Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. OJ08009086
Bruiniers, J.
A father seeks writ relief from an order terminating his family reunification services, suspending visitation with his son, and setting a hearing to select a permanent plan for his son. We affirm.
I. Background
On February 11, 2008, M.A.F. (Mother) and Kenneth R. (Petitioner) were arrested after they fought and injured each other on a Caltrain train in front of their two-year-old son, J.G. On February 14, the Alameda County Social Services Agency (Agency) filed a juvenile dependency petition. (Welf. & Inst. Code § 300 et seq.) The petition described the February 11 incident and alleged that both Mother and Petitioner were intoxicated at the time of their arrests. Both were homeless and had criminal records, including arrests for drug possession, burglary, and domestic violence. They were together despite Mother’s active restraining order against Petitioner. The court ordered J.G. detained on February 15.
All further code references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
The detention report identified Petitioner as “the presumed father as he was living with the mother when the minor was born[,]” but the petition identified him as the alleged father.
A. Jurisdiction/Disposition Report and Hearing
In a February 28, 2008 combined jurisdiction and disposition report and March addendum, the Agency recommended denial of reunification services for Mother based on her failure to reunify with J.G.’s older siblings and a grant of reunification services for Petitioner. At an April 3 hearing at which neither Mother nor Petitioner was present, the court sustained the petition, denied reunification services to Mother, and conditioned services for Petitioner on a positive paternity test. The court scheduled a May 27 hearing to review the Agency’s due diligence in attempting to locate the parents, and a July 24 section 366.26 hearing on termination of parental rights.
Petitioner initially questioned paternity.
B. Petitioner’s Section 388 Petition and Grant of Services
On June 12, 2008, Petitioner filed a section 388 modification petition reporting that the paternity test was positive and asking for reunification services. At the July 24, 2008 hearing, Petitioner testified he had been released from jail on February 22, 2008, but had to surrender to custody again on March 22, 2008, and was finally released on April 29, 2008. He visited J.G. about two weeks after his April 29, 2008 release and three or four more times thereafter. He testified that he lived with Mother and J.G. from the end of 2006 until about February 2008, provided financial support for J.G., and held J.G. out as his son, and that J.G. called him “Daddy.” With the support of minor’s counsel, the court declared Petitioner the presumed father of J.G. and granted him reunification services. (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) The court set a status review hearing for October 2, 2008, which was continued to January 14, 2009.
On August 10, 2009, the Agency asked the court, in lieu of augmenting the record, to take judicial notice of two volumes of reporters’ transcripts which included proceedings on July 24, 2008, January 14, 2009, March 25, 2009, April 1, 2009, April 28, 2009, and June 9, 2009, that are part of the record in Petitioner’s related appeal of other orders in this matter, In re J.G. (A125231, app. pending). We construe the request as a motion to incorporate by reference parts of the record in a prior appeal in the same case pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.147(b)(1), and we grant the motion.
C. January 14, 2009 Status Review Hearing
In a status review report filed on January 13, 2009, the Agency reported that a social worker had been in monthly contact with Petitioner from July to October 2008. The social worker described to Petitioner the services he needed to access and spoke to him about identifying programs and tracking his progress. Petitioner did not sign his case plan until October 9, 2008, “due to the case being in the transition from the Adoptions Program to the SEED Family Reunifications Program.” The plan included individual counseling, an anger management program, a domestic violence prevention program, parenting classes, and drug testing.
In November 2008, Petitioner reported that he was living with friends and family in San Francisco and Pittsburg, and that he was both working at and receiving services from the Potrero Hill Neighborhood House in San Francisco (Potrero Hill). The social worker determined that Potrero Hill did not offer appropriate services for Petitioner and further that a conflict of interest existed if Petitioner received services from his employer. She set up weekly drug testing for Petitioner beginning in November. In December, she learned that Petitioner was not drug testing and he was still receiving services at Potrero Hill contrary to instructions. She referred him to Walden House, but Petitioner failed to follow through on the referral.
The social worker arranged regular weekly visitation between Petitioner and J.G. beginning December 4, 2008. Temporary foster parent S.R. had told the Agency that between June and November, “[Petitioner] would promise [J.G.] that he was coming to visit him on a certain day but would not follow through, leaving [J.G.] upset.” J.G.’s foster parent and his mental health clinician had reported that J.G. showed significant emotional distress that was “triggered” by his parents’ inconsistent visits, false promises of visits, and calls after long periods of absence. He would “put[] his fingers down his throat to induce vomiting[.] [H]e can also pull his hair, destroy[] things in his environment, play with his feces, cry uncontrollably, isolate himself, become withdrawn[,] and ha[ve] a hard time concentrating when triggered.” The clinician opined that these “triggers and his inability to concentrate can have an effect on his learning if it is not managed properly.” After Petitioner missed his first scheduled visit with J.G. in December, the assigned Child Welfare Worker informed him that he needed to contact the visitation supervisor by 11:00 a.m. on the day of a scheduled visit to confirm that he would attend, so as to avoid distress to J.G. when Petitioner did not show up. Petitioner continued to miss visits throughout December.
S.R. is J.G.’s paternal aunt and Petitioner’s sister.
The Agency concluded that Petitioner’s compliance with his case plan had been “minimal.” However, it recommended reunification services for Petitioner for an additional three months “as he has not been given a complete six months of Court ordered services.”
At the January 14, 2009 hearing, minor’s counsel asked the court to grant the social worker discretion to terminate visitation between Petitioner and J.G. if Petitioner did not start visiting consistently. The court stated, “[w]e will rely on the Social Services Agency and the worker to make sure that this child is protected with respect to visitation, and the absence of visitation should be addressed.” The following colloquy ensued:
“[PETITIONER’S COUNSEL]: Judge, are you ordering that the worker has discretion to terminate?
“THE COURT: Not to terminate.
“[PETITIONER’S COUNSEL]: You are ordering that they be terminated?
“THE COURT: I will bar visitation, stop visitation. Then the matter can proceed in this court if there is a dispute, any dispute, as to that.
“[PETITIONER’S COUNSEL]:... I object to the Court’s ruling. I think it is reasonable for the worker to have discretion if it continues; but I think that [minor’s counsel] was saying cut off visits if he continues to disappoint as opposed to cut off visitation right now.
“THE COURT: The discretion is to bar visitation. If it is a situation that creates trauma for this child, then she should bar visitation.
“[PETITIONER’S COUNSEL]: Correct. I have no problem with that.
“THE COURT: Right now the father has a right to visit the child. If he fails to visit the child and that creates distress for the child and detriment to this child’s emotional state, then the social worker is ordered to protect this child by barring visitation.”
The court questioned whether Petitioner had made any substantive progress on his case plan, but ordered three additional months of services and set a status review hearing for March 25, 2009.
D. March 25, 2009 Status Review Report and Hearing
In a status review report filed on March 16, 2009, the Agency reported that Petitioner had still failed to comply with his case plan following the January 14 hearing. At Petitioner’s last visit with J.G., on January 8, “there was very little interaction” between him and the child, and J.G. seemed agitated after the visit. The social worker warned Petitioner in writing that visitation would be terminated if he missed two more visits. On February 10, the social worker terminated visitation after Petitioner had missed four consecutive visits, including three subsequent to her warning letter. At a February 23 meeting with social worker, Petitioner “looked disheveled and appeared frustrated and angry as he stated that he has not been in compliance with his case plan or visited with [J.G.] due to deaths in his family and his mother going in and out of the hospital. [He] stated that he feels like a lot of pressure is on him and he cannot take it.... [He] stated that the Social Services Agency wants him to do ‘all of this stuff,’ but he has to work.”
The Agency also reported that J.G. had regressed since January 2009: “[H]e doesn’t have a particularly strong attachment to anyone and as a consequence he is starting to display some concerning behavior such as lack of cooperation, ambivalence to closeness, drinking from the toilet, sneaking food[,] and lying.” He was “experiencing a great deal of ambivalence and conflict around engaging in relationships and separation due to a lack of trust and the trauma that he has experienced.... [He was] expressing... this by being defiant, isolating himself, not engaging adults around him for assistance or comfort, becoming increasingly agitated during transitions, along with other self destructive behaviors.... [J.G.] has learned self reliance in that he has experienced adults in his life not being emotionally or physically available for him.”
The Agency recommended that reunification services be terminated for Petitioner. The court found that Petitioner’s progress in availing himself of the services provided to him had been “none.” At Petitioner’s request, the March 25, 2009 status review hearing was continued to May 26 for a contested hearing on termination of services. Petitioner’s request for reinstated visitation also was set for a contested hearing on April 1, which was then continued to April 28. On April 1, the May 26 date previously set for the hearing to contest termination of services was continued, at the request of Petitioner’s counsel, to June 9.
E. April 28, 2009 Visitation Hearing
In an April 1, 2009 addendum report, the Agency recommended that Petitioner’s visitation “remain suspended.” Attached was a March 31, 2009 letter from J.G.’s clinician, which stated that J.G.’s witnessing of the domestic violence between his parents on February 11, 2008, “compounded by multiple missed parental visits and multiple placements” had produced symptoms the clinician had witnessed, including “pulling his hair continuously (indicative of anxiety), difficulty tolerating frustration, repetitive isolated play, difficulty separating at the end of visits, depressed mood, dissociate episodes of staring into space, and defiant behaviors.... According to [J.G.]’s current and past caregivers,... he has difficulty sleeping at night, he has vomited after his parents have missed visits with him, he pulls continuously at his hair, he can be non compliant and defiant.... [¶] Because [J.G.]’s early experiences have already impacted his capacity to feel at ease, safe and secure, it would be to [his] detriment if he were exposed to an unstable and inconsistent primary relationship.... [J.G.] is at a crucial period in his formative development, when his brain is laying down the pathways that enable him to form reciprocal, creative and constructive relationships.”
At the April 28, 2009 hearing, after hearing testimony from the social worker and an offer of proof from Petitioner, the court found that “visitation will be extremely dangerous to this child. [¶]... [¶] He has reacted in a disturbing disorder during those visits.... Accordingly, the visitation will not be provided until this child has developed and is progressing so he can be with his father as quick as possible.” The following colloquy ensued:
“[PETITIONER’S COUNSEL]:... Just to clarify, are you continuing to vest the Agency with discretion as to visits?
“THE COURT: Yes. We hope that there will be visits as soon as possible; and that will be on the basis of hoping that this child will develop well with respect to his well-being.
“[AGENCY COUNSEL]: Your Honor, actually I would ask for a clear order that the Agency not provide visits, that that order come from you, and we can discuss this again at the next court date.... [¶]... [¶]
“THE COURT: I am relying on the Social Services Agency to proceed in the best interest of this child. [¶]... [¶] If the social worker then finds based on the information provided to the social worker that visitation would be appropriate, visitation should be provided.”
Following a sidebar conference, the court stated that it was not allowed to vest unlimited discretion over visitation in the social worker. “Based on that, the Court will issue the following order: [¶] Visitation with respect to the father will be suspended until the social worker decides that visitation would be in the child’s best interest, at which time he can request that the social worker return to this Court so that the Court can address and reinstate appropriate visitation by the father.” The Agency responded, “Thank you, your honor. We will file a 388 if that seems appropriate.”
F. June 9, 2009 Status Review Hearing
In a June 9, 2009 addendum report, the Agency again recommended termination of reunification services for Petitioner. Petitioner had told the social worker in April that he could not use Walden House’s services he had previously been referred to because of conflicts with his work schedule and he asked to be referred to services in Pittsburg. In June, he reported that he had not contacted the program in Pittsburg that he had requested and was not in a court required treatment program. He had not sought additional visits with J.G.
At the June 9, 2009 contested hearing, Petitioner was not present and the court denied a continuance. The court terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing for September 29. Petitioner seeks writ relief from this order.
II. Discussion
A. Scope of Writ Proceeding
As a preliminary matter, we define the limited scope of this writ proceeding. As we explain, Petitioner attempts to raise certain issues in this proceeding that are not properly before us.
Petitioner’s petition asks us to vacate the juvenile court’s order for the September 29, 2009 section 366.26 hearing and to order visitation with J.G. This petition was filed pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (l), which requires an order setting a section 366.26 hearing to be challenged by writ before it is appealed, and pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452. Rule 8.450(e) directs a petitioner to file a notice of intent to file a writ petition, in which the petitioner must identify “all known dates of the hearing that resulted in the order under review.” (Rule 8.450(e)(2).) On his notice of intent, Petitioner identifies the following hearing dates: October 2, 2008, April 28, 2009, and June 9, 2009. However, only June 9, 2009, is a date “of the hearingthat resulted in the order under review.” (Rule 8.450(e)(2), italics added.) The “October 2, 2008” hearing—which did not take place on October 2, 2008, but was continued to January 14, 2009—was a six-month status review hearing at which services were continued. The April 28, 2009 hearing was a special hearing on the issue of visitation. Neither was a hearing that resulted in an order setting a section 366.26 hearing.
All rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
Section 366.26, subdivision (l) applies not only to the specific order setting the section 366.26 hearing, but to “[a]ll orders issued at a hearing in which a section 366.26 hearing is ordered.” (In re Tabitha W. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 811, 817, italics added.) However, the “October 2, 2008” (January 14, 2009) and April 28, 2009 orders do not fall within this rule.
On June 12, 2009, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal from the following “findings and orders of the court:” “Previous to 4/28/2009 the social welfare agency stopped visits between father and son (minor [J.G.])[.] [O]n 4/28/2009 appellant contested this. Court had granted visitation discretion to agency on 10/02/08.” Petitioner’s reference to an October 2, 2008 order presumably was intended as a reference to the January 14, 2009 visitation order. There is a timeliness issue presented in the appeal, since the time to appeal the January 14, 2009 order would have expired in March 2009. (§ 395, subd. (a)(1); rule 8.400(d).) To the extent Petitioner timely appealed the April 28, 2009 order, that order will be reviewed in the separate pending appeal. (In re J.G. (A125231, app. pending).) The challenges Petitioner raises in this writ proceeding to the January 14 and April 28, 2009 orders are therefore not properly before us and we do not address those arguments in this opinion.
B. Reasonable Services
Petitioner challenges the trial court’s June 9, 2009 finding that the Agency provided him with reasonable services.
As a presumed father, Petitioner was entitled to child welfare services for a statutorily-limited period of time. (Former § 361.5, subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 2007, ch. 565, § 1 & Stats. 2007, ch. 583, § 25.5; § 361.5, subds. (a), (a)(1)(B), (a)(3), (a)(4).) Before it could terminate Petitioner’s services and schedule a section 366.26 termination hearing, the court had to first find that the Agency had provided him with reasonable reunification services. (§§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1), (2); 366.22, subd. (a).) Arguably, the standard of proof was clear and convincing evidence. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1), (2).) The trial court implicitly applied this standard to the adequacy of the services provided, finding by clear and convincing evidence “that the father failed to participate regularly and make substantial progress in the court-ordered treatment plan.” We review a reasonable services finding for substantial evidence, resolving all conflicts in the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the court’s ruling. (Elijah R. v. Superior Court(1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.)
Unlike section 366.21, subdivision (g)(1) (which applies to 12-month hearings), section 366.22, subdivision (a) (which applies to 18-month hearings) does not expressly condition the scheduling of a section 366.26 hearing on a finding that reasonable services have been offered or provided. However, other statutes imply such a requirement. (See §§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1) [mentioning condition in context of requiring advisements regarding the 18-month hearing], 366.22, subd. (b) [imposing condition at 24-month hearing].) For purposes of deciding this case, we assume the condition applies at the 18 month hearing.
Ordinarily, for a child like J.G. who was less than three years old on the date of his initial removal from his parents’ custody, court-ordered services are limited to six months. (Former § 361.5, subd. (a)(2), as amended by Stats. 2007, ch. 565, § 1 & Stats. 2007, ch. 583, § 25.5; § 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B).) However, if the court finds at the six-month review hearing that reasonable services were not provided, it must continue the case for a 12-month permanency hearing. (§ 366.21, subd. (e).) Similarly, if the court finds at the 12-month hearing that reasonable services were not offered or provided, the court may continue the case for six additional months of services. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1).)
Reunification services should be tailored to the specific needs of a particular family. (In re Precious J. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1474.) Services will be found reasonable if the Agency has “ ‘identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult....’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 1474–1475.) “The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547.)
Petitioner’s only specific complaint about his services is the termination of his visitation in February 2009. As he observes, a reunification plan must include visitation between the parent and child “as frequent[ly] as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A) (italics added); In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310, 317.)
As an initial matter, Petitioner’s claim is forfeited because he fails to support the argument with citations to the record, much less “set forth all the significant facts [relevant to our substantial evidence review of the court’s ruling], not just those beneficial to the appellant.” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 402, 408.)
In any event, the reasonableness of his services is amply demonstrated by the record. Specifically, the Agency made reasonable efforts to facilitate visitation between Petitioner and J.G. even after Petitioner’s egregious inconsistency in visiting caused J.G. significant and documented emotional distress. Within two weeks of Petitioner’s release from jail on April 29, 2008, the Agency arranged for Petitioner to visit J.G. at S.R.’s home. Thereafter, Petitioner visited J.G. at S.R.’s house by arrangement directly with S.R. He visited J.G. only three or four other times for about three or four hours each time between June and September. Petitioner’s case plan, which was signed in October, also provided for regular visitation. Petitioner visited J.G. once at S.R.’s house and once at another location in November, and regular weekly visitation was scheduled at an Agency facility beginning December 4.
Visitation was only terminated after Petitioner missed multiple visits and J.G.’s caretakers and clinician reported that the child experienced severe distress as a consequence of those missed visits. S.R. told the Agency in 2008 that Petitioner repeatedly failed to show up when he promised J.G. he would visit, causing J.G. to become upset. Petitioner continued to miss his visits in December when J.G. was living with the foster family. The foster parent confirmed that J.G. showed significant emotional distress when his parents visited inconsistently, made false promises of visits, and called after long periods of absence. He would “put[] his fingers down his throat to induce vomiting... pull his hair, destroy[] things in his environment, play with his feces, cry uncontrollably, isolate himself, become withdrawn[,] and ha[ve] a hard time concentrating when triggered.” These reports were confirmed by J.G.’s clinician, who opined that the distress could affect J.G.’s development if not managed properly.
The Agency tried to provide an arrangement that would allow visits to continue while still protecting J.G. from distress when appointments were missed. The social worker instructed Petitioner on December 11, 2008, to contact the visitation supervisor by 11:00 a.m. on the day of a scheduled visit to confirm that he would attend. Petitioner, however, missed every appointment that month. When he finally showed up to visit J.G. on January 8, 2009 (their last visit together), “there was very little interaction” between him and the child and J.G. seemed agitated afterward. Petitioner continued to miss visits and the Agency warned him in writing that his visitation would be terminated if the pattern continued. Petitioner did not respond to the letter and did not make any request for assistance in attending visits. He missed three more visits and the Agency informed him visitation was terminated. When Petitioner discussed these issues in a meeting with the social worker, he rationalized his lack of compliance with his case plan, saying that he felt under a lot of pressure and just wanted his child back. The Agency and the court could reasonably conclude the Petitioner’s behavior pattern in failing to visit with his child was not likely to change.
In the meantime, J.G.’s clinician indicated that J.G. had regressed and was “being defiant, isolating himself, not engaging adults around him for assistance or comfort” in part because he had “experienced adults in his life not being emotionally or physically available for him.” She was working with him in part by “creating a safe place for him to be himself and to know that he’ll be loved and cared for.” The Agency and the court could reasonably conclude that a resumption of a visitation schedule would further hinder J.G.’s healing process.
In sum, the record amply supports the termination of visitation as an element of Petitioner’s reunification plan. The plan also included provision of many other services, including repeated referrals to drug treatment, parenting education, anger management and domestic violence programs. Moreover, as noted in the footnote 9 ante, the services were provided for much longer than the presumptive six-month period following J.G.’s initial disposition hearing. Unfortunately, Petitioner declined to take advantage of these referrals. The court’s June 9, 2009 finding that the Agency had provided or offered Petitioner reasonable services is supported by substantial evidence.
C. Delegation of Discretion over Visitation
Petitioner argues the trial court erred by delegating complete discretion over visitation to the Agency. (See In re S.H., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at pp. 317–318.) This argument is not properly before us in this proceeding because the court did not delegate discretion over visitation at the June 9, 2009 hearing.
Again, as a preliminary matter, Petitioner has forfeited this argument because he again provides no record citations to support it. (In re S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.) Record citations were necessary to identify the order in which the court allegedly improperly delegated discretion over visitation.
Our review of the record discloses that the court did delegate discretion over visitation to the Agency in its January 14, 2009 ruling. However, as noted, the time to appeal that order has expired. (§ 395, subd. (a)(1); rule 8.400(d).) Therefore, the issue is forfeited and cannot be renewed in this writ proceeding challenging a subsequent order. (Wanda B. v. Superior Court (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1391, 1396.)
Regardless, at least from April 28, 2009, forward discretion over visitation was no longer delegated to the Agency. At the April 28 hearing, the court ruled: “Visitation with respect to the father will be suspended until the social worker decides that visitation would be in the child’s best interest, at which time he can request that the social worker return to this Court so that the Court can address and reinstate appropriate visitation by the father.” (Italics added.) In other words, the court did not delegate to the Agency the discretion of when and whether to resume visits between Petitioner and J.G., but merely instructed the Agency to return to court (via a section 388 modification petition based on changed circumstances) if it determined resumption of visitation was consistent with J.G.’s well-being. Although the court did not expressly state that Petitioner could file a similar petition, the statute itself authorized Petitioner to do so. (§ 388, subd. (a).)
Although the April 28, 2009 order is not reviewable in this action, the court’s June 9 oral ruling included the following statement: “As for visitation between [J.G.] and the father, it was suspended by the Court on April 28th, 2009 as visitation would not be in the child’s best interest.” In context, the statement is best understood as a continuation of the April 28 order regarding visitation. That is, on June 9 the court again ordered visitation between Petitioner and J.G. to be suspended subject to a section 388 petition for modification. There was no delegation of discretion over visitation in this June 9 hearing, and we reject Petitioner’s claim of error.
D. Denial of Continuance
Petitioner argues the court abused its discretion in not continuing the June 9, 2009 hearing at his attorney’s request.
At the outset of the June 9, 2009 hearing, Petitioner’s attorney said, “The father has asked me by telephone to ask your Honor for a continuance.” He said he had spoken to Petitioner that morning and Petitioner “was intending to come and then I received a recorded message at my office that stated that he had fallen ill and was not coming and asked me to ask you to continue it.” Minor’s counsel and the Agency objected to a continuance, noting that Petitioner had twice been ordered to appear for the hearing, and the court denied the request.
Again, Petitioner’s argument is forfeited because it consists of nothing more than a paraphrasing of the statute on continuances, section 352, and a bare assertion of error. (In re S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408 [“To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error”].)
The claim in any event lacks merit. Although the court may continue a hearing beyond statutory time limits if the continuance is consistent with the child’s interests, the court must give substantial weight to a minor’s need for permanence and stability. (§ 352.) J.G., who was under the age of three at the time he was first removed from his parents’ care, had been a dependent of the court for more than one year by the time of the June 9, 2009 hearing. Throughout the reunification period, Petitioner’s progress in his case plan had been minimal and his intermittent visitation had been terminated to protect the child from further emotional distress. In these circumstances, J.G.’s interest in permanence and stability were factors heavily favoring denial of a continuance. On the other end of the scale, Petitioner provided no direct or reliable information showing “good cause” for a continuance, and the court did not need to accord much weight to his last minute and unsubstantiated claim that he had “fallen ill.” (Ibid.) His showing was far from sufficient to justify a further departure from the statutory time limits and to further delay J.G.’s permanent plan.
The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s unsupported oral request for a continuance at the outset of the June 9, 2009 hearing.
III. Disposition
The petition to set aside the June 9, 2009 order terminating his reunification services, continuing the suspension of visitation, and setting a section 366.26 hearing is denied.
We concur: Jones, P. J., Needham, J.
Here, the trial court granted the Agency’s request to continue the six-month status review hearing from October 2, 2008, to January 14, 2009, so that Petitioner could receive a full six months of services. On January 14, 2009, the court set a further status review hearing for March 25, 2009, just short of the deadline for the 12-month permanency hearing, April 3, 2009. (Former §§ 366.21, subd. (f), as amended by Stats. 2008, ch. 482, § 2; 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(C), as amended by Stats. 2008, ch. 482, § 1.7; see also §§ 366.21, subd. (f), 361.49.) The March 25, 2009 hearing was ultimately continued to June 9, 2009. It is not clear whether the June 9, 2009 hearing is properly characterized as a 12-month or an 18-month hearing.
At a 12-month hearing, the court must find by “clear and convincing evidence” that reasonable services have been provided or offered to the parents before it can set a section 366.26 termination hearing. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(2).) At an 18-month hearing, the court must determine whether reasonable services were provided or offered to the parents. (§ 366.22, subd. (a).) No standard of proof is specified. (Ibid.) Where no standard of proof is specified, a preponderance of the evidence standard ordinarily applies. (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547–548.)
If the June 9, 2009 hearing was a continuation of the March 2009 12-month hearing, the clear and convincing standard would apply. Alternatively, if it was an 18 month hearing, the preponderance standard may have applied. We find that substantial evidence supports the finding that reasonable services were provided to Petitioner regardless of the applicable standard of proof.