Diehl v. A.P. Green Fire Brick Co., 299 Mo. 641, 253 S.W. 984; Kansas City ex rel. Barlow v. Robinson, 322 Mo. 1050, 17 S.W.2d 977; Lone Star Gas Co. v. Parsons, 159 Okla. 52, 14 P.2d 369; Mathis v. Granger Brick Tile Co., 85 Wn. 634, 149 P. 3; Lee v. Georgia Forest Products Co., 44 Ga. App. 850, 163 S.E. 267; Mills v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 140 Ga. 181, 78 S.E. 816, Ann.Cas. 1914C, 1098; Luhman v. Hoover, 6 Cir., 100 F.2d 127; Harriman v. Pittsburgh, C. St. L.R. Co., 45 Ohio St. 11, 12 N.E. 451, 4 Am.St.Rep. 507; Butrick v. Snyder, 236 Mich. 300, 210 N.W. 311; Vills v. City of Cloquet, 119 Minn. 277, 138 N.W. 33; Vallency v. Rigillo, 91 N.J. Law 307, 102 A. 348; Town of Depew, Creek County v. Kilgore, 117 Okla. 263, 246 P. 606; Smith v. Smith-Peterson Co., 56 Nev. 79, 45 P.2d 785, 100 A.L.R. 440; Olson v. Gill Home Investment Co., 58 Wn. 151, 108 P. 140, 27 L.R.A., N.S., 884. Hale v. Pacific Telephone Telegraph Co., 42 Cal.App. 55, 183 P. 280; Kennedy v. Independent Quarry Construction Co., 316 Mo. 782, 291 S.W. 475; Perry v. Rochester Line Co., 219 N.Y. 60, 113 N.E. 529, L.R.A. 1917B, 1058. In the first class of cases, it is generally held that the wrongful act of an immature trespasser because of his immaturity and lack of understanding is not an efficient, intervening cause and that the original wrongdoer should have realized that the young and immature who have access to the premises might come into possession of such explosives, carry them away, and thereby cause injury to themselves or others.
This court has clearly delineated the characteristics of an independent intervening cause. Smith v. Mabrey, 348 Mo. 644, 154 S.W.2d 770; Kennedy v. Independent Quarry Construction Co., 316 Mo. 782, 291 S.W. 475. (8) Respondent's Instruction 1 is erroneous because it predicates a recovery upon a theory which is not supported by any evidence. It hypothesizes that "the reels of cable . . . started to move and roll . . . and that the rolling and shifting . . . made it dangerous and unsafe for plaintiff to remain in said car." (9) The instruction is confusing and misleading.
In fact it would almost have required the gift of prophecy, which corporations are not required to possess or exercise. A defendant is not required to foresee occurrences which are so unusual and extraordinary that no reasonably prudent person could anticipate them. Ray on Negligence of Imposed Duties, p. 133; Fuchs v. St. Louis, 167 Mo. 620; Kennedy v. Quarry Co., 291 S.W. 475; Ward v. Ely-Walker D.G. Bldg. Co., 248 Mo. 348; Wecker v. Grafeman-McIntosh Ice Cream Co., 31 S.W.2d 974; Mattingly v. Broderick, 36 S.W.2d 415; Cole v. Uhlmann Grain Co., 100 S.W.2d 311; Webb's Pollock on Torts, p. 45; Jones v. Ry Co., 63 S.W.2d 94; Nelson v. Heinz Stove Co., 8 S.W.2d 918; Mann v. Pulliam, 127 S.W.2d 426; State ex rel. v. Lusk, 271 Mo. 463; Graney v. Road Co., 157 Mo. 666; Mullen v. Lowden, 124 S.W. 1152; Carnahan v. Railway Co., 338 Mo. 23, 88 S.W.2d 1030; Amer. Brew. Assn. v. Talbot, 141 Mo. 674; De Moss v. K. Rys. Co., 246 S.W. 566; McCullom v. Winnwood Amusement Co., 59 S.W.2d 693; Williams v. Terminal Ry. Assn., 98 S.W.2d 651; Lotta v. K.C. Pub. Serv. Co., 117 S.W.2d 296; Ilgenfritz v. Mo. Power L. Co., 101 S.W.2d 723; Nephler v. Woodward. 200 Mo. 179; Luettecke v. St. Louis, 140 S.W.2d 45; State ex rel. Trading Post Co. v. Shain, 116 S.W.2d 99; Hayes v. Kresge Co., 100 S.W.2d 325; Federal Cold Stor. Co. v. Pupello, 139 S.W.2d 996; Rose v. Thompson, 140 S.W.2d
(1) The demurrers to the evidence should have been sustained because the evidence fails to show that the alleged injuries to the plaintiff were the proximate result of the negligence charged. Kennedy v. Construction Co., 291 S.W. 475, 316 Mo. 791; Chittick v. Philadelphia Rapid Tr. Co., 224 Pa. 13, 73 A. 4; Perkins v. Wilcox, 294 Mo. 700, 242 S.W. 795; Ward v. Ely-Walker D.G. Co., 248 Mo. 348, 154 S.W. 478; Haley v. St. Louis Transit Co., 179 Mo. 30, 77 S.W. 731; Wilson v. Ry. Co., 129 Mo. 658, 108 S.W. 590; Hall v. New York Tel. Co., 214 N.Y. 49, 108 N.E. 182; Brush Elec. L. P. Co. v. Lefevre, 93 Tex. 604, 57 S.W. 640; Phoenix L. F. Co. v. Bennett, 8 Ariz. 314, 74 P. 48; Mitchell v. Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354; Ewing v. Ry. Co., 14 0 Pa. 40, 23 A. 340. The evidence wholly fails to show that the alleged injuries to the plaintiff were such as could reasonably and naturally have been anticipated by the defendants, and were the result of such an extraordinary and unusual occurrence that they cannot be said to have been the proximate results of the alleged negligence. Chittick v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 224 Pa. 13, 73 A. 6; Graney v. Ry. Co., 157 Mo. 666, 57 S.W. 276; Lowe v. Railroad Co., 265 Mo. 587, 178 S.W. 44
Salmon v. Kansas City, 241 Mo. 38; Kansas City ex rel. Blumb v. O'Connell, 99 Mo. 357; Gerber v. Kansas City, 304 Mo. 157. (c) The negligence of William H. Wilson was an intervening proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. Shields v. Costello, 229 S.W. 411; Diehl v. Fire Brick Co., 253 S.W. 984; Kennedy v. Quarry Construction Co., 291 S.W. 475. (2) The city, in attempting to create a new cause of action in the plaintiff, exceeding its lawful powers, in violation of Article XIV of the Constitution of the United States.
(1) The court did not err in refusing appellant's instruction number one in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence offered at the close of plaintiff's case. The weight of evidence is for the jury, and after the triers of fact have passed on the evidence and the trial court passes on the sufficiency of the evidence on a motion for a new trial, and there is any substantial evidence whatever on which to base the verdict of the jury, the appellate court will not interfere. Kennedy v. Construction Co., 291 S.W. 475, l.c. 476, 316 Mo. 782; Stauffer v. Ry. Co., 243 Mo. l.c. 316, 147 S.W. 1935; Mooney v. Monark Gasoline Oil Co., 298 S.W. 69, l.c. 81, 317 Mo. 1255; Goucan v. Atlas Portland Cement Co., 298 S.W. 789, l.c. 794; Kuhlman v. Water Light Transit Co., 271 S.W. 789, l.c. 795, 307 Mo. 607 and cases there cited; Lauck v. Reis, 274 S.W. 827, l.c. 830, 310 Mo. 184; Elstroth v. Karrenbrock, 285 S.W. 525, l.c. 527-8; Cupp v. McCallister, 144 Mo. App. 111; Miller v. Smith, 275 S.W. 769, l.c. 771; Smarr v. Smarr's Estate, 283 S.W. 461, l.c. 463. (2) If the family relationship existed between Bert Thayer and Sarah E. Watson, as the trial court instructed the jury, then it is true the burden was on respondent to prove a contract. This burden the respondent successfully carried throughout the trial by substantial evidence.
The definition of proximate cause is well settled in Missouri. In Kennedy v. Independent Quarry Construction Co., 316 Mo. 782, 291 S.W. 475, 481, it is said: "The proximate cause of an event is that which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new cause, produces the event and without which the event would not have occurred." See, also, Evans v. Massman Const. Co., 343 Mo. 632, 122 S.W.2d 924, 932.
The jury verdict that the company was negligent in its keeping of the fluid necessarily implied that there was attraction in the presence of the fluid under all the circumstances. In Kennedy v. Independent Quarry Construction Company, 316 Mo. 782, 291 S.W. 475, the plaintiff, a boy of twenty, was hurt by a dynamite cap which his companion, a boy of twenty, exploded. The cap had been taken out of a tin box from the company's shed in the quarry by a boy of over eighteen years of age.
It was not the proximate cause unless defendant with reasonable prudence in view of all the facts should have foreseen that an accident of this kind might reasonably be expected to occur. See Kennedy v. Independent Quarry & Const. Co., 316 Mo. 782, 291 S.W. 475. The answer to the second question of the interrogatories demonstrates that this question was considered and gives the jury's conclusion on that point.
The proximate cause of an event is that which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new cause, produces the event and without which the event would not have occurred. Kennedy v. Independent Quarry Construction Co., 316 Mo. 782, 291 S.W. 475, 481 [5]; Evans v. Massman Construction Co., 343 Mo. 632, 122 S.W.2d 924, 932 [18]. Generally, an efficient, intervening cause is a new and independent force which so interrupts the chain of events that it becomes the responsible, direct, proximate, and immediate cause of the injury but it may not consist merely of an act of concurring or contributing negligence.