Kenyon v. Edwards

Full title: DAVID KENYON PLAINTIFF v. CLAYTON EDWARDS, Individually; LT. JIM HALE…

Court: United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, Western Division

Date published: Aug 31, 2005

No. 4:04CV00131 HDY (E.D. Ark. Aug. 31, 2005)

Opinion

No. 4:04CV00131 HDY.

August 31, 2005

ORDER

H. YOUNG, Magistrate Judge

FACTS. On September 13, 2003, plaintiff David Kenyon ("Kenyon") attended a demolition derby at the White County, Arkansas, Fairgrounds in Searcy, Arkansas. While he was attending the demolition derby, he was arrested, allegedly without justification, for domestic battery in the third degree and public intoxication by, among others, defendant Clayton Edwards ("Edwards"), a White County, Arkansas, deputy sheriff. Although Kenyon allegedly "did not resist arrest or physically threaten the [officers], see Document 1 at 2, he was allegedly injured during the course of the arrest. It appears from the record that he was later acquitted of domestic battery in the third degree and had the public intoxication charge against him dismissed. COMPLAINT. Kenyon began this proceeding in February of 2004 by filing a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and joining, among others, Edwards. Kenyon alleged, inter alia, that during the course of his arrest, "Edwards . . ., using unnecessary and excessive force, caused injury to [Kenyon], including but not limited to a torn rotor cuff in his left shoulder, contusions to his right knee, contusions to his neck, severe bruising to his left arm, and other contusions about his body." See Document 1 at 2.

TRIAL. This proceeding was tried to jury beginning on January 24, 2005. On the third day of trial, the jury retired to begin deliberating its verdict. The following day, the foreperson of the jury reported that the jury had reached a unanimous verdict on both counts and all defendants, save Kenyon's claim of excessive force against one of the four defendants. Court was then reconvened, and the jury's verdict was read in open court. The verdict provided the following:

(1) with respect to Kenyon's claim of false arrest, the jury found for all of the defendants;

(2) with respect to his claim of excessive force, the jury found for all of the defendants, save Edwards; and

(3) with respect to Kenyon's claim of excessive force against Edwards, the jury was unable to reach a verdict.

In accordance with the verdict announced by the jury, the Court ordered the following:

(A) Kenyon's claim of false arrest against all of the defendants was dismissed, although a judgment was not entered at that time;

(B) His claim of excessive force against three of the defendants was also dismissed;

(C) The three defendants exonerated by the jury's findings were dismissed from this proceeding, although a judgment dismissing them was not entered at that time.

(D) A mistrial was declared on Kenyon's claim of excessive force against Edwards.

POST-TRIAL PROCEEDINGS. Immediately after declaring a mistrial, the Court began the process of scheduling a new trial on Kenyon's claim of excessive force against Edwards. The new trial was eventually scheduled for the week beginning September 12, 2005. The Court additionally established several deadlines, two of which were a deadline for filing pre-trial motions, that being, July 14, 2005, and a deadline for the completion of discovery, that being, July 18, 2005.

The parties thereafter requested, and received, an extension of the motions and discovery deadlines. The parties were given up to, and including, August 15, 2005, to file all pre-trial motions and complete discovery.

On August 15, 2005, Kenyon filed the pending motions in limine.See Documents 33 and 35. On the same day, Edwards filed the pending motion for summary judgment. See Document 37. Kenyon has now submitted a response to Edwards' motion for summary judgment, and the Court is prepared to address the motion. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. ¹ Edwards maintains that Kenyon's claim of excessive force should be dismissed. Edwards specifically maintains the following:

1 "Summary judgment is proper only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Blair v. Wills, 2005 WL 2036240 (8^th Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff's excessive force claim . . . should be summarily dismissed because Plaintiff (1) can offer no proof of an objective law enforcement standard that was violated by . . . Edwards and (2) can offer no proof to show that . . . Edwards' conduct was unreasonable under any standard.

Plaintiff's claims for compensatory and punitive damages should be summarily dismissed because Plaintiff cannot establish the casual link necessary to recover compensatory damages and cannot establish the level of willful misconduct necessary to recover punitive damages.

Plaintiff cannot offer any proof to show that . . . Edwards violated any clearly established law and [Edwards] is therefore entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

See Document 37 at 1. For the reasons that follow, Edward's motion is denied.

Edwards first maintains that Kenyon can offer no proof that an objective law enforcement standard was violated nor can he offer any proof to show that Edwards' conduct was unreasonable under any standard. The Court disagrees. There is a material question of fact whether the force employed by Edwards was objectively reasonable under the particular circumstances.²

2 Edwards represents, and the Court accepts, that "[t]he force employed by an officer is not excessive and, thus, not violative of the Fourth Amendment if it was `objectively reasonable under the particular circumstances.'" See Document 38 at 2 [quoting Greiner v. City of Champlin, 27 F.3d 1346, 1354 (8^th Cir. 1994)].

Edwards next maintains that Kenyon's claims for compensatory and punitive damages should be summarily dismissed because he cannot establish the casual link necessary to recover compensatory damages and cannot establish the level of willful misconduct necessary to recover punitive damages. With respect to Edward's assertion regarding Kenyon's claim for compensatory damages, the Court disagrees. There is a material question of fact concerning the cause of Kenyon's rotor cuff injury. The evidence linking Edwards' conduct to Kenyon's injury is admittedly not particularly strong, but it is enough to survive Edwards' summary judgment motion.

With respect to Edwards' assertion regarding Kenyon's claim for punitive damages, the Court did not submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury in the first trial. The Court anticipates doing likewise in the second trial but will reserve a final ruling on that issue until the close of all the evidence.

Edwards next maintains that he is shielded from liability by qualified immunity. The prevailing law on that issue is clear. He is shielded by qualified immunity unless he violated a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known.See Walker v. City of Pine Bluff, 414 F.3d 989 (8^th Cir. 2005).³ Qualified immunity issues are oftentimes analyzed using a two step procedure. The two steps are as follows:

First, [the court asks] whether the facts as asserted by the plaintiff "show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). If the answer is no, [the court grants] qualified immunity. If the answer is yes, [the court goes] on to determine "whether the right was clearly established." Id. "The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Id. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151.

See Wright v. Rolette County, 2005 WL 1862343 at 2 (8^th Cir. 2005). The facts as asserted by Kenyon, i.e, Edwards used excessive force in arresting Kenyon, show that Edwards' conduct violated a constitutional right.⁴ Could a reasonable officer believe that Edwards' conduct was lawful in light of clearly established law? At this juncture of the proceeding, it is impossible to say because a material question of fact exists.

3 "`The qualified immunity standard gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'" See Id. at 992 [quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991).

4 The Court accepts Kenyon's assertion as true solely for purposes of this order. It is not accepted as true for any other purpose.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds that material questions of fact exist. Edwards' motion for summary judgment is therefore denied. With respect to Kenyon's claim for punitive damages, the Court will reserve a final ruling on that issue until the close of all the evidence.

MOTIONS IN LIMINE. As the Court noted above, Kenyon has filed separate motions in limine. The Court will address those motions in a separate order to be issued in the coming days.

IT IS SO ORDERED.