Summary
granting plaintiff's motion for reconsideration because a prior court order, dismissing the case without prejudice, might have resulted in a claim being time-barred
Summary of this case from AMBAC ASSURANCE CORPORATION v. EMC MORTGAGE CORPOpinion
05 Civ. 0727 (DAB).
July 22, 2005
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On June 2, 2005, the Court issued an Order dismissing the above-captioned case without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff now moves the Court pursuant to Local Civil Rule 6.3 to reconsider its ruling so that Plaintiff is granted leave to amend her Complaint. The Court presumes familiarity with its previous Order and therefore will not reiterate the factual background of the case here.
"The standards governing motions to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) and motions for reconsideration or reargument pursuant to Local Rule 6.3 are the same." Word v. Croce, No. 00 Civ. 6496, 2001 WL 755394, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2001). A motion for reconsideration "is appropriate only where the movant demonstrates that the Court has overlooked controlling decisions or factual matters that were put before it on the underlying motion . . . and which, had they been considered, might have reasonably altered the result before the court."Range Road Music, Inc. v. Music Sales Corp., 90 F.Supp.2d 390, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also Bonnie Co. Fashions, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 170 F.R.D. 111, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (same). A motion for reconsideration, furthermore, is not one in which a party may reargue "those issues already considered when a party does not like the way the original motion was resolved." In re Houbigant, Inc., 914 F.Supp. 997, 1001 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); thus Local Rule 6.3 should be "narrowly construed and strictly applied" to avoid repetitive arguments already submitted to the Court. National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights v. City of New York, 191 F.R.D. 52, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citation omitted). Moreover, the parties "may not address facts, issues or arguments not previously presented to the Court," U.S. Titan v. Guangzhou Zhen Hua Shipping Co., Ltd., 182 F.R.D. 97, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (citations omitted), for a motion to reconsider should never act "as a substitute for appealing from a final judgment." Bonnie Co., 170 F.R.D. at 113 (citation omitted).
Plaintiff argues that the Court, in dismissing the Complaint without granting leave to amend, overlooked well-established authority holding that, in circumstances similar to this case, the Court should permit Plaintiff to cure the initial jurisdictional defect by amending the Complaint to reflect the issuance of a copyright registration. Although Plaintiff acknowledges that the Court dismissed the action without prejudice, enabling Plaintiff to re-file her action under a new index number, "the Court's decision may nevertheless result in extreme prejudice to plaintiff because defendants have asserted the one-year statute of limitations as a defense to plaintiff's state law claim for invasion of privacy under Section 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law." (Pl.'s Mem. Law at 2.)
The new filing is also before this Court, as Case No. 05 Civ. 5483 (DAB).
Plaintiff also states that Plaintiff "requested permission to amend the Complaint in the event that the Court disagreed with her cited authorities."
The Court's review of Plaintiff's letter to the Court, dated April 4, 2005, did not reveal any request for permission to amend the Complaint. In that letter, Plaintiff stated that "In light of the authorities cited . . ., as well as the January 14, 2005 effective date of plaintiff's registration, we do not believe that an amended pleading should be necessary. However, if the Court prefers, we are ready and willing to file an amended complaint. . . ." (Pl.'s Letter of Apr. 4, 2005 at 2) (emphasis added). The Court's interpretation of Plaintiff's letter was a statement that it was willing to amend the Complaint if the Court to ordered her to do so, and not as a request by Plaintiff to amend the Complaint.
In support of her argument, Plaintiff cites cases decided by courts in this district where the court permitted the plaintiffs in those cases to amend their complaints to cure the jurisdictional defect. See J. Racenstein Co. v. Wallace, No. 96 Civ. 9222, 1997 WL 605107, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 1997) ("Where an action is commenced without registration being effected, the defect can be cured by subsequent registration, and an appropriate amendment to the complaint may be made to provide the necessary basis for subject matter jurisdiction."); Tooker v. Copley, 1987 WL 124315 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (court dismissed complaint without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and granted plaintiff leave to refile complaint);Conan Properties, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 601 F.Supp. 1179, 1182 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (court dismissed copyright infringement claims, other than those where the registered copyright were attached to complaint, and granted plaintiff leave to replead those claims);Charron v. Meaux, 60 F.R.D. 619, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (court granted leave to replead copyright claims "since there has been no showing that correction of the defect . . . would prejudice defendants"). Plaintiff also likens her case to Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 680 F.Supp. 658, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), where the court, in deciding a Motion for Preliminary Injunction, stated that "[t]he Copyright Office issued a registration before the court made its determination [on the Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief] . . . hence giving the court jurisdiction."
The cases cited by Plaintiff do not, as claimed, constitute "well-established authority" that the Court must grant leave to replead. The language in the cases cited is discretionary — the Court may grant leave to replead, but is not required to do so. Moreover, the Court already considered these cases prior to its June 2, 2005 Order. The Court also notes that in Demetriades, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint prior to the court's determination of the preliminary injunction motion. The amended complaint clearly gave the court jurisdiction over the matter.Demetriades does not stand for the proposition, as Plaintiff seems to imply, that the simple fact of the registration by the Copyright Office gives a court jurisdiction, without amending the pleading.
The Court also notes that a number of Plaintiff's parentheticals are misleading, either by misstating the holdings of the courts or by omitting certain significant facts.
However, as Plaintiff argues, the inability to replead the claims may prejudice Plaintiff's loss of privacy claim because the statute of limitations is generally not tolled when a case is dismissed without prejudice. See Favia v. Bronx Council of the Arts, No. 93 Civ. 5936, 1995 WL 358750, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1995).
Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider the Court's June 2, 2005 dismissal Order is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall file an Amended Complaint within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order.
The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to reopen the docket in this case.
SO ORDERED.