It is not necessary to wander over the whole domain of facts and law developed by the case and involved in the requested findings. It is sufficient if the facts found and the law cited adequately cover the material points involved in the case. Kershbaum v. London Guaranty Accident Co., 286 Pa. 213; Athens National Bank v. Ridgeway Tp., 393 Pa. 479; Crew Levick Co. v. Philadelphia Investment Building Loan Assn., 177 A. 498. The cases cited so far were actions at law, but the analogy appears to be carried through in causes in equity.
Error assigned, inter alia, was judgment, quoting record. Reese H. Harris, of O'Malley, Hill, Harris Harris, for appellant. โ This policy does not provide that it will cover a sale to one without rating if his account is guaranteed by one with the rating: National Aniline Chemical Co. v. American Credit-Indemnity Co., 228 Pa. 588; Kershbaum v. Guarantee Accident Co., 286 Pa. 213. Installation of work in a building does not make the owner a "purchaser" or a "debtor": Schwartz v. Whelan, 295 Pa. 425; Vulcanite Portland Cement Co. v. Allison, 220 Pa. 382; Kyle v. Graham, 46 Pa. Super. 6.
True, some of the defendant's requests were not categorically answered. Where, as here, however, the controlling questions are discussed and set forth in the general opinion, specific answers to the requests are not required: Kuhn v. Buhl, 251 Pa. 348; Com. v. School Dist. of Altoona, 241 Pa. 224; Com. v. Monongahela Co., 216 Pa. 108. It would be an unnecessary burden for the trial court to specifically answer every request that might be suggested, whether pertinent or not. See Kershbaum v. London G. A. Co., 286 Pa. 213, 217. Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that the findings of facts in such case are entitled to the same weight as the verdict of a jury: McDonald Construction Co. v. Gill et al., 285 Pa. 305. The defendant township has eighty-eight miles of public highways, which, by reason of hills and streams, are expensive to maintain.
To clear up some disputed matters when further proceedings are had in the court below we shall refer to several other points raised and argued on the appeal. (1) The Act of April 22, 1874, P.L. 109, does not require the court to specifically answer all requests for findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by counsel: Kershbaum v. LondonGuarantee Accident Co., 286 Pa. 213, 133 A. 229. (2) As the policy contained a facility of payment clause, authorizing the company to make payment to any relative by blood or marriage of the insured, or to any other person appearing to the company to be equitably entitled to the same, by reason of having incurred expense on behalf of the insured for her burial, or for any other purpose, the filing of proofs of death by the husband of the insured, who afterwards took out letters of administration on her estate, will be deemed sufficient where the defendant did not ask for additional proofs and raised no objection to the payment of the claim on this ground.
The Act of April 22, 1874, P.L. 109 (12 Pa.C.S.A. ยง 689), as amended July 10, 1935, P.L. 640 (repealed as to Philadelphia County by the Act of June 25, 1937, P.L. 2090), relating to trials by a judge without a jury in civil cases, provides in section 2 as follows: "The decision of the court shall be in writing, and, if requested by counsel for either party for the purposes of filing exceptions or for the taking of an appeal, shall state separately and distinctly the facts found, the answers to any points submitted in writing by counsel and the conclusions of law. . . . . ." In Kershbaum v.London Guarantee Accident Co., 286 Pa. 213, 217, 133 A. 299, where the Act of 1874 was considered, the appellant, as here, complained that its request for findings of fact and conclusions of law were not separately and distinctly answered. The Supreme Court held that this was not necessary if the facts found adequately covered all the material points involved in the case.