It is undisputed that the employer had notice of the injury within two days thereof, and therefore full opportunity to investigate the circumstances surrounding the accident and injury. After the approval of the compromise settlement agreement by the Industrial Accident Board, the claimant was excused from filing a claim for compensation because thereafter, under the Texas authorities, the Board had no jurisdiction to act until the agreement had been duly set aside. Kennedy v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, Tex.Civ.App., 121 S.W.2d 434, 439; Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Hilton, 126 Tex. 497, 87 S.W.2d 1081. Clearly, under the evidence, the issue of good cause for not sooner filing her claim was one for the trier of the facts. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cobb, 5 Cir., 131 F.2d 603; Hayes v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 140 S.W.2d 250.

The jury returned an instructed verdict for the association and a judgment was rendered that plaintiff take nothing. That judgment was reversed by the Court of Civil Appeals and the cause remanded to the trial court with one of the justices dissenting, 121 S.W.2d 434, and the insurance association has brought error to the Supreme Court. The case was referred to the Commission of Appeals, Section A, for their opinion thereon and the Supreme Court adopted same and ordered judgment entered in accordance therewith.

We do not embrace the suggestion, because we are committed to the long established Texas law that fraud will vitiate a contract if a fraudulent representation is relied upon to the extent that it was a material factor in inducing the making of the contract. Kennedy v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 121 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1938), aff'd, 135 Tex. 486, 143 S.W.2d 583 (1940). CONCLUSION

Most of the courts faced with the question have agreed that if the evidence supports this contention, and also shows that the injuries were more extensive or serious than supposed, the release can be avoided, even though there may have been no intention to deceive the releasor, such an innocent misrepresentation being taken as evidence of a mutual mistake or of what is sometimes called 'constructive fraud'. Graves v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co., 138 Tex. 589, 161 S.W.2d 464 (1942); Kennedy v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 121 S.W.2d 434 (Tex.Civ.App., Dallas 1938, affirmed 135 Tex. 486, 143 S.W.2d 583); Jones v. Traders General Ins. Co., 188 S.W.2d 739 (Tex.Civ.App., Eastland 1945); General Accident Fire Life Assur. Corp. v. Marker, 298 S.W.2d 848 (Tex.Civ.App., Galveston 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.); and Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735 (Tex.Sup. 1964). See also cases collated in 71 A.L.R.2d 118 — 126.

It is sufficient if the fraudulent representation is relied upon to the extent that it was a material factor in inducing the making of the contract, and without which the same would not have been made.' The holding the case of Kennedy v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, Tex.Civ.App., 121 S.W.2d 434, is to the same effect and was affirmed by the Commission of Appeals at 135 Tex. 486, 143 S.W.2d 583. This last cited opinion was adopted by the Supreme Court.

We think this was sufficient to show that the claim had been filed within time and in such manner as to confer jurisdiction on the Board. Central Surety Insurance Corporation v. McCowan, Tex.Civ.App. 93 S.W.2d 472, 475; Casualty Reciprocal Association v. Berry, Tex.Civ.App. 90 S.W.2d 595; Commercial Casualty Insurance Company v. Hilton, 126 Tex. 497, 87 S.W.2d 1081, 89 S.W.2d 1116 pars. 3, 4-5; Kennedy v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association, Tex. Civ. App. 121 S.W.2d 434, par. 10. The contention is therefore overruled.