And, in fact, it is that very rationale the petition pleads to invoke the wrongful death remedy of Missouri § 537.080, et seq. The traditional doctrine that the lex loci delicti applies to determine questions of conflicts of law in tort cases was discarded from our jurisprudence in Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. banc 1969). The strict principle that all substantive questions were determinable by the law of the state where the tort occurred was supplanted by the more pliant and fair most significant contacts standard as promulgated by Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 (1971).

This is not the first time a Missouri court has had to decide whether to apply Missouri law or the law of another state to an action by one Missouri resident against another Missouri resident arising from an incident in the other state. In Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo.banc 1969), a Missouri resident (Kennedy) accompanied four other Missouri residents on an automobile journey from Missouri to New York. Id. at 175.

This is not the first time a Missouri court has had to decide whether to apply Missouri law or the law of another state to an action by one Missouri resident against another Missouri resident arising from an incident in the other state. In Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo.banc 1969), a Missouri resident (Kennedy) accompanied four other Missouri residents on an automobile journey from Missouri to New York. Id. at 175.

The trend in the nation is toward acceptance of the "center of gravity" theory proposed in Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws §§ 332(b) and 379. [ 235 F. Supp. at 893]. We are convinced that the 1969 decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri in Kennedy v. Dixon, (Sup.Ct. of Mo. en banc 1969) 439 S.W.2d 173, clearly forecast that court's eventual abandonment of its prior admittedly confusing and conflicting conflict of laws rules as they relate to contracts in favor of the rules set forth in Chapter 8 of the Second Restatement of Conflicts of Law for the reasons we state in the next part of this opinion. We therefore conclude that the question noted by Chief Judge Becker in 1964, when Taylor was decided, in regard to whether Missouri will join the national trend toward acceptance of the basic theory then proposed in the Second Restatement, must in light of the rationale upon which Kennedy v. Dixon is based, be decided in the affirmative, and that, accordingly, we are under duty to apply the appropriate rules of the Second Restatement to the factual circumstances of this case.

To determine if another state has a more significant relationship than the state of injury, the section 6 factors must be evaluated with the contacts listed in Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145: (a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties; and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. See Dorman, 23 F.3d at 1358, citing Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173, 181 (Mo. 1969) (en banc). "In cases in which the injury and the conduct causing the injury occur in the same state, the Restatement principles are easy to apply."

They are: (a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties; and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. Galvin v. McGilley Memorial Chapels, 746 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Mo.App. 1987) (citing Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173, 181 (Mo. 1969) (en banc)); Restatement, Second, Conflict of Laws § 145(2). The district court analyzed each of the foregoing considerations and concluded that Kansas law applied, 854 F. Supp. 601-02, and we find no error in its analysis.

(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173, 181 (Mo. 1969) (en banc) (quoting Restatement § 145(2)). In cases in which the injury and the conduct causing the injury occur in the same state, the Restatement principles are easy to apply.

This rule is of primary significance here since we are dealing with the federal district court of Missouri and that court's special knowledge of Missouri law. Appellant's second and final contention is that since Missouri has now adopted the "'significant contacts" approach to conflict of laws problems, Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969), the proper approach in this case would be to apply the Missouri statute of limitations. The trial court disagreed.

Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941); Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 61 S.Ct. 1023, 85 L.Ed. 1481 (1941). In Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969), the Missouri Supreme Court, sitting en banc, suggested that the rule of lex loci delicti, heretofore followed in Missouri, which applies the substantive law of the state where the tort occurred, should be abandoned in favor of the "most significant contracts" rule. Id. at 184.

Missouri has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws which uses the "most significant relationship" test to determine which state's laws govern. Flynn v. Mazda Motors of Am., 4:09 CV 2069 HEA, 2010 WL 2775632, at *2 (E.D.Mo. July 14, 2010) (quoting Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173, 184 (Mo.1969) (en banc)). The most significant relationship is not merely which party has the most number of contacts with each state. Livingston v. Baxter Health Care Corp., 313 S.W.3d 717, 721 (Mo.Ct.App.2010).