Kenney v. Chicago Great Western Railway Co.

8 Citing cases

  1. Morningstar Coffee v. Mainstream Develop

    No. C4-03-151 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2003)

    The objection at trial must state the specific ground for the objection if the ground is not apparent from the context. Minn.R.Evid. 103(a)(1); Kenney v. Chicago Great W. Ry. Co., 245 Minn. 284, 289, 71 N.W.2d 669, 673 (Minn. 1955). But where a party fails to object to an evidentiary error at trial, this court may take notice of the error if it is an error of fundamental law or a plain error affecting substantial rights.

  2. Ruppert v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co.

    392 N.W.2d 550 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 4 times
    Suggesting benefits may be terminated only if insured has been cured and thus requires no further treatment or if insured is receiving treatment for pre-existing condition

    "Ordinarily a finding of proximate cause is reserved to the jury." Kenney v. Chicago Great Western Railway Co., 245 Minn. 284, 290, 71 N.W.2d 669, 673 (1955). Therefore, we must determine whether the court's finding is clearly erroneous.

  3. Chicago Great Western Railway Company v. Smith

    228 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1955)   Cited 9 times

    "The great weight of authority supports the rule that medical expert testimony to be sufficient to take the case to the jury must be to the effect that the accident or injury probably caused the Insured's death; and that testimony to the effect that a causal connection between the accident or injury and Insured's ensuing death was possible, such as testimony that the accident or injury `might have,' or `may have,' or `could have' caused the death of Insured, is insufficient to take the case to the jury, because such testimony leaves the issue in the field of conjecture and permits the jury to speculate or guess as to the cause of death." In Kenney v. Chicago Great Western Railway Co., Minn., 71 N.W.2d 669, at page 673, the court states: "* * * Ordinarily a finding of proximate cause is reserved to the jury.

  4. Wenner v. Gulf Oil Corp.

    264 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1978)   Cited 24 times
    Finding that where the warranty and disclaimer on a herbicide label could not be reconciled with each other the language of the express warranty prevailed

    Defendant is apparently relying on the general rule that a hypothetical question must embody all or substantially all of the facts relating to the subject matter on which the opinion of the witness is asked. Kenney v. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co., 245 Minn. 284, 287, 71 N.W.2d 669, 672, certiorari denied, 350 U.S. 903, 76 S.Ct. 182, 100 L.Ed. 793 (1955). However, defendant's objection to the hypothetical question is without merit and can be refuted in several ways.

  5. McNab v. Jeppesen

    102 N.W.2d 709 (Minn. 1960)   Cited 19 times
    In McNab v. Jeppesen, 258 Minn. 15, 102 N.W.2d 709 (1960), inadmissible expert opinion testimony on the point of vehicle impact in an automobile accident was elicited by a defendant on cross-examination and objected to on the incorrect ground of lack of foundation only.

    Becker County Nat. Bank v. Davis, 204 Minn. 603, 284 N.W. 789; Baker v. City of South St. Paul, 202 Minn. 491, 279 N.W. 211. Opinion evidence, which would be inadmissible if objected to on that ground, has probative force if received without objections. Cameron v. Duluth-Superior Traction Co. 94 Minn. 104, 102 N.W. 208; Kenney v. Chicago G. W. Ry. Co. 245 Minn. 284, 71 N.W.2d 669, certiorari denied, 350 U.S. 903, 76 S.Ct. 182, 100 L. ed. 793. In the instant case plaintiff only objected to the foundation, but did not object on the ground of invasion of the province of the jury.

  6. Romano v. Dibbs

    98 N.W.2d 146 (Minn. 1959)   Cited 7 times

    We also observed in that case that "an adversary enjoys certain safeguards in that he may on cross-examination supply omitted facts and ask the expert if his opinion would be modified by them." See, also, Storbakken v. Soderberg, 246 Minn. 434, 75 N.W.2d 496; Kenney v. Chicago G. W. Ry. Co. 245 Minn. 284, 71 N.W.2d 669, certiorari denied, 350 U.S. 903, 76 S.Ct. 182, 100 L.ed. 793; McCormick, Some Observations upon the Opinion Rule and Expert Testimony, 23 Tex. L.Rev. 109. 2.

  7. State v. Williams

    No. A07-0690 (Minn. Ct. App. Sep. 16, 2008)

    Williams did not object to Jorgensen's testimony at trial on either of these grounds, and his challenges to her testimony here have therefore been waived. See Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996); Kenney v. Chicago Great W. Ry. Co., 245 Minn. 284, 289, 71 N.W.2d 669, 673 (1955) (concluding that defendant waived the right to have opinion testimony stricken or receive a new trial because the defendant failed to object to the expert's opinion and questioned the witness on cross-examination). Even were we to thoroughly analyze Williams's arguments on appeal, we would conclude that they are without merit for several reasons.

  8. State v. Schaeffer

    452 N.W.2d 719 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 2 times

    The Minnesota Supreme Court held that when a defendant failed to make an appropriate objection regarding opinion testimony given on cross-examination, he waived any right to question the admissibility of such testimony after trial. Kenney v. Chicago Great Western Railway Co., 245 Minn. 284, 289, 71 N.W.2d 669, 673 (1955). From the holding in Kenney, it follows that if defendant's attorney mentions the polygraph results and asks questions about it on cross-examination, he cannot later object to that evidence as constituting reversible error.