Defendant established her entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting the affirmed report of an orthopedist who found normal ranges of motion in the affected body parts i.e., the right elbow and wrist (see e.g. Torres v. Triboro Servs., Inc., 83 A.D.3d 563, 563–564, 921 N.Y.S.2d 240 [1st Dept.2011] ). Defendant was not required to submit the report of an expert neurologist as to plaintiff's claim of carpal tunnel syndrome in his right wrist, since it was not pleaded in the bill of particulars and was raised for the first time in opposition to the motion (see Boone v. Elizabeth Taxi, Inc., 120 A.D.3d 1143, 1144, 993 N.Y.S.2d 302 [1st Dept.2014] ). In any event, defendant's orthopedist found normal ranges of motion in plaintiff's right wrist and elbow, no atrophy in the muscles of the hand, and that Phalen's sign was negative (see Jacobs v. Slaght, 47 A.D.3d 679, 850 N.Y.S.2d 166 [2d Dept.2008] ; see also Kendig v. Kendig, 115 A.D.3d 438, 439, 981 N.Y.S.2d 411 [1st Dept.2014] ).Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether his carpal tunnel syndrome was causally related to the accident ( Perl v. Meher, 18 N.Y.3d 208, 217–218, 936 N.Y.S.2d 655, 960 N.E.2d 424 [2011] ).

(see Gaddy v Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955 [1992]). Munoz has met the prima facie burden through the affirmations of Dr. April, who found that the injuries to the spine were degenerative and Dr. Berman, as well as Dr. April, who found that there was no causality between the injuries to the spine, neck and shoulder and the August 14, 2019 accident under the categories of permanent loss of use; permanent consequential limitation of use; significant limitation of use; and 90/180-day (Rabb v Mohammad, 132 A.D.3d 527 [1st Dept 2015]) [holding defendants met their prima facie burden by submitting a radiologist's affirmation who opined that the MRI of the plaintiffs spine showed disc bulge of degenerative origin]; Kendig v Kendig, 115 A.D.3d 438 [1st Dept 2014] [plaintiff could not produce prima facie evidence because he failed to show causality of the injuries to the accident at issue].

Inzalaco v. Consalvo, 115 A.D.3d 8077, 808-809 (2d Dept. 2014). See also, Boroszko v. Zylinski, 140 A.D.3d 1742, 1743-45 (4th Dept. 2016); Kendig v. Kendig, 115 A.D.3d 438, 439 (1st Dept. 2014); Nova v. Fontanez, 112 A.D.3d 435, 436 (1st Dept. 2013).

ary judgment using the plaintiff s deposition testimony and medical reports and records prepared by the plaintiffs own physicians (see Fragale v Geiger, 288 A.D.2d 431, 733 N.Y.S.2d 901 [2d Dept 2001]; Grossman v Wright, 268 A.D.2d 79, 707 N.Y.S.2d 233 [2d Dept 2000]; Vignola v Varrichio, 243 A.D.2d 464, 662 N.Y.S.2d 831 [2d Dept 1997]; Torres v Micheletti, 208 A.D.2d 519, 616 N.Y.S.2d 1006 [2d Dept 1994]). Where a plaintiff has alleged an aggravation/and or exacerbation of a pre-existing injury or condition, a defendant may demonstrate his or her entitlement to summary judgment by submitting an expert's findings showing no deficits in range of motion in the alleged exacerbated/aggravated body part or by showing that the findings in the radiological studies were pre-existing and not caused by the subject accident (see Pommells v Perez, 4 N.Y.3d 566, 797 N.Y.S.2d 3 80 [2005]; Kendig v Kendig, 115 A.D.3d 438, 981 N.Y.S.2d 411 [1st Dept 2014]; Brand v Evangelista, 103 A.D.3d 539, 962 N.Y.S.2d 52 [2d Dept 2013]; Spencer v Golden Eagle, 82 A.D.3d 589, 920 N.Y.S.2d 24 [1st Dept 2011]). Once a defendant has met this burden, the plaintiff must then submit objective and admissible proof of the nature and degree of the alleged injury in order to meet the threshold of the statutory standard for "serious injury" under New York's No-Fault Insurance Law (see Dufel v Green, supra; Tornabene v Pawlewski, 305 A.D.2d 1025, 758 N.Y.S.2d 593 [4th Dept 2003]; Pagano v Kingsbury, supra).

The First Department Appellate Division has found that summary judgment on the issue of serious injury is appropriate where it has been confirmed that "plaintiff suffered from degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine. Her treating neurologist's report failed to address defendant's prima facie showing that her cervical and lumbar spine conditions were degenerative, preexisting and arthritic (Kendig v Kendig, 115 AD3d 438, 439 [1st Dep't 2014] [internal citations omitted]). The report in Kendig noted clinical findings consistent with an 'exacerbation of multilevel cervical and lumbar disc bulges and protrusion' but provided no basis for determining the extent of any such exacerbation" (Kendig, 115 AD3d 438 citing Brand v Evangelista, 103 AD3d 539, 540 [1st Dep't 2013; Nova v Fontanez, 112 AD3d 435, 436 [1st Dep't 2013]).

The defendant may meet this burden by submitting expert affidavits indicating that the plaintiff's injury was caused by a pre-existing condition and not the accident (Pommells v Perez, 4 NY3d 566 [2005]); Spencer v Golden Eagle, Inc., 82 AD3d 589 [1st Dept 2011]). In cases involving a claim of aggravation, exacerbation and/or activation of a pre-existing injury or condition, a defendant may demonstrate entitlement to summary judgment upon submission of experts' findings of no deficits in range of motion in the subject body part and opinion that MRI findings were pre-existing and not caused by the subject accident (Kendig v Kendig, 115 AD3d 438 [1st Dept 2014]; Nova v Fontanez, 112 AD3d 435 [1st Dept 2013]; Mitrotti v Elia, 91 AD3d 449 [1st Dept 2012]).Once the defendant meets this threshold, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present objective medical evidence that the subject motor vehicle accident aggravated the pre-existing condition so severely as to produce a statutory serious injury above and beyond the pre-existing condition (Suarez v Abe, 4 AD3d 288 [1st Dept 2004]).

The defendant may meet this burden by submitting expert affidavits indicating that the plaintiff's injury was caused by a pre-existing condition and not the accident (Pommells v Perez, 4 NY3d 566 [2005]); Spencer v Golden Eagle, Inc., 82 AD3d 589 [1st Dept 2011]). In cases involving a claim of aggravation, exacerbation and/or activation of a pre-existing injury or condition, a defendant may demonstrate entitlement to summary judgment upon submission of experts' findings of no deficits in range of motion in the subject body part and opinion that MRI findings were pre-existing and not caused by the subject accident (Kendig v Kendig, 115 AD3d 438 [1st Dept 2014]; Nova v Fontanez, 112 AD3d 435 [1st Dept 2013]; Mitrotti v Elia, 91 AD3d 449 [1st Dept 2012]).

In the First Department, it as been consistently held that the failure of plaintiff's expert to address a pre-existing condition or degenerative condition warrants dismissal of the action. See, Boone v. Elizabeth Taxi, Inc., 993 N.Y.S.2d 302 (1st Dept. 2014)(Summary judgment proper where plaintiff's submissions failed to address defendants' showing that his cervical spine injuries were degenerative and preexisting); Nicholas v. Cablevision Systems Corp., 984 N.Y.S.2d 332 (1st Dept. 2014)(Plaintiff's physicians failed to address the degeneration that defendants' neurologist found in the MRIs taken of the cervical and lumbar spine); Kendig v. Kendig, 981 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1st Dept. 2014)(Plaintiff's treating neurologist's report failed to address defendant's prima facie showing that her cervical and lumbar spine conditions were degenerative, preexisting and arthritic); Rickert v. Diaz, 976 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1st Dept. 2013)( Plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact where her doctors failed to explain why degeneration could not be ruled out as the cause of plaintiff's injuries); Spencer v. Golden Eagle, Inc., 920 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1st Dept. 201 l)(Plaintiff expert must address causation where defendants expert indicates that plaintiff's injury was caused by pre-existing condition); McCree v. Sam Trans Corp., 920 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1st Dept.,2011)(While its medical expert attributed the range of motion restrictions he found in plaintiff's right shoulder and cervical spine to degenerative changes or a pre-existing condition, his opinion lacked a factual basis and was conclusory); Frias v. James, 895 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1st Dept. 2010) (Expert's opinion that plaintiff's restrictions were attr

Thus, because neither of plaintiff's treating doctors, Dr. Capiola or Dr. Liebowitz, said one word to address or challenge defendants' doctors' findings of degenerative and pre-existing changes in plaintiff's knees, cervical and lumbar spine and shoulders, their opinions that plaintiff's conditions are causally related to the subject accident are conclusory and did not raise a triable issue of fact. See Kendig v Kendig, 115 AD3d 438, 981 NYS2d411 (1st Dept 2014). Additionally, although plaintiff's own radiologist, Dr. Lichy, noted degenerative conditions in his MRI report of plaintiff's knees, plaintiff failed to explain why this was not the cause of plaintiff's reduced range of motion.

Plaintiff submitted an affirmation from his treating physician, Dr. Louis Rose, however, Dr. Rose never addressed the defendants' prima facie showing that plaintiff's left shoulder condition was degenerative or pre-existing. (See Kendig v. Kendig, 981 NYS2d 411, 413 [1st Dept 2014]; see also Rampersaud v. Eljamali, 100 AD3d 508 [1st Dept 2012])(medical expert's report failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to causation by failing to address the degenerative conditions)). Therefore, plaintiff failed to establish a causal connection between the MRI findings and the accident.