NICHOLS, Justice. 1. The defendant concedes that under decisions exemplified by Rakestraw v. Rakestraw, 70 Ga. 806; Cooney v. Walton, 151 Ga. 195 ( 106 S.E. 167); Kennedy v. Durham, 220 Ga. 310 ( 138 S.E.2d 567); Webb v. Jones, 221 Ga. 754 ( 146 S.E.2d 910); Nash v. Crowe, 222 Ga. 173 ( 149 S.E.2d 88) and Keown v. Craig, 228 Ga. 194 ( 184 S.E.2d 583), had there been contingent remaindermen or had the vested remaindermen agreed, then such a petition for the sale of the parcel of land would not be subject to the motion to dismiss. However, the contention is made that under the Act of 1961 (Ga. L. 1961, pp. 228, 229; Code Ann. ยง 85-1517 et seq.) that no sale may be made upon a petition by a life tenant.
Moreover, in view of the evidence as a whole it does not appear that the exclusion of the divorce complaint harmed the appellant since the fact sought to be proven had previously been established by other evidence. See Gardner v. Ga. F. R. Co., 120 Ga. App. 494 (2) ( 171 S.E.2d 540); Keown v. Craig, 228 Ga. 194, 195 (2) ( 184 S.E.2d 583). 7. The assertion that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the law of unavoidable accident is not meritorious. The substance of the requested charge defined accident as an event occurring without lack of ordinary care or diligence on the part of the defendant which would relieve her of liability.