The Board, a corporation, identifies itself as a "voluntary association" - a characterization that has not been challenged by Chin. Illinois courts have characterized certain corporate entities as voluntary associations. See, e.g., Kendler v. Rutledge, 78 Ill. App. 3d 312 (1979) (referring to non-profit corporation as a voluntary association); Virgin v. American College of Surgeons, 42 Ill. App. 2d 352, 355 (1963) (same); see also Butler, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 583 (court referred to defendant USA Volleyball as a "voluntary association"; the challenged bylaws referred to USA Volleyball as "this Corporation"). In a dissent, Justice Simon stated that "the majority opinion is needlessly reluctant about intervening in the affairs of quasi-public entities."
Voluntary associations have great discretion when conducting their internal affairs, especially when their conduct relates to the interpretation and enforcement of the association's rules and regulations. Kendler v. Rutledge, 78 Ill. App.3d 312, 316, 396 N.E.2d 1309 (1979). Judicial review of an association's conduct is limited to whether the association exercised its power consistently with its own internal rules and the members' fundamental right to a fair hearing.
The AANS's failings as to the other ground are unfortunate, but they do not abrogate the fact that due process was provided, at least in part. Hatley v. Am. Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1977); Masonic Grand Chapter of Order of Eastern Star v. Sweatt, 329 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc. of Orthodontists, 526 P.2d 253 (Cal. 1974); McCune v. Wilson, 237 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1970); Kendler v. Rutledge, 396 N.E.2d 1309 (1st Dist. 1979); Virgin v. Am. College of Surgeons, 192 N.E.2d 414 (1st Dist. 1963). Dr. Barrash posits that the adjudicative process afforded him was irredeemably tainted by the PCC's conclusion—without fair notice to Dr. Barrash—that he had engaged in so-called "improper advocacy."
AAOS Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss the Complaint under the internal affairs doctrine. They assert that under Illinois law, courts generally do not interfere with internal affairs of a private, voluntary membership organization, Kendler v. Rutledge, 396 N.E.2d 1309, 1312 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)) unless a plaintiff has demonstrated that membership in the organization is an "economic necessity," Nat'l Ass'n of Sporting v. F.T.L. Mktg., 779 F.2d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir. 1985)) and that the organization's membership decision was based on bad faith or violated due process. Austin v. Am. Ass'n of Neurological Surgeons, 253 F.3d 967, 969 (7th Cir. 2001.)
Nevertheless, under the major premise that a "judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned [Canon 3C, supra]," we subscribe, as a general principle, to the premise that a judge should not "sit in review of a case decided by him." Kendler v. Rutledge, 78 Ill.App.3d 312, 33 Ill.Dec. 585, 587, 396 N.E.2d 1309, 1311 (1979). But this general principle must be given common-sense application in the context of the presenting circumstances.
Although not addressing the appropriateness of declaratory relief, such relief has been granted where an association disciplined one of its members. See Kendler v. Rutledge, 78 Ill. App. 3d 312, 319 (1979) (real estate broker's declaratory judgment action challenging board of realtors' imposition of sanctions; court remanded with directions to grant member a new hearing in conformity with board's bylaws). We disagree with BSA's and the Council's characterization of the controversy.
The constitution or bylaws of a union may, and often do, contain provisions for the resolution of disputes that occur within the organization. See, e.g., Local 165, 149 Ill. App. 3d at 202-03; Kendler v. Rutledge, 78 Ill. App. 3d 312, 312-13 (1979). Similarly, they may explicitly vest authority with some officer or body of the organization to interpret the constitution or bylaws (see, e.g., Maher v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 15 F.3d 711, 714 (7th Cir. 1994)) or even allow the exercise of legislative authority in certain circumstances (see, e.g., Serpico v. Laborers' International Union of North America, 97 F.3d 995, 997 (7th Cir. 1996)).
Their conduct is subject to judicial review only when they fail to exercise power consistently with their own internal rules or when their conduct violates the fundamental right of a member to a fair hearing. Lee v. Snyder, 285 Ill. App.3d 555, 558-59, 673 N.E.2d 1136 (1996); Kendler v. Rutledge, 78 Ill. App.3d 312, 316, 396 N.E.2d 1309 (1979). Generally, a court will not interfere with the internal affairs of voluntary associations absent mistake, fraud, collusion or arbitrariness. Proulx v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 125 Ill. App.3d 781, 787-88, 466 N.E.2d 620 (1984), citing 4 Am. Jur. Associations Clubs § 17 (1936). If there has been no mistake, fraud, collusion or arbitrariness, our supreme court has endorsed the exercise of jurisdiction only when a substantial property, contract, or other economic right that implicates due process is at stake.
The court noted that a private association can set its own standards as long as they are not against public policy. Kendler v. Rutledge, 78 Ill. App.3d 312, 396 N.E.2d 1309 (1979), involved a declaratory judgment action by a real estate broker to challenge sanctions imposed on him by a local real estate board. The court stated it would not substitute its judgment for that of the board since associations should have considerable discretion to conduct their internal affairs; however, the court did review the board action to determine that it followed its own rules and gave fair hearing rights in disciplining the broker.
While we agree that these comments are insufficient to raise the issues of conflicting duties and bias and prejudice raised before the PCB, we are impelled, owing to the seriousness of the Village's charges, to consider the merits of the issue. The waiver rule is not inflexible and may encompass challenges to the composition of administrative bodies made for the first time on administrative review wherein injustice might otherwise result. Kendler v. Rutledge (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 312, 318; Olson v. Department of Registration Education (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 166, 168. • 2 Also preliminarily, we disagree with petitioners' argument that the PCB improperly allowed the Village to discover and introduce evidence of the County Board's alleged conflict and bias.