Kennedy v. Decker

3 Citing cases

  1. Gomez v. Katz

    61 A.D.3d 108 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)   Cited 99 times
    In Gomez v. Katz, the Second Department explained that the continuous treatment doctrine contains three principal elements, the first being that the plaintiff continued to seek, and in fact obtained, an actual course of treatment from the defendant physician during the relevant period.

    The Court of Appeals logically determined that the plaintiff had lost continuing trust and confidence in the hospital, as a result of which the continuous treatment toll would be inapplicable ( see Allende v New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 90 NY2d at 339). The defendants rely upon, for a similar conclusion, Kennedy v Decker ( 237 AD2d 576) from this Court and Hall v Luthra ( 206 AD2d 890) from the Appellate Division, Fourth Department. Neither case is particularly helpful to the defendants since each is readily distinguishable on its facts. In Kennedy, the plaintiff sought to impute to her original physician the subsequent treatment she received from other physicians ( Kennedy v Decker, 237 AD2d at 577), which is not at issue here.

  2. Hansson v. Madowitz

    292 A.D.2d 342 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)   Cited 1 times

    Contrary to the plaintiff's contentions, the appellant established his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting prima facie proof that the applicable Statute of Limitations had expired on the plaintiff's claims for medical malpractice accruing before October 14, 1995, and her wrongful death claims accruing before May 2, 1994 (see, CPLR 214-a; EPTL 5-4.1). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to submit sufficient evidence to establish that the continuous treatment doctrine was applicable to toll the running of the Statute of Limitations (see, Massie v. Crawford, 78 N.Y.2d 516; Kennedy v. Decker, 237 A.D.2d 576). RITTER, J.P., FLORIO, FEUERSTEIN and CRANE, JJ., concur.

  3. Bledsoe v. Ctr. for Human Reprod.

    2022 N.Y. Slip Op. 33855 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2022)   Cited 1 times

    A single telephone call between Oktay and Dr. Arici in November 2010, in which Oktay simply described CFHR's grading system, did not constitute examination, advice, or treatment (see Pierre-Louis v Ching-Yuan Hwa, 182 A.D.2d 55, 58 [2d Dept 1992]; Swartz v Karlan, 107 A.D.2d 801, 802-803 [2d Dept 1985] [a single telephone call by a prior treating physician to a subsequent treating physician to verify the proper dosage of medication that had previously been prescribed to patient does not constitute continuous treatment]). Nor was the continuing supervision of the cryopreserved embryos by Oktay's co-employees at CFHR sufficient, in and of itself, to invoke the toll (see Pierre-Louis v Ching-Yuan Hwa, 182 A.D.2d at 59). Rather, after August 11, 2008, the evaluation and maintenance of the embryos became the responsibility of other health-care providers at CFHR, whose negligence, if any, cannot be imputed to Oktay (see Kennedy v Decker, 237 A.D.2d 576, 577 [2d Dept 1997]).