Stated another way, our interest here is directed to the reasonableness of the opportunity afforded to mature pension eligibility under current standards where all that is lacking is the actual termination of employment, rather than in debating whether such eligibility should be regarded in substance as already having been matured. Danti v. Lewis, supra; compare Ruth v. Lewis, 166 F. Supp. 346 (D.D.C. 1958), with Hobbs v. Lewis, 159 F. Supp. 282 (D.D.C. 1958); cf. Kennet v. United Mine Workers of America, 183 F. Supp. 315, 317-318 (D.D.C. 1960). This brings us to appellant's second major contention, which is that the Trustees acted arbitrarily in altering the eligibility requirement in respect of years of service without prior notice of any kind or the provision of an opportunity rationally calculated to give appellant an opportunity to elect between taking his pension or continuing in employment subject to the new requirement.
May's claim that Corley lacks standing to bring an action on behalf of the plan is not supported by District of Columbia case law. See Kennet v. United Mineworkers of America, 183 F. Supp. 315, 317 (D.D.C. 1960). 2.
"It thus becomes unnecessary to discuss the defense of the statute of limitations, also raised as a defense because the payment of a pension is a continuing obligation and no back payments before institution of suit are included in the findings herein, for the reasons stated." In Kennet v. United Mine Workers, D.C. 1960, 183 F. Supp. 315, (Holtzoff, J.), the Court adopted the contractual view. The Court there, feeling that the right to a pension when the eligibility requirements are met is part of the compensation of a coal worker, stated that the employee has a right to enforce the contract as a third-party beneficiary.