To be effective, an amendment of a prior act ordinarily must be expressed. Amendments by implication, like repeals by implication, are not favored and will not be upheld in doubtful cases.'"Tharaldson v. Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, 225 N.W.2d at 45 ( quoting Sands' Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol. 1A, Section 22.13, at 139 and 149 (4th Ed. 1972)). See City of Fargo v. Little Brown Jug, 468 N.W.2d 392 (N.D. 1991); State of North Dakota by Workmen's Compensation Bureau v. Clary, 389 N.W.2d 347 (N.D. 1986); Walsvik v. Brandel, 298 N.W.2d 375 (N.D. 1980); Grace Lutheran Church v. North Dakota Employment Sec. Bureau, 294 N.W.2d 767 (N.D. 1980); City of Grand Forks v. Bd. of County Commr's of Grand Forks, 284 N.W.2d 420 (N.D. 1979); Kessler v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Fessenden, 87 N.W.2d 743 (N.D. 1958); Coulter v. Ramberg, 79 N.D. 208, 55 N.W.2d 516 (1952). The practice of repealing or amending a piece of legislation by implication is disfavored in North Dakota and there is an established presumption against it.

In Shark Brothers, Inc. v. Cass County, 256 N.W.2d 701 (N.D. 1977), we explained that application of the exhaustion doctrine depends upon a bundle of considerations, including whether the issues need the expertise of an administrative body, the interpretation of a statute, or the resolution of a pure question of law. See also Kessler v. Board of Educ. of City of Fessenden, 87 N.W.2d 743 (N.D. 1958) (no requirement for exhaustion of administrative remedies where construction of statute involved pure legal question customarily decided by courts). Shark Brothers acknowledges that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a rigid prerequisite for a statutory interpretation that does not infringe on an agency's factual decisionmaking process.

In Shark Brothers, Inc. v. Cass County, 256 N.W.2d 701 (N.D. 1977), we explained that application of the exhaustion doctrine depends upon a bundle of considerations, including whether the issues need the expertise of an administrative body, the interpretation of a statute, or the resolution of a pure question of law. See alsoKessler v. Board of Educ. of City of Fessenden, 87 N.W.2d 743 (N.D. 1958) (no requirement for exhaustion of administrative remedies where construction of statute involved pure legal question customarily decided by courts). Shark Brothers acknowledges that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a rigid prerequisite for a statutory interpretation that does not infringe on an agency's factual decisionmaking process.

In Shark Brothers, Inc. v. Cass County, 256 N.W.2d 701 (N.D. 1977), we explained that application of the exhaustion doctrine depends upon a bundle of considerations, including whether the issues need the expertise of an administrative body, the interpretation of a statute, or the resolution of a pure question of law. See also Kessler v. Board of Educ. of City of Fessenden, 87 N.W.2d 743 (N.D. 1958) (no requirement for exhaustion of administrative remedies where construction of statute involved pure legal question customarily decided by courts). Shark Brothers acknowledges that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a rigid prerequisite for a statutory interpretation that does not infringe on an agency's factual decisionmaking process.

The language under Section 15-22-17, N.D.C.C., which provides that the State Superintendent's decision is "subject to appropriate remedies in the courts" does not authorize an appeal from the State Superintendent's decision. That language merely declares that separate proceedings may be brought in the courts for an appropriate remedy. See Kessler v. Board of Education, 87 N.W.2d 743 (N.D. 1958); Zenith School District No. 32 v. Peterson, 81 N.W.2d 764 (N.D. 1957). When the Legislature intends to create a right of appeal from a decision of a governmental body to the district court it is capable of doing so in a clear and unequivocal manner.

E. E. Bach Millwork Co. v. Meisner Co., 228 N.W.2d 904 (N.D. 1975); Newby v. Johnston's Fuel Liners, Inc., 122 N.W.2d 156 (N.D. 1963). See Kessler v. Board of Education of City of Fessenden, 87 N.W.2d 743 (N.D. 1958). If prosecution of a suit by the plaintiff would protect the defendant from further harassment or lawsuits by other claimants to the same dispute, then the plaintiff is the real party in interest. See: Mason-Rust v. Laborers' International Union, Local 42, 435 F.2d 939, 943-945 (8th Cir. 1970); Archer v. Musick, 147 Neb. 1018, 25 N.W.2d 908 (1947); and Home Indemnity Co. v. State Bank of Fort Dodge, 233 Iowa 103, 8 N.W.2d 757 (1943).

The order of the district court denying the writ was reversed. See also, Dakota National Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Insurance, supra, and Kessler v. Board of Education of City of Fessenden, 87 N.W.2d 743 (N.D. 1958), where the Court was required to interpret the statutes in question but nevertheless proceeded with a writ of mandamus. Thus, North Dakota case history shows that the court has not always hesitated to interpret statutes, the construction of which were in dispute, in mandamus cases.

Although repeals by implication are not favored by this court, a later statute may operate to repeal an earlier one if the statutes are irreconcilable and inconsistent. Kessler v. Board of Education of City of Fessenden, 87 N.W.2d 743 (N.D. 1958); State ex rel. State Farmers' Mut. Hail Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 18 N.D. 583, 120 N.W. 878 (1909). A statute may repeal prior inconsistent legislation, whether expressly declaring such repeal or not.

The intention of the Legislative Assembly in enacting a statute must be ascertained from the language of the law, and where such language is clear and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the intention of the Legislature clearly expressed. Brenna v. Hjelle, 161 N.W.2d 356 (N.D. 1968); City of Fargo v. Annexation Review Commission, 148 N.W.2d 338 (N.D. 1966); Kessler v. Board of Education of City of Fessenden, 87 N.W.2d 743 (N.D. 1958). We therefore hold that Section 32-19-07 clearly indicates that the intention of the Legislature was to prevent deficiency judgments in the event of foreclosure, except as provided by Sections 32-19-04 and 32-19-06, North Dakota Century Code.

This court has held that the intent of the Legislative Assembly in the enactment of law is to be ascertained primarily from the language used. State ex rel. Linde v. Taylor, 33 N.D. 76, 156 N.W. 561, L.R.A. 1918B, 156 (1916); Coulter v. Ramberg, 79 N.D. 208, 55 N.W.2d 516 (1952); Kessler v. Board of Education of Fessenden, 87 N.W.2d 743 (N.D. 1958); Salzseider v. Brunsdale, 94 N.W.2d 502 (N.D. 1959). In order to determine whether the Legislative Assembly in 1961 had some idea of using the word "hospital" in a limited manner, we have examined all of the available committee and other reports as they relate to the consideration and enactment of this law.