner’s competency may need to be evaluated if he were unable to participate in mental health treatment and cooperate with his attorney. He stated petitioner would likely require ongoing mental health services for the rest of his life and may need a conservatorship. Finally, he said petitioner was not capable of caring for himself much less a child.
On December 8, 2010, the juvenile court set a contested six-month review hearing for December 21, 2010. Mr. Moholt advised the court petitioner would be challenging the reasonableness of services.
On December 21, 2010, the juvenile court conducted the contested six-month review hearing. The only evidence presented was the agency’s reports. Mr. Moholt informed the court that he had just received Dr. Middleton’s report that day and argued that the agency’s delay in obtaining a psychological evaluation was unreasonable. Further, Mr. Moholt argued that had petitioner received psychotropic medication earlier he may have been more compliant with his case plan. Minor’s counsel argued that petitioner was receiving mental health services through the VA as part of his reunification plan and there was no reason to believe he was not competent to comply with his services plan. County counsel asked the court to consider petitioner’s refusal to sign the required release of medical information, which prevented the agency from inquiring what services he was receiving from the VA. County counsel also argued that the agency was not unreasonable in refusing to conduct the psychological evaluation through its SCIU nor did it unreasonably delay in scheduling an evaluation with Dr. Middleton.
Following argument, the juvenile court found petitioner was provided reasonable services, including mental health services but failed to comply by not providing the proper releases. The court terminated petitioner and Rhonda’s reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. This petition ensued.
Rhonda did not file a writ petition.
DISCUSSION
Petitioner contends the juvenile court erred in finding he was provided reasonable services. His argument is as follows. The agency misinformed the juvenile court that he was receiving mental health services through the VA. As a result, the court did not properly weigh the delay in obtaining Dr. Middleton’s psychological evaluation. In other words, had the court known that petitioner was not court-ordered to participate in VA services, it may have found he was not provided reasonable mental health services given the lateness of Dr. Middleton’s report.
Real party in interest argues petitioner waived his right to challenge whether VA mental health services were part of his reunification services plan by not raising it at the six-month review hearing. We do not find waiver. Nevertheless, we find no merit to petitioner’s argument.
When the juvenile court removes a child from parental custody, it must provide the parent a plan of reunification designed to reunite the family. (In re Joanna Y. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 433, 438.) The specific services comprising the plan are set forth in the dispositional order. (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) The agency is expected to assist the parent in accessing the services ordered and the parent is presumed able to follow a reasonable services plan. (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414; In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 415.) A parent has assented to the terms of the plan unless the plan is modified by order of the juvenile court (§ 388) or by a reviewing court following direct appeal. (In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 47.) Consequently, when the juvenile court decides whether reasonable services were provided at the review of dependency hearings, the court is assessing the reasonableness of the department's efforts to assist the parent in complying with the plan rather than the content of the plan.
We review the juvenile court’s reasonable services finding for substantial evidence. (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 971.) In so doing, we defer to the trier of fact and have no power to weigh the evidence or to resolve conflicts in, or make inferences or deductions from the evidence. (In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 199.) Further, we do not review the court’s reasoning for its ruling. (Davey v. Southern Pacific Co. (1897) 116 Cal. 325, 329.) Rather, it is judicial action, not judicial reasoning, which is the proper subject of appellate review. (El Centro Grain Co. v. Bank of Italy, Etc. (1932) 123 Cal.App.564, 567.)
Substantial evidence is evidence that is “‘reasonable, credible and of solid value’” that would allow a reasonable trier of fact to reach the same conclusion as the juvenile court. (In re Christina A. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1073, 1080.) Where there is any substantial evidence to support the court’s order, contradicted or not, we must affirm the dependency court’s order. (In re Tracy Z. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 107, 113.) The appellant has the burden of showing the finding or order is not supported by substantial evidence. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.)
We conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s reasonable services finding. Petitioner’s mental health diagnoses were known from the inception of the court’s intervention and he represented that he was receiving mental health counseling through the VA. He agreed, as part of a voluntary family maintenance plan, to continue receiving those services. For reasons not reflected in the appellate record, VA mental health counseling was not incorporated into petitioner’s reunification plan ordered into effect at the dispositional hearing in July 2010. However, petitioner did not challenge the content of his reunification plan in his appeal (F060552) or file a section 388 petition requesting a modification of his reunification plan to include VA mental health counseling.
Moreover, once the reunification plan was implemented, petitioner continued to represent to the court that he was receiving VA mental health services. At the hearing on the section 388 petitions in August, petitioner informed the court through his attorney that he was under the care of a VA psychiatrist and had been prescribed medication. In September, he told the substance abuse evaluator at New Heights that he was enrolled in a concurrent program at the VA.
Further, petitioner in essence acquiesced to the requirement that he participate in VA mental health services by failing to refute it. For example, Mr. Ikerd repeatedly told petitioner that he was court-ordered to comply with that service yet petitioner never sought clarification or objected to it. Neither did his attorney. Consequently, the agency’s report referencing it was entered into evidence without objection at the six-month review hearing. Moreover, petitioner’s attorney listened while the court and counsel made repeated references to the court’s order that petitioner participate in VA mental health counseling without objecting.
Understandably, real party in interest argues petitioner waived his right to challenge the issue of VA services by not raising it before the juvenile court. Real party in interest would be correct if petitioner were claiming the court erred in admitting the evidence. However, that is not petitioner’s argument. Rather, he claims the court’s reliance on that erroneous evidence caused it to minimize the significance of the agency’s delay in scheduling the psychological evaluation.
Petitioner’s argument is faulty for several reasons. First, whether court-ordered or not, the evidence was that petitioner was receiving VA mental health services for his mental health problems. This is what he continually represented to the court and, since he refused to allow the agency access to his VA records, there was no way to determine otherwise. Further, there was every reason to believe the VA mental health services were, as the court noted, as good as, if not better than, those available through the county. Consequently, according to the evidence, petitioner was receiving adequate mental health services.
With respect to the psychological evaluation, the court commented that the “SCIU took a long time to evolve.” It also acknowledged that the delay in receiving Dr. Middleton’s report left no time to act on his recommendations. However, the court also stated that Dr. Middleton affirmed what the court knew in June 2010; i.e. that petitioner needed mental health counseling. Implicit in that statement is that the court would not have ordered different or additional services based on Dr. Middleton’s report. In addition, the court determined the agency made reasonable efforts to evaluate petitioner’s compliance but that he was uncooperative.
In light of the evidence and giving due deference to the juvenile court and its ruling, we affirm the court’s finding petitioner was provided reasonable mental health services.
On a final note, it strikes this court that petitioner may not have been an accurate historian when it came to reporting his participation in treatment especially given the severity of his mental illness. However, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s reasonable services finding and petitioner has failed to show otherwise.
DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is denied. This opinion is final forthwith as to this court.