Opinion
Civil Action No. 1:99-CV-5-R
August 25, 1999.
MEMORANDUM OPINION ORDER
Concerned about a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court ordered the parties to submit briefs on the issue. Plaintiff filed a memorandum regarding federal question jurisdiction (doc. # 21), and Defendants filed a memorandum opposing imposition of federal question subject matter jurisdiction (doc. #22).
I.
Diane Kobe filed a Complaint in this Court, alleging that Tony Scott took her to a vacant house in Bowling Green, Kentucky on a "pretext of discussing employment possibilities with the construction company for which he works." Complaint of Diane Kobe, Kobe v. Scott, No. 1:98-CV-180-R (W.D. Ky. filed Nov. 6, 1998). There he allegedly exposed himself to her, touched his genitals to her body, ignored her requests to stop, blocked her from leaving the room, threatened and committed acts of physical force against her, and forcibly compelled her to have sexual intercourse with him in violation of the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"), 42 U.S.C. § 13981 and Kentucky law. Id.
Kentucky Fair Plan ("KFP"), Scott's homeowner insurer, filed a complaint seeking a declaration of rights in the pending matter between Kobe and Scott. KFP alleges that the policy does not cover the acts complained of by Kobe. KFP claims that the incidents in Kobe's complaint are not accidents and thus, not occurrences covered by the policy. KFP argues that it does not have to provide a defense to Scott and is not liable to Scott or Kobe.
Kobe v. Scott, No. 1:98-CV-180-R, was dismissed after the parties reached a settlement. KFP continues to seek declaratory relief. The parties agree that there is no diversity jurisdiction, but dispute whether federal question jurisdiction exists.
II.
The Court must dismiss a case whenever it appears that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction . Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). Plaintiff seeks to establish federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the Court needs to interpret the Violence Against Women Act in order to determine coverage.
To determine whether a claim arises under federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the Court must ascertain if a federal cause of action would appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint. Hudson Ins. Co. v. American Electric Corp., 957 F.2d 826, 828 (11th Cir.); cert. denied 506 U.S. 955, 113 S.Ct. 411, 121 L.Ed.2d 336 (1992). In this action pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, the "court must determine whether or not the cause of action anticipated by the declaratory judgment plaintiff arises under federal law." Id.; see also Speedco, Inc. v. Estes, 853 F.2d 909, 912 (Fed. Cir. 1988). A suit to enforce an insurance contract and to recover insurance benefits arise under state law. The VAWA issues are mere potential defenses to Scott's state-created cause of action and are insufficient to confer jurisdiction under § 1331. See Hudson Ins. Co., 957 F.2d at 828. While federal law (VAWA) creates the liability for which Scott may seek reimbursement, "[a]n insurance suit does not arise under the law that creates the insured's liability; rather, such a suit arises under the law that creates the insured's cause of action." Id. at 828, n. 1. Because contract interpretation arises under state law, the Court does not have federal question subject matter jurisdiction over this case.
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED:
This case is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).