Kennet v. United Mineworkers of America

15 Citing cases

  1. Harper v. Lewis

    186 F. Supp. 285 (D.D.C. 1960)   Cited 2 times

    Barlow v. Roche (Lewis), supra, and 2 Scott, Trusts, §§ 198, 198.1 (1956). There is also a diversity of opinion among the courts as to the amount of judicial review available in cases similar to this one. Certainly, the furtherest the courts have gone in establishing the extent of judicial review is that expressed by the court in Kennet v. United Mineworkers, etc., 1960, 183 F. Supp. 315, 318: Compare Hobbs v. Lewis, supra, and Kennet v. United Mineworkers of America, D.C.D.C. 1960, 183 F. Supp. 315 with Ruth v. Lewis, supra.

  2. Szuch v. Lewis

    193 F. Supp. 831 (D.D.C. 1960)   Cited 10 times

    "It thus becomes unnecessary to discuss the defense of the statute of limitations, also raised as a defense because the payment of a pension is a continuing obligation and no back payments before institution of suit are included in the findings herein, for the reasons stated." In Kennet v. United Mine Workers, D.C. 1960, 183 F. Supp. 315, (Holtzoff, J.), the Court adopted the contractual view. The Court there, feeling that the right to a pension when the eligibility requirements are met is part of the compensation of a coal worker, stated that the employee has a right to enforce the contract as a third-party beneficiary.

  3. Gambrell v. Lewis

    167 A.2d 605 (D.C. 1961)   Cited 2 times

    Appellant argues that while employed by the signatory operator her husband helped to produce the coal upon which his employer's contribution to the Fund was based, and that he thereby acquired a vested right in the Fund extending beyond the period of that employment. Citing among others Kennet v. United Mineworkers of America, D.C.D.C., 183 F. Supp. 315, 318, where the court said that an "employee who meets the test of eligibility" has "legal rights" in the Fund whether they are characterized as vested or inchoate. We must hold that the act of qualifying as eligible is the essential factor creating a beneficiary's rights under the Agreement.

  4. Marlowe v. Roche

    289 F.2d 786 (D.C. Cir. 1961)

    The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. Kennett v. Roche, No. 15892, D.C. Cir., Dec. 20, 1960; Kennet v. United Mine Workers, D.C.D.C. 1960, 183 F. Supp. 315. Affirmed.

  5. Danti v. Lewis

    312 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1962)   Cited 80 times
    Holding a decision “arbitrary and capricious” where it was based on a failure to comply with a resolution “which did not exist when [the application] was filed, when in fact the application was sufficient to establish eligibility under standards at the time it was received”

    The scope of judicial review of the Trustees' decision that an applicant is not a beneficiary of the Fund has been discussed in several decisions of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, as well as in decisions of courts in other jurisdictions. See Hobbs v. Lewis, 159 F. Supp. 282 (D.D.C. 1958); Kennet v. United Mineworkers of America, 183 F. Supp. 315 (D.D.C. 1960). Compare Ruth v. Lewis, 166 F. Supp. 346 (D.D.C. 1958); Barlow v. Roche, 161 A.2d 58 (D.C.Mun.App. 1960).

  6. Kosty v. Lewis

    319 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1963)   Cited 95 times
    In Kosty, the plaintiff miner was already eligible for retirement and pension rights at the time the pension eligibility requirement was changed without notice or grace period.

    Stated another way, our interest here is directed to the reasonableness of the opportunity afforded to mature pension eligibility under current standards where all that is lacking is the actual termination of employment, rather than in debating whether such eligibility should be regarded in substance as already having been matured. Danti v. Lewis, supra; compare Ruth v. Lewis, 166 F. Supp. 346 (D.D.C. 1958), with Hobbs v. Lewis, 159 F. Supp. 282 (D.D.C. 1958); cf. Kennet v. United Mine Workers of America, 183 F. Supp. 315, 317-318 (D.D.C. 1960). This brings us to appellant's second major contention, which is that the Trustees acted arbitrarily in altering the eligibility requirement in respect of years of service without prior notice of any kind or the provision of an opportunity rationally calculated to give appellant an opportunity to elect between taking his pension or continuing in employment subject to the new requirement.

  7. Ramsey v. U. Mine Wrks. of Am. Welf. Retire. Fund

    231 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Tenn. 1964)   Cited 5 times

    The difficulty presented is by use of the word "detailed". It is clear that the language of the National Wage Agreement with reference to the establishment of the Welfare Fund provides a basis for disbursement of the Welfare Fund. When the National Wage Agreement is read in conjunction with all of the provisions of Section 302(c) which govern in some detail the establishment and the operation of the trust, it is apparent that a legally sufficient trust is established to be the subject of enforcement in the courts. Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corporation, (C.C.A.6, 1958) 259 F.2d 346; Kennet v. U.M.W. of A., (D.C., D.C., 1960) 183 F. Supp. 315; Lewis v. Mill Ridge Coals, Inc., (C.C.A.6, 1962) 298 F.2d 552. It is apparent from the legislative history of Section 302(c) that the concern of Congress was to permit the establishment of welfare funds only where, among other matters, such funds were set apart in a trust legally enforcible at the instance of the employee beneficiaries.

  8. Burk v. Lewis

    282 F. Supp. 620 (D.D.C. 1968)

    Danti v. Lewis, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 105, 108, 312 F.2d 345, 348 (1962); Kosty v. Lewis, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 343, 346, 319 F.2d 744, 747 (1963); Miniard v. Lewis, 387 F.2d 864 (U.S.App.D.C., December 19, 1967); Szuch v. Lewis, 193 F.Supp. 831, 832 (D.C.1960); Kennet v. United Mine Workers of America, 183 F.Supp. 315, 318 (D.C.1960).

  9. Haynes v. Lewis

    298 F. Supp. 331 (D.D.C. 1969)   Cited 4 times
    In Haynes v. Lewis, 298 F. Supp. 331, 336 (D.D.C. 1969), the Court held that it was justified to exclude workers who had left the bargaining unit prior to the establishment of the trust fund.

    Where the interpretation of an eligibility requirement is deemed reasonable and where there is substantial evidence to support the Trustees' application of that requirement, as interpreted, the Court may not find the determination of the Trustees to be arbitrary or capricious or made in bad faith. Kennet v. United Mine Workers of America, 183 F. Supp. 315 (D.D.C. 1960) aff'd per curiam No. 15,892, D.C. Cir., December 20, 1960. This Court has concluded that the Trustees were reasonable in interpreting the eligibility requirement of "classified" employment set out in Resolution 41 to require reference to the collective bargaining agreement in effect at the time the service was performed.

  10. Collins v. United Mine Workers of Am. W. R. Fund

    298 F. Supp. 964 (D.D.C. 1969)   Cited 8 times

    The scope of review is, however, very narrow and is limited in the manner just stated. Danti v. Lewis, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 105, 108, 312 F.2d 345; Kosty v. Lewis, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 343, 346, 319 F.2d 744; Kennet v. United Mineworkers of America, D.C., 183 F. Supp. 315, 317. The next step to be taken is to extend this authority of the courts to setting aside and declaring invalid a qualification for eligibility for a pension, if the Court concludes that the requirement is arbitrary and capricious.