Additionally, it is generally considered that a consignee (in this instance the consignee and shipper are the same entity) is in a much better position to dispose of the damaged merchandise than the carrier who is not in the business of buying and selling the product involved. See Kennedy Kratzer, Inc. v. Chicago, B. Q.R.R., 245 N.E.2d 910 (Ill.App. 1969). This is consonant with the fact that unless the goods are worth only "salvage value" at their point of delivery (cf. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Tifton Produce Co., 179 Ga. 624, 176 S.E. 624, 96 A.L.R. 772 (1934)), the carrier could be at the mercy of low bidding on the product by a consignee or third parties. Under such circumstances there exists no justification to make a carrier a forced buyer by a forced contract.
Additionally, it is generally considered that a consignee (in this instance the consignee and shipper are the same entity) is in a much better position to dispose of the damaged merchandise than the carrier who is not in the business of buying and selling the product involved. See Kennedy Kratzer, Inc. v. Chicago, B Q R.R., 106 Ill. App.2d 278, 245 N.E.2d 910 (Ill.App. 1969). This is consonant with the fact that unless the goods are worth only `salvage value' at their point of delivery (cf. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Tifton Produce Co., 179 Ga. 624, 176 S.E. 624, 96 A.L.R. 772 (1934), the carrier could be at the mercy of low bidding on the product by a consignee or third parties. Under such circumstances, there exists no justification to make a carrier a forced buyer by a forced contract.