Kent v. Bedford Apartments Co.

7 Citing cases

  1. Liggett v. Lew Realty LLC

    211 A.D.3d 473 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022)   Cited 4 times

    An agreement by a tenant to waive the benefit of any provision of the rent control law is expressly prohibited and void ( 9 NYCRR 2200.15 ; Grasso v. Matarazzo, 180 Misc.2d 686, 687, 694 N.Y.S.2d 837 [App. Term, 2d Dept. 1999] ). However, when McKinney and defendant settled their dispute over McKinney's status, McKinney was not a tenant ( Kent v. Bedford Apts. Co., 237 A.D.2d 140, 654 N.Y.S.2d 143 [1st Dept. 1997] ) . He was not on the lease and had no evident rights, other than being an occupant of the apartment who claimed that he had succession rights when Brown died.

  2. Liggett v. Lew Realty LLC

    2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 3378 (N.Y. 2024)

    The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the complaint (211 A.D.3d 473 [1st Dept 2022]). Relying on Kent v Bedford Apartments Co. (237 A.D.2d 140 [1st Dept 1997]), the court concluded that although an agreement by a tenant to waive the benefit of any provision of the rent control law is void, this protection did not apply to McKinney because he was not an established tenant when he signed the Stipulation. The Appellate Division also concluded that because Liggett's claim implicates how rents are set, it is akin to an FMRA and therefore barred by the statute of limitations (see 9 NYCRR 2522.3 [c]).

  3. Meyers v. Four Thirty Realty, LLC

    173 A.D.3d 543 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019)   Cited 1 times

    The 1995 order was available to defendant, regardless of whether it actually knew about it. Even accepting defendant's claim, that it was unaware of the 1995 order when it made that concession or filed its prior appeal, we perceive no public policy or other reason to disregard defendant's decision to concede the issue (seeMartin v. City of Cohoes , 37 N.Y.2d 162, 165, 371 N.Y.S.2d 687, 332 N.E.2d 867 [1975] ; Kent v. Bedford Apts. Co. , 237 A.D.2d 140, 654 N.Y.S.2d 143 [1st Dept. 1997] ). Defendant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate whether the apartment was properly deregulated, and elected to concede that it was subject to rent stabilization.

  4. Cenpark Realty, LLC v. Mesnikoff

    2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 52159 (N.Y. App. Term 2005)

    Tenant's defense of waiver and estoppel premised upon landlord's alleged acquiescence to tenant's use of the premises for business purposes since the inception of the tenancy is without legal merit. While parties, consistent with the purposes of rent regulation, may agree to confer rent stabilization status upon a residential tenant by contract or stipulation ( see Kent v. Bedford Apartments Co., 237 AD2d 140; West 56th and 57th Street Corp. v. Pearl, NYLJ, Nov. 30, 1993, at 33, col 2 [Mazzarelli, J.], app dismissed 242 AD2d 508), parties may not agree to exempt a premises from rent regulation through private agreements premised upon nonprimary residential occupancy ( see Draper v. Georgia Properties, 94 NY2d 809). Thus, to the extent that tenant rests upon an "agreement" evolving from landlord's long-term condonation of his occupancy as a nonprimary resident, the facts presented here are substantively indistinguishable from those of Draper and are similarly contrary to public policy.

  5. 546 W. 156 St. HDFC v. Smalls

    2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 51207 (N.Y. App. Term 2005)

    In accordance with the stipulation, landlord HDFC provided tenant with a rent stabilized lease and thereafter a rent stabilized renewal. Civil Court erred in denying tenant's motion to dismiss since, notwithstanding the statutory exemption otherwise available to landlord, the stipulation expressly conferring rent stabilization status upon the tenant is binding ( see Kent v. Bedford, 237 AD2d 140). While coverage under a statutory rent regulation scheme cannot be created by waiver or estoppel ( Heller v. Middagh Street Associates, 4 AD3d 332; Ruiz v. Chwatt Associates, 247 AD2d 308), nothing in the rent regulation laws prohibits a landlord from granting rent stabilization rights by express contract ( West 56th 57th Street Corp. v. Pearl, NYLJ, Nov. 30, 1993, at 33, col 2 [Sup.Ct., N.Y. Co., Mazzarelli, J.], app dismissed 242 AD2d 508; see Kent v. Bedford Apartments Co., supra; cf. 220 West 98 Realty v. New York Province of the Society of Jesus, NYLJ, Nov. 6, 2000, at 24, col 6 [App Term, 1st Dept], aff'd 291 AD2d 13).

  6. 12-62 Realty Corp. v. Scapula

    2004 N.Y. Slip Op. 50132 (N.Y. App. Term 2004)   Cited 3 times

    At this pre-answer stage of the proceeding, and without the advantage of a developed record, it is not established that there was a meeting of the minds to confer stabilized status or benefits upon the tenant, thereby overriding and/or modifying the 1986 stipulation which was subsequently reaffirmed in 1990. Nor has any public policy rationale been advanced for declining to enforce the so-ordered stipulations negotiated by counsel (see, Kent v. Bedford Apartments Co., 237 AD2d 140). This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

  7. East Eleventh Street Associates v. Breslow

    174 Misc. 2d 994 (N.Y. App. Term 1997)

    The Stipulation was an acknowledgment of the reciprocal right to attorney's fees and a knowing waiver of any right to object. Blum v. Graceton Estates, Inc., 228 A.D.2d 274, 644 N.Y.S.2d 35; Kent v. Bedford Apts. Co., et al., 237 A.D.2d 140, 654 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144. A tenant may not waive the benefit of any provision of the Rent Stabilization Code and the Tenant has not.