Kent v. State

6 Citing cases

  1. Berglowe v. Dir. of D.O.C.

    CASE NO. 7:17CV00516 (W.D. Va. Jul. 18, 2018)

    Furthermore, the evidence pertaining to the other drug charges for which he was indicted established he was involved in substantial illegal drug activity from his own home in the months following the controlled transaction. "[E]vidence of similar crimes or activities may be relevant to show that a defendant has a proclivity to commit the crime charged, whether the collateral activity occurs before or after the offense." Kent v. State, 704 So. 2d 121, 124 (Fla. Ct. App. 1997); see also United States v. Mack, 643 F.2d 1119, 1121 (5th Cir. 1981) (explaining "subsequent acts [may] be introduced to counter an assertion of entrapment"). Despite the confidential informant's actions the day before the controlled transaction, petitioner was predisposed to commit offenses involving illegal drugs and accepted the opportunity to sell the informant cocaine.

  2. Pearce v. State

    CASE NO. 1D14-3224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2015)

    Lebron v. State, 127 So. 3d 597, 603 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). See § 90.801(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2013) ("'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."); Kent v. State, 704 So. 2d 121, 125 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) ("An out-of-court statement is hearsay only if it is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted."); Barber v. State, 576 So. 2d 825, 830 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) ("[I]f an out-of-court statement is offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of its contents, the statement is admissible provided the purpose for which the statement is being offered is a material issue in the case."); see also Charles W. Ehrhardt, 1 Fla. Prac., Florida Evidence § 803.3a (2015 ed.) ("If an out-of-court statement of a person is offered as circumstantial evidence of his or her state of mind, the statements are not hearsay and are admissible, if relevant."). The trial court erred in ruling the appellant's statements during the videotaped interview were hearsay.

  3. Jones v. State

    114 So. 3d 1123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 13 times

    Arguably dictum, this statement nonetheless refutes Appellant's assertion that criminal acts undertaken after alleged inducement by law enforcement are categorically irrelevant to prove predisposition. In addition, Kent v. State, 704 So.2d 121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), which the State cites, establishes that the relevance of collateral criminal activity is not based solely on when the activity occurred. To do so would “place[ ] too high a premium on the time of the collateral offense.”

  4. Corbett v. State

    113 So. 3d 965 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 5 times
    Misspelling the victim's name by one vowel was not a fatal variance

    The time in between the crimes did not render the Williams rule evidence irrelevant in light of the other strong factors that render the evidence relevant. See Kent v. State, 704 So.2d 121, 124 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (“[T]he admissibility of subsequent acts depends heavily on its probative value and prejudicial effect, which the trial court must balance.”); cf. State v. Drolet, 549 So.2d 1172, 1172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (“Evidence of acts approximately six months subsequent to the time of the charged crimes was not relevant to prove predisposition to commit those crimes.”). Corbett claims that the similar fact evidence was not relevant to prove Corbett's state of mind at the time of the Thanksgiving Day offenses, but the evidence was not offered for that purpose. It was offered to prove a common plan or scheme and to rebut Corbett's defense of consent.

  5. Burkey v. State

    922 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 29 times

    The rejection of an offer, especially an offer to perform an illegal act, has clear legal consequences and is thus admissible to show that the statement was made, irrespective of the truth of any incidental assertion. See Pronesti v. State, 847 So.2d 1165, 1166 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (holding that statements by defendant's employee to undercover police officer regarding sex for money were admissible as nonhearsay verbal acts); Kent v. State, 704 So.2d 121, 125 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (holding that the defendant's rejection of the detective's offer to buy drugs was relevant non-hearsay and admissible to prove his entrapment defense); see also A.J. v. State, 677 So.2d 935, 937 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (holding that medical bills are words of contract and admissible in a restitution hearing as non-hearsay verbal acts). We conclude that exclusion of this evidence was not harmless error, because testimony indicating that the defendant rejected the CI's request to sell her drugs was highly relevant and crucial to his defense that he did not participate in the sales transaction and that Mercer acted alone.

  6. Cotton v. State

    763 So. 2d 437 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 25 times
    Holding rule of completeness, also referred to as doctrine of curative admissibility, entitles defendant to admit exculpatory portions of his statement when a state witness has testified about incriminating remarks contemporaneously made by the defendant

    Id. at 1217. In Kent v. State, 704 So.2d 121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), also cited by appellant, testimony concerning conversations in which undercover officers sought to purchase cocaine from the defendant and the defendant refused to sell cocaine to them was ruled admissible as either nonhearsay, since it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, or as a state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule under section 90.803(3). The statements tended to show either inducement by the police or the defendant's lack of predisposition and were, therefore, relevant to his defense of entrapment.