"[T]he equal protection clause requires that those similarly situated not be treated differently unless the disparity is justified." ( Board of Supervisors v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 903, 914; Kenneally v. Medical Board (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 489, 495.) "The Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection and the California Constitution's protection of the same right (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a), art. IV, § 16, subd. (a)) are substantially equivalent and are analyzed in a similar fashion.
[Citations.]" ( Kenneally v. Medical Board of California (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 489, 495 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 504] ( Kenneally).) Likewise, the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process and the California Constitution's protection of due process (Cal. Const., art. 1, § 7, subd. (a)) can be analyzed in a similar fashion.
She contended the law impermissibly injected conduct, or common law fault, into the no fault system of compensating for industrial injuries, contrary to article XIV, section 4 of the California Constitution. She alleged such conduct-based compensation denies equal protection under the test enunciated in Kenneally v. Medical Board (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 489 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 504], because public policy is not served by treating psychiatric injuries due to personnel actions differently. Sakotas challenged having to show her psychiatric injury was predominantly caused by industrial factors even though a physical injury would be compensable where a preexisting condition was simply aggravated by work.
Equal Protection clauses in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and in the California Constitution (art. I, § 7, subd. (a), art IV, § 16, subd. (a)) guarantee substantially similar rights and the courts analyze them in a similar fashion. ( Kenneally v. Medical Board (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 489, 495.) In considering an equal protection challenge, this court first determines which of two standards of review applies, according to the classification in the challenged law and the interests it affects.
However, the courts have repeatedly held that legislative enactments affecting the "right to work" are tested under a rational basis and not the strict scrutiny analysis because there is no fundamental right to work. ( Graham v. Kirkwood Meadows Pub. Util. Dist., supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1644-1646; Rittenband v. Cory (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 410, 417-419 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 576]; Kenneally v. Medical Board (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 489, 496-498 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 504].) Appellants rely on language in several administrative review cases suggesting the right to work is fundamental.
" The federal and state equal protection clauses are substantially equivalent. (See Kenneally v. MedicalBoard (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 489, 495; Sagaser v. McCarthy (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 288, 305.) Here, we apply the "rational basis" test to determine whether these California statutes are unconstitutional under equal protection principles.
"The general right to engage in a trade, profession or business is subject to the power inherent in the state to make necessary rules and regulations respecting the use and enjoyment of property necessary for the preservation of the public health, morals, comfort, order and safety; such regulations do not deprive owners of property without due process of law. [Citation.] No person can acquire a vested right to continue, when once licensed, in a business, trade or occupation which is subject to legislative control under the police powers. [Citations.]" ( Gregory v. Hecke (1925) 73 Cal.App. 268, 283 [ 238 P. 787]; see Frankel v. Board of Dental Examiners (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 534, 550-551 [ 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 128]; Kenneally v. Medical Board (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 489, 497 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 504]; Murrill v. State Board of Accountancy, supra, 97 Cal.App.2d 709, 711-712.) (1f) Thus, although Hughes is correct that his status as a licensee entitles him to certain procedural protections consistent with a vested interest, he does not possess a substantive vested right to continue to pursue his occupation.
We find this case to be analogous to the situation in which the Legislature chooses to “resolve identical problems with respect to different professions” in a different manner. ( Kenneally v. Medical Bd. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 489, 499, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 504; see also Griffiths v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 757, 776, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 445.) For example, in Naismith Dental Corp. v. Bd. of Dental Examiners (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 253, 137 Cal.Rptr. 133, Naismith challenged the constitutionality of a provision in the Business and Professions Code prohibiting a dentist from having an additional place of practice unless “ ‘he [or she] is in personal attendance at each place of practice at least 50 percent of the time’ ” on the ground that no similar statute applied to the practice of medicine.
We find this case to be analogous to the situation in which the Legislature chooses to "resolve identical problems with respect to different professions" in a different manner. (Kenneally v. Medical Bd. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 489, 499; see also Griffiths v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 757, 776.) For example, in Naismith Dental Corp. v. Bd. of Dental Examiners (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 253, Naismith challenged the constitutionality of a provision in the Business and Professions Code prohibiting a dentist from having an additional place of practice unless " 'he [or she] is in personal attendance at each place of practice at least 50 percent of the time' " on the ground that no similar statute applied to the practice of medicine.
We find this case to be analogous to the situation in which the Legislature chooses to "resolve identical problems with respect to different professions" in a different manner. (Kenneally v. Medical Bd. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 489, 499; see also Griffiths v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 757, 776.) For example, in Naismith Dental Corp. v. Bd. of Dental Examiners (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 253, Naismith challenged the constitutionality of a provision in the Business and Professions Code prohibiting a dentist from having an additional place of practice unless " 'he [or she] is in personal attendance at each place of practice at least 50 percent of the time' " on the ground that no similar statute applied to the practice of medicine.