Opinion
F087551
08-07-2024
In re Sp.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. C.T., Defendant and Appellant. KERN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Brian Bitker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Kern County. No. JD134632-02, Susan M. Gill, Judge.
Brian Bitker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
THE COURT [*]
In this juvenile dependency case, C.T. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court's order denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition requesting reunification services and the order terminating her parental rights pursuant to section 366.26 as to her minor daughter Sp.R. After reviewing the record, mother's court-appointed counsel informed this court he could find no arguable issues to raise on mother's behalf. This court granted mother leave to personally file a letter setting forth good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844.) Mother filed a letter but failed to make such a showing. (Ibid.) Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
In addition to the juvenile court's order denying her section 388 petition and the order terminating parental rights, which were both made on January 24, 2024, mother indicates in her notice of appeal she is appealing from several other orders, including the order removing Sp.R. from her custody, and orders that were made in January 2015, June 2023, and October 2023. The notice of appeal is only timely as to the orders made at the January 24, 2024, hearing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.405(a)(1), 8.406(a)(1).) Accordingly, we do not have jurisdiction to review the other orders mother lists in her notice of appeal. (In re Elizabeth G. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1327, 1331.)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The proceedings underlying this appeal were initiated in June 2021 when it was reported mother injured then six-year-old Sp.R. and her sibling Sy.R. with a knife and burned them to "ward off demons." Mother was arrested and taken into custody, and the Kern County Department of Human Services (department) filed a juvenile dependency petition on behalf of Sp.R., as well as Sy.R. and her other sibling D.T., who are not subjects of this appeal. During the department's investigation, Sp.R. reported feeling unsafe at home and afraid mother would hurt her again.
On June 17, 2021, the court ordered the children detained from mother. On November 12, 2021, mother was appointed a guardian ad litem. On January 19, 2022, the court found the children came within the court's jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (j) (abuse of siblings) and continued the matter for disposition. Mother was ordered to submit to two psychological evaluations to determine if she could benefit from reunification services.
The specific facts found true, as amended by the juvenile court, as to the section 300, subdivision (b) allegation read: "The child, [Sp.R.], has suffered, or there is substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness by the inability of the mother ... to provide regular care to the child due to the mother's mental illness. On March 25, 2021, the mother was driving a vehicle with her children in the car, going 101 miles per hour, law enforcement put a spike strip on the road as the mother had led law enforcement on a high speed chase. Despite her tires being blown and law enforcement demanding she exit the vehicle, she remained in her vehicle for 30 minutes with the children. She was subsequently placed on a 5150 Psychiatric hold at the the San Bernardino County Hospitals. On June 14, 2021, the mother could not engage in rational conversations or answer questions about current circumstances. The mother stabs the child and the child's sibling, [Sy.R.], with a knife and burns them to ward off demons. The mother wants the children to live with her in the County jail. The mother's ongoing mental health illness places the child at risk." The specific facts found true supporting the section 300, subdivision (j) allegation outline a previous dependency proceeding from 2015 initiated on behalf of the children due to mother's physical abuse and failure to protect the children due to mother's mental illness and substance abuse. Mother successfully reunified with the children and was granted sole physical custody.
The court granted several continuances of the disposition hearing for various reasons, including mother being incarcerated and having trouble scheduling the psychological evaluations, mother's request to prepare to contest bypass recommendations by the department, father's absence due to a medical quarantine, and because a conflict of interest developed for minors' counsel . For these reasons, the disposition hearing was not conducted until November 15, 2022.
Ahead of the hearing, the department was recommending mother be bypassed for reunification services based on the psychological evaluators' reports that mother would not benefit from them. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(2).) Originally, the department also asserted mother was incarcerated and providing services would be detrimental to the children, (§ 361.5, subd. (e)(1)), but by the time of the continued hearing, mother had been released.
At the hearing, the juvenile court adjudged the children dependents of the court and removed them from mother's custody. The court declined to make determinations, however, as to whether a bypass provision applied, finding the issue was "moot" as the proceedings were nearing the 18-month mark. Rather, the court simply declined to order mother reunification services. The court set a section 366.26 hearing for Sp.R. and Sy.R. The court ordered another planned permanent living arrangement for D.T.
Mother subsequently filed a petition for extraordinary writ, arguing the court erred by denying mother reunification services. In C.T. v. Superior Court (Mar. 2, 2023, F085283) and In re D.T. (July 7, 2023, F085285), this court directed the juvenile court to vacate its orders that reunification services would not be provided as to all three children and setting a section 366.26 hearing as to Sp.R. and Sy.R. and conduct a new dispositional hearing. The remittitur was issued in case No. F085283 on April 3, 2023, and in case No. F085285 on July 7, 2023.
The disposition hearing after remittiturs issued was conducted on October 5, 2023. Mother had been incarcerated again since February 2023, and it was reported her earliest release date was in February 2024. The court again adjudged the children dependents pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j) and ordered them removed from mother. The court ordered that mother would not receive family reunification services because though she was incarcerated, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that the children came within section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1), in that services would be detrimental to the children. The court set a section 366.26 hearing as to Sp.R. As to Sy.R. the court ordered placement with a fit and willing relative, and as to D.T., another planned permanent living arrangement.
Mother was sentenced to a prison term of two years for attempted robbery.
Mother filed a petition for extraordinary writ as to Sp.R., contending the court erred by improperly denying mother's request for a continuance of the disposition hearing after the remittitur. In C.T. v. Superior Court (Dec. 11, 2023, F087016), this court denied mother's writ petition. The remittitur was issued on January 12, 2024.
Mother also filed an appeal regarding Sy.R. and D.T., asserting mother should have been ordered reunification services as to them because no section 366.26 hearing was set. In In re D.T. (July 9, 2024, F087018), this court affirmed the juvenile court's orders.
The department's section 366.26 report dated January 9, 2024, recommended parental rights be terminated as to Sp.R. and that adoption be ordered as her permanent plan. The report indicated that Sp.R. had been with her current care provider since October 1, 2021, and Sp.R.'s care provider wished to adopt her. The care provider planned on continuing visits between Sp.R. and her siblings, who were placed in different homes, and her paternal grandmother. The report further indicated mother had visited Sp.R. a total of 12 times out of a possible 117 opportunities to visit. One was cancelled due to mother arriving late, two were cancelled due to mother not showing, and the rest of the visits were cancelled because the children did not want to attend and had consistently stated they were afraid of mother. Sp.R. reported she was happy with her care provider and wanted to be adopted by her.
On January 17, 2024, mother filed a section 388 petition requesting reunification services; she alleged she had been released from custody on January 5, 2024, and was enrolled in a residential treatment facility. The court ordered a hearing on mother's petition to coincide with the section 366.26 hearing for Sp.R.
On January 24, 2024, mother was personally present, along with her attorney and her guardian ad litem. The juvenile court first heard argument regarding mother's section 388 petition and stated there was no evidence it was in Sp.R.'s best interests to have any further efforts to reunify with mother, citing the "substantial trauma" Sp.R. had endured because of mother and her resistance to seeing mother. The court moved on to the section 366.26 issues and found notice was proper. Mother's counsel entered an objection to the recommendation to terminate parental rights but offered no evidence, authority, or argument. The court ordered adoption as Sp.R.'s permanent plan and terminated parental rights.
DISCUSSION
An appealed-from judgment or order is presumed correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) It is the appellant's burden to raise claims of reversible error or other defect and present argument and authority on each point made. If the appellant fails to do so, the appeal may be dismissed. (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994.) As we explain, dismissal is appropriate in the present case.
Mother begins her letter by stating the reasons she believes the dependency proceedings were initiated-that one of her children who was not the subject of any of the underlying proceedings was abused by his father-suggesting that she and her children were unjustly involved and that there was no reason for the department to intervene in her or Sp.R.'s lives. She denies having mental health issues and that she injured the children. She also raises several concerns with how her attorney handled hearings throughout the case, as well as complaints about how a previous dependency case was conducted, and at one point she asserts the department did not do enough to keep Sp.R. and Sy.R. in the same placement. Here, the only orders mother has timely appealed from are the order denying her section 388 petition and the order terminating her parental rights at a section 366.26 hearing. Mother's comments on events leading to the children's adjudication as dependents or complaints from previous hearings or dependency cases amount to attempts to challenge findings and orders that have long become final and are therefore not properly before this court. (Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1018 [appeal from the most recent order in a dependency matter may not challenge earlier orders for which the time to file an appeal has passed].)
A few times throughout her letter, mother takes issue with the original allegation in the dependency petition that she had been diagnosed with schizophrenia. We note this allegation was stricken by the juvenile court.
Mother also makes assertions about services in which she has participated, including attending therapy, completing a residential substance abuse program, parenting classes, and anger management classes. Mother does not provide dates for when she completed these services, but because her section 388 petition included proof she had enrolled in similar services on January 5, 2024, we can presume she completed the services after the January 24, 2024, hearing. Such information is not appropriate for us to consider on appeal. (See In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 400 [appellate courts must not receive and consider postjudgment evidence never before the juvenile court to reverse the judgment, absent rare and compelling circumstances].) Throughout her letter, mother also includes several asserted facts not contained in the record on appeal, including statements regarding her relationship with Sp.R. and representations that Sp.R. did not understand what adoption meant and that she wanted to go home to mother, which we similarly cannot consider. (See ibid. [generally, a reviewing court may not consider evidence that is outside the record on appeal and not considered by the trial court].)
Even if we could consider the above assertions, to the extent mother offers them to argue the court erred by denying her section 388 petition or by terminating parental rights, she has not furnished a valid legal argument supported by appropriate authorities as to why they constitute a basis for reversing the juvenile court's orders, like, for example, demonstrating the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her petition or pointing to evidence that demonstrates as a matter of law that an exception to termination of parental rights applies.
Finally, mother briefly accuses Judge Gill of being biased against her and county counsel of lying in court but makes no citation to the record or to other evidence to support her allegations, nor can we find any from our review of the record.
In sum, we conclude mother has failed to make a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists. Further, although we are not required to do so, we have reviewed the record as it relates to the January 24, 2024, hearing and have found no arguable issues. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
[*]Before Franson, Acting P. J., Meehan, J. and De Santos, J.