From this testimony and other evidence the chancellor concluded that the two older children, whose personality had been already formed and would not likely be affected by the appellant's sickness, should be awarded to the appellant; but because of the tender age of Barbara and the appellant's "mental disorder", he reasoned that the best interests of the youngest child would be better served if the custody of the child were awarded to the appellee. The chancellor recognized the fact that this court has frowned upon split custody, Roussey v. Roussey, 210 Md. 261, 264, 123 A.2d 354, but, under the circumstances and Barbara's age, found it proper to make such a provisional disposition, Kerger v. Kerger, 156 Md. 607, 145 A. 10. We concur in his solution of the problem.
Other things being equal, a divided control is to be avoided. Cullotta v. Cullotta, 193 Md. 374. This Court has repeatedly stressed the inadvisability of having children brought up in hostile camps, Kartman v. Kartman, 163 Md. 19, 26, where they are deprived of each other's companionship. Burns v. Bines, 189 Md. 157, 165; White v. Seward, 187 Md. 43, 48; Dunnigan v. Dunnigan, 182 Md. 47, 53. The only case cited where a split custody was approved is Kerger v. Kerger, 156 Md. 607. In that case the children were much older, the factual basis is not stated in the per curiam opinion, and the Court was divided on the point.
We conclude that, unless and until conditions arise hereafter to contradict or alter that decision, it should stand, and be affirmed. Kerger v. Kerger, 156 Md. 607, 609, 145 A. 10. Decree affirmed, the appellee to pay costs.