Opinion
F076449
08-28-2018
In re S.S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. KERN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. AMANDA G., Defendant and Appellant.
Thomas W. Casa, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mark L. Nations, County Counsel, and Bryan C. Walters, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. JD126398-01)
OPINION
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Raymonda B. Marquez, Judge. Thomas W. Casa, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mark L. Nations, County Counsel, and Bryan C. Walters, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION
When two of S.S.'s younger half-siblings were found wandering near a busy street unattended by any adult and the family residence was found in an uninhabitable state, the Kern County Department of Human Services (department) initiated a dependency proceeding on behalf of S.S. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. Amanda G. (mother) appeals from the dispositional orders of the juvenile court denying mother reunification services for her dependent daughter, S.S., pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), and finding that S.S.'s biological father, Z.S., was S.S.'s presumed father rather than Michael C., who was the father of two of S.S.'s half-siblings. Mother also asserts the juvenile court erred in terminating dependency jurisdiction over S.S. We find no error and affirm the orders of the juvenile court.
Unless otherwise designated, statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Mother's Background
Mother had several older children who were not involved in this dependency proceeding. The other children are in the legal and physical custody of their fathers. Mother entered a mental institution when she was 10 or 11 years old and then entered foster care. Although mother was diagnosed with depression and anxiety, she stopped taking medication she had been prescribed by a physician. Mother was concerned she had Huntington's disease, which ran in her family. Mother abused drugs for over a decade.
2011 Dependency Proceedings
S.S., who was three years old at the time, was placed in protective custody in May 2011 when the Kern County Sheriff's Department conducted a welfare check and found mother intoxicated while S.S. was in mother's care. Mother was placed in custody and later tested positive for methamphetamine. A section 300 petition was filed and S.S. was detained at the conclusion of an uncontested detention hearing.
Mother identified Z.S., who lived in New Mexico, as S.S.'s alleged father. In June 2011, Z.S. filed a statement regarding parentage, declaring he believed he was S.S.'s parent, he was on S.S.'s birth certificate, and he had told friends and family S.S. was his child. A social worker later discovered that Z.S. was not identified on S.S.'s birth certificate as her father. Z.S. told the social worker mother told him he was on S.S.'s birth certificate. S.S.'s birth certificate does not identify a father, but S.S.'s last name is Z.S.'s last name. Mother lived with Z.S. for a short time, but moved away from Z.S. when she was five or six months pregnant. Z.S.'s DNA test confirmed there was a 99.99 percent probability he was S.S.'s biological father.
Z.S. was diagnosed with schizophrenia when he was 16 or 17 years old and took medications until he was 18 years old. He stopped taking the medications because they were slowing him down. Z.S. told the department he wanted to raise S.S. The department recommended no services to Z.S. because he never had contact with S.S.
In August 2011, the juvenile court found Z.S. to be S.S.'s biological father. The court found the allegation in the petition true, removed S.S. from mother's custody and ordered that she receive reunification services. The court denied Z.S.'s request for placement, finding by clear and convincing evidence it would be detrimental to place S.S. with him. The court made no finding on whether Z.S. was a presumed father. Michael C. was not a party to the 2011 dependency action, is not listed as a party, and is not identified as a presumed father.
Although Z.S. had the right to monthly visitation, he could not afford to travel to California. By June 2012, mother took and completed her reunification services, but failed to submit to drug tests on several occasions. Mother also consistently visited S.S. Mother was living with Michael C., who was participating in visits to S.S. with mother after April 2012. Michael C.'s visits with S.S. were awkward and he had difficulty talking to her. In March 2012, mother gave birth to Savannah C. Michael C. was Savannah's presumed father, David M. was the child's alleged father. Mother had late prenatal care and a hold was placed on her infant at the hospital. Savannah was also adjudicated a dependent. Michael C. was not an alleged or presumed father in S.S.'s first dependency case.
The department reported in November 2012 that mother had received services for 18 months. Mother completed mental health counseling and recently had not missed drug testing. The department believed mother had made improvements and did well with the children with Michael C. present during visitation. The department was concerned that mother was completely dependent on Michael C. The department, however, recommended that S.S. be returned to mother under a plan of family maintenance services. At the section 366.22 review hearing in November 2012, the juvenile court placed S.S. back with mother under a plan of family maintenance services. Mother gave birth to fraternal twins in May 2013. On June 13, 2013, the juvenile court awarded mother sole legal and physical custody of S.S. and terminated dependency jurisdiction. The custody order listed Z.S. as S.S.'s father, with no mention of Michael C.
Beginning of Current Dependency
On August 21, 2016, Savannah, who was four years old, and one of the twins, who was three years old, were seen playing in the middle of California Avenue, a high traffic roadway in Bakersfield. The witness who reported the incident said the children were almost hit by vehicles several times. Officer Andrew Peery was dispatched to investigate. Peery found the two children on California Avenue unattended by any adult. Both children were dirty. The girls had not been bathed in over a week and they smelled of urine and feces. Their clothes had not been washed in over a week. The children were placed in the patrol car. Michael C. soon arrived but did not ask to see his children, although he was very concerned about a dog that had escaped.
Officer Thomas conducted a child welfare check at Michael C.'s apartment. When he entered, they noticed the apartment was unkempt with a foul odor. S.S. answered the door. Mother and the other twin were also at home. S.S. was extremely dirty and was not wearing shoes. There were food crumbs on the floor throughout the residence and trash on the floor. There was a strong smell of spoiled food in the refrigerator, but the officer could not determine the source. Trash and animal feces were accumulating in the living room. Dishes on the counter smelled of rotting food and were covered with insects. There were cockroaches on the kitchen floor and gnats in the air. The home had no electricity or running water.
One of mother's neighbors told officers that the children were regularly in the front of the house without any adult supervision. They were frequently seen wandering the neighborhood for hours with only their dog as protection. The neighbors reported there was an unsecured swimming pool at the front of the residence. The pool was filled with approximately three feet of brown murky water. The pool had a ladder that provided easy access to the children. There was also a hole in the fence giving the children access to a canal, filled with water and with a strong surface current. The home was found to be in an "unlivable" condition and the children were taken into protective custody.
Michael C. told investigators he left the residence at 7:30 a.m. to get food while mother and the children were all sleeping. He returned about 8:10 a.m. and mother was there, but Savannah and one of the twins were not in the house. Michael C. ran out of the residence to look for the children. When asked about why the residence was so messy, Michael C. said he was on "'[s]trike'" and he would not clean until mother cleaned.
Mother told investigators that S.S. woke her up after the other two children went missing. Mother did not look for them. She was frantically trying to clean the kitchen when the officers arrived. Mother could not spell her children's names or give their proper birth dates, and she appeared to be falling asleep during questioning with the officers. Mother explained this was due to Fibromyalgia.
On August 24, 2016, the department filed a petition alleging that S.S was a person described by section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g). The petition did not mention Michael C. and did not list him as a presumed or alleged father. The petition listed Z.S. as S.S.'s biological father. Michael C. was not a party in the petition and was not designated as an alleged or presumed father. The section 300, subdivision (b) allegations state S.S. was at substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness due to: (1) mother's failure to adequately supervise or protect; (2) mother's failure to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter or medical care; and (3) mother's inability to provide regular care based on her mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse. The section 300, subdivision (g) allegation was that mother was incarcerated with pending felony allegations of willful child cruelty.
A social worker interviewed mother on August 22, 2016. Mother was having difficulty with her functional movement and motor control. When mother was asked about any possible medical conditions, she reported having fibromyalgia. There was not an official diagnosis. Mother said her father had been diagnosed with Huntington's disease. Mother asserted she did not have the disease, but said she had never been tested for the condition. Mother attributed her physical limitations to fibromyalgia.
The social worker also interviewed Michael C. on August 22, 2016. He acknowledged and agreed with the law enforcement report that his home was in an "'unlivable'" condition for the children. Michael C. told the social worker he was not the father of S.S. or Savannah. Michael C. identified Z.S. as S.S.'s father.
On August 22, 2016, the social worker received a telephone call from Z.S., who had received a Facebook message from mother's brother stating that mother had been arrested and that S.S. was placed into protective custody. Z.S. expressed concern for S.S.'s well-being and his desire to have the child placed with him. Z.S. explained that mother fled with S.S. to California from New Mexico when the child was approximately five months old. Z.S. had tried and failed to get custody of S.S. during the previous dependency proceeding. Z.S. tried to contact mother through phone calls and Facebook after S.S. was returned to mother's care in the prior dependency proceedings, but mother prevented him from making any contact with S.S. Z.S. did not know mother's current whereabouts until mother's brother called to inform him that S.S. was in protective custody.
At the detention hearing on August 25, 2016, the juvenile court appointed separate counsel for mother, Z.S., and S.S. Michael C. was also present at the hearing, which included S.S.'s half-siblings. Through counsel, Michael C. claimed he was the father of the twins. Mother testified that she was married to Michael C. and he was the father of the twins. They had been living together prior to when the twins were born. The twins were born in May 2013.
The juvenile court raised Michael C.'s status to the presumed father of the twins. The court found that Z.S. was S.S.'s biological father. S.S. was ordered detained, visitation orders were made as to mother and the child's siblings, and the hearing was continued. The detention hearing resumed on August 30, 2016. Z.S. was unable to appear telephonically at the hearing. The court ordered S.S. and her siblings detained. The court ordered supervised visits for mother and Michael C. with the children to occur twice weekly for two hours. Visits between S.S. and Z.S. were ordered weekly for one hour, to be accomplished by telephone or electronic means.
On September 17, 2016, the social worker discussed a proposed initial case plan with mother and Michael C. Both parents pled guilty to one count of felony child endangerment and one misdemeanor count of willful cruelty to a child. They were placed on probation and ordered to complete a 52-week program for child abusers. The case plan included a 52-week parenting/neglect class as ordered by the criminal court on October 4, 2016, and voluntary, random, unannounced drug tests. Mother was asked to undergo a medical examination and testing for possible Huntington's disease. Mother informed the social worker that she had a CT scan earlier that year. Mother's gait and balance were impaired. Mother said the results should be at one of four facilities in Bakersfield.
On October 6, 2016, mother's attorney advised the social worker that the parents were having a hard time getting their Medi-Cal situated as sometimes it would work and sometimes not. On November 3, 2016, the social worker sent signed authorizations for release of medical records to Clinica Sierra Vista, Truxton Radiology, and Kern Radiology. The social worker also called the Northeast Walk-in Clinic in an effort to get their fax number. Kern Radiology had no medical records for mother.
Jurisdiction Hearing
The jurisdiction hearing was held on November 21, 2016. Z.S. made a telephonic appearance. The parents waived their rights and submitted on the allegations in the petition. The section 300, subdivision (g) allegation was dismissed without prejudice and the remaining allegations were found true. The department requested a psychiatric evaluation of mother to determine if she could benefit from family reunification services and/or a neurological examination. Mother's counsel objected to a psychiatric evaluation. The court appointed Dr. Michael Musacco, a clinical psychologist, to perform an evaluation and report his findings by January 4, 2017.
The clerk's transcript indicates the jurisdiction hearing began as a joint jurisdiction/disposition hearing. Because of delays in getting medical evaluations of mother completed, however, the disposition phase of the proceedings was continued several times.
A hearing on the evaluation was set for January 23, 2017. The purpose of the evaluation was to determine: (1) whether mother suffers from a mental illness; (2) whether mother would benefit from family reunification services; (3) what services, if any, would the doctor recommend; and (4) whether or not mother would benefit from a neurological evaluation.
On January 23, 2017, Michael C. submitted a statement regarding parentage (Judicial Council Forms, form JV-505), asserting he believed he was S.S.'s parent and requested a judgement of parentage. Michael C. stated S.S. lived with him from July 2012 until August 2016 and he had told his family and friends that S.S. was his child. Michael C. stated he had provided S.S. with "[b]asic living necessities and toys," and he claimed that S.S. had spent unspecified time with his parents, brothers, sisters, nieces, and nephews. Michael C. asserted he raised S.S. as his own child since 2012 and he had held himself out as her father since then. At the continued disposition hearing on January 23, 2017, Michael C. requested designation as S.S.'s presumed father.
Michael C.'s form JV-505 was not file stamped as received, however, until October 26, 2017.
Mother supported Michael C.'s request for recognition as S.S.'s presumed father. Counsel for Z.S. objected, requesting a continuance. At the hearing, Z.S.'s counsel requested the department be permitted to authorize overnight visitation. The department noted that Z.S. may qualify as a father pursuant to Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816 (Kelsey S.), because mother moved from New Mexico and failed to provide Z.S. with contact information.
The court took this issue and the request for a continuance under submission. The court directed the department to begin supervised visits for Z.S. and expand to unsupervised visits when appropriate. During the hearing, the court noted mother had a neurological appointment scheduled the next day. The minute order reflects that mother requested a continuance because of the appointment. The disposition proceedings were continued.
On May 22, 2017, there was a brief hearing on Michael C.'s petition to be a presumed father. The court denied Michael C.'s request to be elevated to a presumed father. The court noted that while it was clear S.S. recognized Michael C. in a father role, there was not evidence he ever held S.S. out as his natural child. The court found Michael C. to be a nonrelated extended family member to S.S. The court noted that Z.S. had shown a concerted effort to establish a relationship with S.S. The court granted the department's request to allow Z.S. to have an unsupervised overnight visit with S.S.
Medical and Psychological Examinations of Mother
A clinical report of mother by Dr. Michael Musacco, a doctor in psychology, was filed with the court on February 3, 2017. Mother told Dr. Musacco that she had been evaluated for Huntington's disease 10 days earlier. Mother was tested for intelligence and cognitive functioning. Testing revealed substantial deficits in mother's verbal skills, with low, borderline scores on tasks measuring her perceptual reasoning skills. Her full-scale I.Q. score of 60 showed compromised intellectual functioning.
Dr. Musacco diagnosed mother with a major neurocognitive disorder that appeared to be the product of unconfirmed Huntington's disease. Dr. Musacco stated mother was unlikely to benefit from reunification services. Dr. Musacco recommended mother be evaluated by a neurologist and that a medical social worker be assigned in order to help mother obtain medical benefits and supplemental services, including disability benefits. Dr. Musacco stated it did not appear mother would be capable of successfully reunifying with her children within the statutorily prescribed time. It further did not appear mother had made substantive changes or progress to address issues. Mother's specific deficits in her cognitive functioning and motor skills interfere with her ability to parent her young children. Dr. Musacco reiterated that even with those interventions, mother would be unable to reunify with her children within the prescribed timeframe.
On January 24, 2017, mother was examined by Nurse Practitioner Lorelei Punsalan for a Huntington's disease evaluation and management. The laboratory test was positive for the Huntington's allele and onset of the disorder. Mother reported her symptoms increased, and they included uncontrolled movements of her arms, legs, and trunk that began approximately two years earlier. Mother reported balance problems, and she had an increased number of falls. Another clinical evaluation performed at Clinica Sierra Vista confirmed mother will develop the disease. On February 13, 2017, Punsalan prescribed additional medications to mother. Mother's Huntington's disease was characterized as stable.
The social worker received a call from Dr. Musacco, who explained mother would not be able to provide care for her children without some type of services that provides extensive aide. Although Dr. Musacco is not a medical doctor, he highly suspected mother is suffering from Huntington's disease due to her consistently flat affect and her uncoordinated gait. Mother reported to Dr. Musacco that she had an appointment to see a neurologist in late January 2017. Dr. Musacco explained to the social worker that it could take weeks or months before the neurologist could provide a diagnosis or recommendations. Dr. Musacco did not believe mother could benefit from reunification services without significant services in place to assist her with childcare and home cleaning. Dr. Musacco did not believe mother would benefit from reunification services unless her neurologist could provide a recommendation or plan for services that would allow mother to meet the needs of her children.
At the continued disposition hearing and hearing on medical report held on March 13, 2017, the juvenile court appointed Dr. Gary A. Longwith to perform an evaluation and report his findings by April 17, 2017. The hearings were continued again to May 22, 2017.
At the hearing on May 22, 2017, the juvenile court denied Michael C.'s request to be elevated to S.S.'s presumed father. The court noted that S.S. had lived with Michael C. and she recognized him in a father role, but there was no evidence that Michael C. held her out as his natural child. The court recognized Michael C. as a nonrelated extended family member.
On June 19, 2017, mother was evaluated by Dr. Longwith, who is a medical and clinical psychologist, qualified medical examiner, and clinical psychopharmacologist. Dr. Longwith noted the court-ordered purpose of the examination was to determine whether mother had a diagnosable mental disability and if a neurological referral was indicated. When Dr. Longwith first met mother, her condition was evident and it was clear to him additional or other protocols would be required to assess her condition and answer the court's question with any degree of confidence and medical certainty. Dr. Longwith described mother as appropriately dressed and groomed. There was no obvious evidence she was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Mother's mood was fair, but blunted with evidence of a depressive effect. Mother's general attention and concentration was poor and dulled. Dr. Longwith had to repeat himself frequently to ensure mother understood his questions and examination instructions. Mother appeared to "zone out at times" while looking at a computer screen or after Dr. Longwith asked her a question.
Dr. Longwith found mother's short- and long-term memory were compromised. Mother had difficulty with recalling dates and times associated with important historical events in her life. She could not remember when she was married or when she first gave birth. Mother's inability to find words was notable. Mother was oriented to month and year, but not to date or location. Mother was unsteady on her feet outside Dr. Longwith's office. Walking to Dr. Longwith's office, mother's gait was lurching, contorted, and was not rhythmic. Mother's facial expressions were dominated by frowns, grimaces, and a constant tightening of her mouth. Mother made eye contact well, but her gaze was abnormal and her eyelids drooped. Mother frequently dropped objects she was trying to hold in her hand, such as her cell phone or a pencil.
Dr. Longwith tested mother with several tests. The Million Multiaxial Clinical Inventory test showed mother presented as someone who wants social approval, is generally naïve about psychological matters, and lacks personal insight. The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory showed mother had mild emotional distress. Mother showed elevated self-confidence. Mother awakens from an evening of sleep without feeling fresh or rested. This is consistent with her neurological disorder. Mother was given the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, which showed her verbal comprehension, processing speed, and full-scale intelligence to be extremely low. Mother's perceptual reasoning was below average. Her working memory and general ability were borderline. Mother's intellect was less than average.
Dr. Longwith performed the Repeatable Battery for the Assessment of Neuropsychological Status on mother. The results of the clinical protocol were consistent with patients who are diagnosed with Huntington's disease. Mother's delayed memory tested as borderline. Her immediate memory, visuospatial/constructional ability, language, and attention were all extremely low. Mother showed significant cognitive deficits in all domains. Mother's scores suggested subcortical white matter and/or subcortical nuclei deficits. Dr. Longwith diagnosed mother with a mood disorder and dementia due to Huntington's disease, mild to moderate cognitive impairment, mild intellectual disability, and migraine.
Dr. Longwith stated that mother demonstrated prominent symptoms of the disease process for Huntington's disease, which has a mean onset age between the years of 35 and 37. Mother was 35 years old when she was examined by Dr. Longwith. To answer the question posed by the juvenile court, Dr. Longwith's examination of mother required six hours of testing. Mother, for instance, reported seeing spirits, which is consistent with bizarre cognitive mentation. There was also a high degree of consistency between the different testing protocols. The I.Q. assessment was dismal, in the extremely low range, and mother demonstrated extremely low verbal and cognitive processing ability. The test measuring mother's neurocognitive abilities were highly suggestive of deficits. The testing was consistent with Huntington's disease. Mother's anxiety and depression can be treated and Dr. Longwith recommended that her medication protocol be revisited. The core concern remains mother's Huntington's disease and the accompanying physical problems and dementia that are part of the disease process. Mother has ambulation difficulties, leading to frequent falls, contusions, and medical interventions.
Dr. Longwith noted that mother's physical and cognitive abilities will continue to decline over time as part of the normal disease process. Dr. Longwith stated that his opinion, after considering the history of the case, the psychometric test data, and his own observations, was that mother's cognitive deficits render her unlikely to benefit from reunification services. Concerning mother's ability to raise children, Dr. Longwith believed she will require assistance and supervision to safely raise children. Dr. Longwith recommended mother be referred to a neurologist to assist with symptom management and to aging adult services for an evaluation of benefits to include home health assistance.
Disposition Hearing
The disposition hearing and hearing on medical reports was held on July 24, 2017. Based on the strength of the relationship Z.S. was establishing with S.S., the department recommended that Z.S. be elevated to presumed father and be granted placement of S.S., and that the dependency case as to S.S. be dismissed. On the issues of placement of S.S. and termination of dependency, mother requested a contested evidentiary hearing. Concerning Z.S.'s request for presumed parental status as to S.S., mother's counsel lodged a general objection. Mother's counsel recognized Z.S. was getting overnight visitations with S.S. and that this has a tendency to qualify him as presumed father under the circumstances. The court found sufficient evidence to find Z.S. qualified as S.S.'s presumed father. A parentage finding and judgment declaring Z.S. to be the presumed parent was filed on July 24, 2017.
S.S.'s three siblings were removed from the physical custody of mother and Michael C. The court ordered reunification services for Michael C. Reunification services were denied for mother pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2). The disposition as to S.S. was set for a contested hearing.
A social study was prepared by the department for the continued disposition hearing. Z.S. was employed at a restaurant for two years and had worked in the oil industry for five years prior to his current employment. Z.S. had a child in New Mexico who was one year old and was in a stable relationship with the child's mother, Amanda M. Z.S.'s only legal history was limited to convictions for driving with a suspended license, driving without insurance, speeding, and not having vehicle registration. Z.S. experimented with drugs as a minor, but denied any current use of controlled substances or alcohol. Z.S. also reported no current or mental health conditions, but reported a family history of depression and anxiety. After S.S.'s dependency began, her caregiver reported that Z.S. regularly contacted S.S. by phone. In December 2016, S.S. was referring to Z.S. as her father or her other dad.
In September 2016, the social worker received a letter from Amanda M., stating that she was the mother of Z.S.'s other child. Z.S. was close to Amanda M.'s husband, who passed away. Later, Z.S. became romantically involved with Amanda M. and Amanda M. became pregnant. After the birth of their child, they mutually agreed to end the romantic relationship but remain friends. Amanda M. described Z.S. as a father figure to her two older children and who takes all three children as often as possible. Z.S. helps Amanda M. financially and visits the children as often as possible. Amanda M. explained that Z.S. has a large family support system and supported the juvenile court finding Z.S. to be S.S.'s parent. Since Z.S. and Amanda M. have split, Z.S. has remained an active part of their child's life and continued to be her older children's sole father figure. Z.S. is generous with financial support. Amanda M. described Z.S. as "an amazing dad." She explained she never worries about her children's safety when they are in Z.S.'s care.
The social worker was contacted by one of Z.S.'s aunts, Ms. B.-A, who expressed her disappointment at the 2011 juvenile court ruling denying placement of S.S. with Z.S. Ms. B.-A. explained that Z.S. and S.S. would be residing with her, her husband, and their two children who were twelve and eight years old. Z.S. had several relatives in New Mexico who would provide family support. Mother's brother was engaged to marry Z.S.'s cousin. Ms. B.-A. explained that mother prevented Z.S. from having contact with S.S. and Z.S. could not get mother's address to send S.S.'s toys or clothes. When mother left New Mexico pregnant with S.S., she did not leave Z.S. with any contact information except to send pictures of S.S. after she was born to Ms. B.-A. via Facebook. Mother occasionally contacted Z.S. via Facebook, but only when she needed money. When the social worker asked Ms. B.-A. about the report in the 2011 dependency indicating that Z.S. had a history of mental health problems, Ms. B.-A. told the social worker this information was incorrect. Ms. B.-A. reported Z.S. had experimented with and had a problem with drugs when he was a teenager, as well as behavioral problems. These issues resolved once Z.S. became an adult. Ms. B.-A. denied Z.S. had any form of mental illness and stated he had never taken any form of psychotropic medication or controlled substance since he was a teenager.
A social worker from New Mexico contacted the social worker from the department and reported that Ms. B.-A.'s home was very appropriate for S.S.'s placement and S.S. would receive a lot of support from Z.S.'s extended family. The New Mexico social worker had no concerns about Z.S. or placement with him in Ms. B.-A.'s home. The department's social worker reported that since S.S.'s detention, Z.S. has taken advantage of court-ordered telephonic visits and was working on building a bond with S.S. When Z.S. appeared for a court hearing in March 2017, he worked to set up visits with S.S. during his brief stay here. The visit included Z.S., Ms. B.-A., and her husband. The visit went well and S.S. enjoyed it. Through May 2017, father maintained telephonic visitation with S.S.
In May 2017, S.S. had two overnight visits with Z.S. After the first visit, S.S. told the social worker she wanted another overnight visit. S.S. reported she enjoyed spending time with Z.S. and no concerns about the visit were reported. In a supplemental report, the department recommended that S.S. be placed with Z.S.
Mother and Michael C. attended a parenting/neglect class. Mother only attended the class once a month and, in the opinion of the instructor, mother was unable to benefit from the class because her medical condition was so severe that it impaired mother's ability to concentrate or meaningfully engage. The instructor did not charge mother for the class because she was unable to get anything out of the class. In contrast, Michael C. was doing well in class and in group sessions.
At the contested phase of the disposition hearing on October 16, 2017, Michael C. testified that he married mother in April 2012 and had been in a relationship with her since September 2011. Mother became pregnant with Savannah in 2011. Michael C. remembered that Z.S. visited S.S. during one supervised visit during the first dependency action when S.S. was about one year old. Z.S. sent a toy to S.S. once at Christmas. Michael S. said that Z.S. never sent child support for S.S. and never requested custody or visitation with her.
Michael C. described S.S. as having a daily big sister relationship with the other children and noted she "does a good job looking over her younger siblings. S.S. "would help make sure" the younger children would get equal portions of food or snacks. She helped one of the twins with vocabulary words. S.S. would make sure the younger children wore the correct shoes when they went outside and was always "very attentive to what they are all doing, when they are doing it, how they are doing it." S.S. is affectionate with her siblings. When Michael C. and mother visit the children, they visit them all together. Michael C. stated that he raised S.S. as his own child, had daily interaction with her until the detention in August 2016, and supported her as his own child.
Z.S. testified that he had two overnight visits with S.S. and is her biological father. During the overnight visits, the two went to the store and played with toys they bought together. S.S. gives Z.S. hugs and kisses. Z.S. loves S.S. S.S. told Z.S. she loves her siblings and does not want to leave them if she lives with Z.S. in New Mexico. S.S. told Z.S. she wanted to live with him. Z.S. described his sister's home in New Mexico, where he also lives. Z.S. wanted S.S. placed with him because he believed it would be best for her. Z.S. said he would support contact between S.S. and her maternal relatives in New Mexico, as well as contact between S.S. and mother. Since the case began, Z.S. had 10 in-person visits with S.S. Since the dependency case began, Z.S. had phone contact with S.S. twice a week for 30 minutes to one hour each time.
Ms. B.-A. described Z.S. as hardworking, devoted to his kids, and very responsible. Ms. B.-A. said Z.S. is not the same person he was when he was a teenager and should not be judged in that light.
The department requested that the court place S.S. with Z.S. and dismiss the dependency case. The juvenile court found S.S.'s relationship with her siblings could be characterized in large part as a parental role. The juvenile court adjudged S.S. as a dependent child of the juvenile court and removed her from the custody of mother. Family reunification services were denied because the court found there was clear and convincing evidence the child comes within section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2). The court found mother suffers from a disability that renders her incapable of utilizing services. Even with services, the court found mother was unlikely to become capable of adequately caring for S.S. within the prescribed timeframe. The juvenile court placed S.S. with Z.S. The court awarded sole legal and physical custody of S.S. to Z.S., with visitation ordered for mother, and the court terminated its jurisdiction over S.S.'s dependency action.
BYPASS OF REUNIFICATION SERVICES
Introduction
Absent specific statutory exceptions, parents are usually afforded services to effectuate reunification of families subject to dependency proceedings. (In re Anthony Q. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 336, 345-346; Bridget A. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285, 302.) Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), provides such exception, allowing the bypass of reunification services if the parent suffers from a mental disability rendering him or her incapable of utilizing those services. Mother contends the juvenile court erred in applying this section to deny her reunification services because she argues there was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding. Mother further argues the department failed to adequately investigate her neurological disease and what reunification services would benefit S.S. and the family. We find substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's finding based on clear and convincing evidence.
Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), provides:
"(b) Reunification services need not be provided to a parent or guardian described in this subdivision when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, any of the following: [¶] ... [¶]
"(2) That the parent or guardian is suffering from a mental disability that is described in Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 7820) of Part 4 of Division 12 of the Family Code and that renders him or her incapable of utilizing those services."
Section 7827 of the Family Code provides in relevant part:
"(a) 'Mentally disabled' as used in this section means that a parent or parents suffer a mental incapacity or disorder that renders the parent or parents unable to care for and control the child adequately.
"(b) A proceeding under this part may be brought where the child is one whose parent or parents are mentally disabled and are likely to remain so in the foreseeable future.
"(c) [T]he evidence of any two experts, each of whom shall be a physician and surgeon, certified either by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology or under Section 6750 ..., a licensed psychologist who has a doctoral degree in psychology and at least five years of postgraduate experience in the diagnosis and treatment of emotional and mental disorders, is required to support a finding under this section...."
Standard of Review
The juvenile court's finding that mother's mental disability rendered her unable to care for S.S. is reviewed for substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. (Curtis F. v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 470, 474; see T.J. v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1238.) Where the bypass provisions are used to deny services, however, the juvenile court must make its findings by clear and convincing evidence. (§ 361.5, subd. (b); T.J. v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 1238-1239.)
Although some courts have found the clear and convincing evidence standard disappears on appellate review (In re Alexzander C. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 438, 451; In re J.S. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1493; Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 872, 880-881), other courts suggest reviewing courts should conduct substantial evidence review bearing in mind the juvenile court's heightened standard of proof (T.J. v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1238-1239; In re Hailey T. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 139, 146; In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 971; In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1654). If the first approach is taken and the heightened standard of proof for the juvenile court is ignored on appeal, the heightened standard of proof loses much of its force, which is counter to the legislative scheme in dependency proceedings. Hence, we review the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's order to determine whether there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could make the necessary findings based on the clear and convincing evidence standard. (T.J. v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 1239-1240.)
Analysis
Mother acknowledges in her opening brief there were two psychologists who evaluated her and opined she would not benefit from reunification services due to her neurocognitive disorder. Mother concedes this procedurally satisfied the requirements of Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), and Family Code section 7827. Mother does not challenge the qualifications of either expert to render an opinion to the juvenile court (generally see In re Joy M. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 11, 17-20; In re Jennilee T. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 212, 221-222).
The evaluations of two qualified mental health professionals, Drs. Musacco and Longwith, satisfied the statutory requirements of Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), and Family Code section 7827 that mother was incapable of utilizing reunification services due to a mental disability. (See Linda B. v. Superior Court (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 150, 152-153; In re Rebecca H. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 825, 841-844.) Furthermore, there were no objections to the qualifications of either psychologist during the proceedings and absent such a timely and clear objection any evidentiary defect is waived. Also, we presume the juvenile court performed its official duty in appointing two qualified psychologists. (In re Joy M., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at pp. 19-21.)
Mother argues both psychologists recommended the department refer mother to a neurologist. Dr. Musacco, for instance, stated that mother was not likely to benefit from reunification services unless a neurologist could provide a recommendation for services that would allow mother to meet the needs of her children. Mother contends, therefore, that she could have benefited from reunification services. As we explain, mother has taken the psychologists' evaluations and recommendations out of context.
During Dr. Musacco's phone conversation with the social worker, he carefully qualified his suggestion that a neurologist could provide a recommendation or plan for services that would meet her children's needs. Dr. Musacco explained a neurologist would have to give mother a battery of tests, which could take weeks or months before the neurologist could provide a diagnosis or recommendation. Even if the neurologist could provide a plan, mother would still need "significant services" to assist her with childcare and house cleaning.
Dr. Musacco's evaluation and report to the juvenile court was even less positive than his phone call to the social worker. At the time Dr. Musacco prepared his report in January 2017, Huntington's disease had not yet been confirmed. Dr. Musacco observed significant facial grimacing, involuntary motor mannerisms, as well significant deficits in mother's intellectual and executive functioning skills. In his report to the court, Dr. Musacco's recommendation for mother to see a neurologist was for her to receive medical treatment. Even with such intervention, Dr. Musacco did not believe mother could make the necessary changes to her life for the children to be safely returned to her care.
Dr. Longwith's evaluation and report of mother occurred six months later, in June 2017. At this stage of the proceedings, mother had been positively diagnosed with Huntington's disease. After six hours of testing and evaluation, Dr. Longwith found mother's neurological and intellectual deficits consistent with the disease. Dr. Longwith noted mother had been misdiagnosed with fibromyalgia. Mother's immediate memory, visuospatial construction, and language ability all tested in extremely low range.
Dr. Longwith noted that mother's physical and cognitive abilities will continue to decline over time as part of the normal disease process. Dr. Longwith stated that his opinion, after considering the history of the case, the psychometric test data, and his own observations, was that mother's cognitive deficits render her unlikely to benefit from reunification services. Concerning mother's ability to raise children, Dr. Longwith believed she will require assistance and supervision to safely raise children. Dr. Longwith recommended mother be referred to a neurologist to assist with symptom management and to aging adult services for an evaluation of benefits to include home health assistance.
It is clear from Dr. Longwith's evaluation that due to her cognitive impairments caused by Huntington's disease, he did not believe mother would benefit at all from reunification services. Dr. Longwith's recommendation for mother to have a follow-up evaluation with a neurologist was "to assist with symptom management." Both psychologists saw the need for mother to receive proper medical attention. Dr. Musacco's evaluation was done prior to the confirmation that mother suffered from Huntington's disease. Dr. Longwith's recommendation was focused not on how mother could improve with proper medical attention, but getting assistance with symptom management. Both psychologists viewed mother's physical and mental deficits as significant. Importantly, Dr. Longwith noted that mother's symptoms would continue to deteriorate over time.
Mother analogizes her case to In re Jamie M. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 530 (Jamie M.). There, the mother suffered from chronic schizophrenia manifesting itself in paranoid delusions. (Id. at p. 537.) In that case, however, drug therapy was very effective at controlling the mother's illness. Delusions were caused by the mother's failure to take her prescribed medication. The court in Jamie M. reversed the juvenile court's order removing the children from the mother because it had concluded the mother was not responsible enough or emotionally capable of providing the appropriate home environment for her children. Jamie M. found the juvenile court's order was that a schizophrenic parent is per se detrimental to a child and there was no evidence mother's illness would adversely affect her children. (Id. at pp. 537, 546.) Jamie M. concluded that harm to a child cannot be presumed from the mere fact of a mental illness diagnosis. (Id. at p. 540.)
In Jamie M., with little more evidence than the fact of the parent's mental health diagnosis, the juvenile court concluded placing the children with the mother would be detrimental to them. In contrast, both psychologists here had evaluated mother and found her suffering from significant physical and mental deficits as a result of her disease, which impaired her ability to benefit from reunification services. The juvenile court's finding that mother would not benefit from reunification services was not, as it was in Jaime M., speculative and the court's ruling was based on substantial evidence under the clear and convincing finding required by section 361.5, subdivision (b).
PRESUMED FATHER STATUS
Introduction
Mother contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's findings that Michael C. was not S.S.'s presumed father and that Z.S. was a presumed father. She also contends the juvenile court erred in terminating its jurisdiction after awarding custody of S.S. to Z.S. We reject these contentions. In analyzing this issue, we look to Michael C.'s relationship with S.S. as well as the relationship Z.S. formed with S.S. The question of what constitutes a parental relationship is controlled by the Uniform Parentage Act (Fam. Code, § 7600 et seq.; UPA) and, more specifically applicable to this case, Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d), which provides that a person is a presumed parent if he or she "receives the child into his or her home and openly holds out the child as his or her natural child."
Mother has standing to challenge the juvenile court's findings concerning who is a presumed father. (See Dent v. Wolf (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 230, 233-234.)
Legal Principles
One recent authority provides a thorough overview of the history and legal principles applied to determining who qualifies as a presumed father, albeit with very different facts than those we confront. (W.S. v. S.T. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 132 (W.S.).) W.S. involved the petition of W.S., the biological father, to establish a parental relationship with his daughter (daughter). S.T., mother of daughter, and W.S. had been in a relationship while S.T. was married to her husband, Martin T. (Martin). W.S. sought joint legal and physical custody of daughter. (Id. at p. 136.) The trial court found W.S. was not a presumed parent within Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d). (W.S., supra, at p. 136.) Martin and S.T. filed for divorce, after which S.T. began a relationship with W.S. S.T. and Martin reconciled after S.T. became pregnant with daughter. Shortly after daughter's birth, S.T. suspected W.S. was daughter's biological father and this was later confirmed by a DNA test. It was Martin who attended prenatal classes with S.T., took S.T. to the hospital when she was in labor, took time off from work to assist S.T. with daughter's care, and had a relationship with daughter. (Id. at p. 137.)
Daughter visited W.S. in his apartment where he kept toys for her. Although W.S. purchased a crib for daughter, she did not use it. W.S. fed daughter, told workers at daycare that he was her father, and later paid for her preschool tuition. W.S. held birthday parties for her and they celebrated holidays together, including Thanksgiving and Christmas. (W.S., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 138.) W.S., however, did not know the names of daughter's doctor or dentist and she was not on his health insurance. He occasionally gave S.T. money and paid her cell phone bill. (Id. at pp. 138-139.)
S.T. testified that W.S. exaggerated the closeness of his relationship with daughter, describing his typical visits as brief. Daughter stayed overnight with W.S. only once as an infant. Visits with W.S. when daughter was in daycare were brief. S.T. would take daughter to brief visits with W.S. on Christmas if W.S. had gifts for her. (W.S., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 139.) Martin could recall only a few occasions when daughter was not home at night. He did not believe daughter spent many nights with W.S. Martin put daughter to bed and daughter was on his health insurance. Martin thought S.T. was paying for preschool. (Id. at p. 140.)
The trial court found a conclusive presumption that Martin was daughter's father because he was married to and cohabitating with S.T. when daughter was conceived. The court rejected W.S.'s requests for visitation as well as for joint and physical custody of daughter. (W.S., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 141.) W.S. appealed, arguing inter alia that the court applied the incorrect legal standard in determining whether he received daughter into his home and erred in failing to grant him visitation. (Id. at p. 142.)
W.S. explained that the UPA distinguishes presumed fathers from biological and alleged fathers. Biology is not determinative of presumed fatherhood. Mothers and presumed fathers acquire far greater rights. A father is not elevated to presumed father status unless he has demonstrated a commitment to the child and the child's welfare regardless of whether he is the biological father. (W.S., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 143.) The purpose of the statute is to distinguish between those fathers who have entered into some familial relationship with the mother and child from those who have not. Subdivison (d) of Family Code section 7611 creates a rebuttable presumption of presumed fatherhood if "'[t]he presumed parent receives the child into his or her home and openly holds out the child as his or her natural child.'" (W.S., supra, at p. 143.)
Subdivision (d) of Family Code section 7611, however, does not provide an express definition of what constitutes receipt of a child into a home. Courts have analyzed the roots of the receiving element. (W.S., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 143.) Prior law was based on concepts of legitimacy and illegitimacy, which was replaced in the UPA by the concept of parentage. Prior to the enactment of the UPA, courts liberally construed what constituted receipt into the home. Actual physical acceptance of the child into the home, even by temporary residence with the mother and child, was sufficient to constitute receipt. Even a brief visit would suffice. (W.S., supra, at p. 144.)
Under the UPA, there is no requirement that a child live with a parent for the parent to achieve the status of a presumed parent. (W.S., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 144, citing In re A.A. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 771, 784 [finding presumed father status when child never lived with presumed father].) W.S. asserted he achieved presumed father status when daughter was physically present in his home. W.S. found that after enactment of the UPA, Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d), requires something more than a man being the mother's casual friend or long-term boyfriend. (W.S., supra, at p. 144.) He must be someone who has entered into a familial relationship with the child; someone who has demonstrated an abiding commitment to the child and the child's well-being regardless of his relationship with the mother. (Id. at pp. 144-145, citing In re D.M. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 541, 553 (D.M.).) The child's physical presence within the alleged father's home is, by itself, insufficient under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d). (W.S., supra, at p. 145.) Michael C.
Although Michael C. lived with S.S. for four years and testified that he had raised her as part of a family unit, there is little other evidence he acknowledged or held S.S. out as his daughter. Michael C. attended visitations of S.S. with mother during the first dependency case no later than April 2012, but was never a party to those proceedings. Michael C. was not an alleged or presumed father during the first dependency case. Although the other children's records are not included in the record before us, it is clear from the social workers' reports that Michael C. had the role of presumed father when petitions were filed for the twins.
When the petition was filed in S.S.'s dependency, Michael C. was not named as an alleged or presumed father. Z.S. was named in the petition as S.S.'s biological father and became involved with the case during the earliest stages of the dependency to assert a parental role in S.S.'s life. Michael C. was aware of Z.S.'s parental designation and early involvement in the case, but did not object. Michael C. did not file a form JV-505 asserting presumed paternity of S.S. until January 23, 2017, five months after S.S.'s dependency began.
Michael C. did go to visitations with the children, which included S.S. S.S. referred to Michael C. as her dad. Michael C. testified he loved and raised S.S. There is little other evidence showing a close bond between Michael C. and S.S. In fact, in his testimony at the contested disposition hearing, Michael C. described S.S. as having a daily big sister relationship with the other children. He noted S.S. "does a good job looking over her younger siblings. S.S. "would help make sure" the younger children would get equal portions of food or snacks. She helped one of the twins with vocabulary words. S.S. would make sure the younger children wore the correct shoes when they went outside and was always "very attentive to what they are all doing, when they are doing it, how they are doing it."
Michael C. was describing his relationship of S.S. more in the role of a parent who could assist him with the younger children, not a five-year-old in need of her own nurturing. When Savannah and one of the twins were rescued from nearly being run over in traffic, S.S. was alone in the residence with her mother, who was already mentally and physically disabled, and the other twin. Michael C. was not present to help anyone during this crisis. The record supports a reasonable inference that Michael C. left a disabled wife and a parentified five-year-old to care for three younger children. The threat to the children was not merely because he left the house for a brief time and two of them made their way to a highly trafficked street. The squalor of the residence and the unkempt state of the children, who smelled of urine and feces, are all indicative of Michael C.'s lack of attention to the children, including S.S., for an extended period of time.
The fact that Michael C. was an adult who lived with S.S. for four years is not sufficient evidence that he had established a parental bond with S.S. He did not hold out S.S. as his child during the first dependency case that continued through 2012, nor during the beginning of this dependency. Pursuant to Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d), Michael C. "'must be "someone who has entered into a familial relationship with the child ...."'" (W.S., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 144-145, quoting D.M., supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 553.) S.S.'s physical presence in the alleged father's home is, by itself, insufficient under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d). (W.S., supra, at p. 145.) The juvenile court did not err in finding that Michael C. was a nonrelated extended family member rather than a presumed father. Z.S.
Mother relies on a case from this court, In re Salvador M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1353. In that case, a mother, Rosa, and her young, adult daughter with her own child all lived together. Rosa gave birth to Salvador, whose father was married to another woman and was not involved in raising Rosa's child. Together, Rosa and her adult daughter raised their children. After Rosa died in a car accident, her adult daughter continued to raise Salvador as her own child. (Id. at p. 1355.) The young, adult daughter had a second child and was arrested on a drug offense and became involved in dependency proceedings. Salvador viewed her as his mother, although they were actually siblings. The biological father of the adult daughter's first child became a party to the dependency and was found to be that child's presumed father. The adult daughter, who had petitioned to be Salvador's de facto parent, was not found to be Salvador's presumed mother. The biological father was awarded custody of Salvador. Maternal relatives became caregivers to the children. (Id. at pp. 1356-1357.) Our court reversed the juvenile court's finding that Rosa's adult daughter was not a presumed parent, rejecting the maternal relatives' argument that she failed to establish she openly held Salvador out to be her child because she did not publicly admit maternity. (Id. at p. 1359.)
Salvador M. is not analogous to this case. Unlike the presumed mother in Salvador M., Michael C. did not show by preponderance of the evidence he was S.S.'s presumed father because he failed to establish that he ever held her out to be his daughter. We therefore decline mother's suggestion that this case should be remanded to the juvenile court to weigh whether or not it should determine if Michael C. has rebutted the presumption that Z.S. is a presumed father pursuant to Family Code section 7612.
Z.S. had established in the first dependency case that he was S.S.'s biological father. Although he was a party to that proceeding, he found it difficult to attend hearings because he lived in New Mexico. There are indications in the social workers' reports that he lacked the financial means to travel to Bakersfield. Mother left her relationship with Z.S. at about the midpoint of her pregnancy with S.S. and moved to California from New Mexico. Z.S. had little contact with S.S. after her birth and did not, or could not, support her financially.
During S.S.'s first dependency which commenced in 2011, Z.S. established through genetic testing that he is S.S.'s biological father. He also unsuccessfully sought S.S.'s custody. In making its findings, the juvenile court did not make a finding concerning whether Z.S. was a presumed father. The issue of whether Z.S. qualified as a Kelsey S. father was not litigated during either dependency case. We note, however, that Z.S. had little access to his daughter and apparently did not have the financial means to physically visit her during the first dependency case.
The parties do not raise the issue of whether Z.S. qualifies as a Kelsey S. father. Because it was never raised in the juvenile court, we do reach this question.
When the instant petition was filed, Z.S. was denoted as S.S.'s biological father. Z.S. did intervene, seeking to establish himself as S.S.'s presumed father. The juvenile court ordered phone and/or electronic visitation between Z.S. and S.S. Z.S. regularly visited with S.S. by these means and established a relationship with her. By May 2017, the juvenile court permitted overnight visitation between Z.S. and S.S., which went well. S.S. told Z.S. she would miss her siblings, but still wanted to live with him in New Mexico. The social services agency in New Mexico visited Z.S.'s home and determined it was an appropriate residence for a minor to reside.
Z.S.'s family members contacted local social workers and described him as an excellent father to another child he had. One family member told the social worker that information concerning Z.S. having a mental illness was incorrect. Although the mother of that child did not remain in a relationship with Z.S., she also contacted social workers to explain he was an excellent father to their child. Z.S. continued his phone and electronic visits with S.S. There was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's determination that Z.S. had formed a significant bond with S.S., had held himself out as her father since at least the first dependency action in 2011, and was willing to provide for her as his child.
Termination of Jurisdiction
Mother argues the juvenile court erred in terminating its jurisdiction. When the juvenile court places a child with a noncustodial parent, it may order that parent to become the legal and physical custodian of the child and terminate dependency jurisdiction pursuant to section 361.2, subdivision (b)(1). Pursuant to this section, the court may also award visitation to the noncustodial parent, which was done here. Mother has failed to demonstrate that the juvenile court abused its discretion in this regard. (See In re J.S. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1082.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's orders are affirmed.
/s/_________
MEEHAN, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
SMITH, Acting P.J. /s/_________
ELLISON, J.
Retired Judge of the Fresno Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.