OCGA §§ 31-7-71 (1) (defining "hospital authority" as "any public corporation created by this article"); 31-7-75 (stating that "[e]very hospital authority shall be deemed to exercise public and essential governmental functions" and listing several powers of hospital authorities, including the power in subsection (21) "[t]o exercise any or all powers now or hereafter possessed by private corporations performing similar functions"); Martin v. Hosp. Auth. of Clarke County, 264 Ga. 626, 626, 449 S.E.2d 827 (1994) (describing a hospital authority as a "governmental entity"); Cox Enterprises v. Carroll City/County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 39, 45-46, 273 S.E.2d 841 (1981) (determining that a hospital authority is a "governmental entity"); Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Gaither, 241 Ga. 572, 575, 247 S.E.2d 89 (1978) (hospital authorities "are public corporations having for their object the administration of a portion of the powers of government delegated to it, and are not business corporations"); Kendall v. Griffin-Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 242 Ga. App. 821, 822-823 (2), 531 S.E.2d 396 (2000) ("The functions and powers of a hospital authority are established in OCGA § 31-7-75, which vests an authority with 27 specific grants of power that permit it to act as a corporation by, for example, entering into contracts, buying or selling property, and selecting officers."); Dept. of Human Resources v. Northeast Ga. Primary Care, 228 Ga. App. 130, 132 (1), 491 S.E.2d 201 (1997) (noting that a hospital authority has been described as a "governmental instrumentality" that, at the same time, "is not an agency or department of either the state or county because it is a public, non-profit corporation").There is created in and for each county and municipal corporation of the state a public body corporate and politic to
) (citation and punctuation omitted). Lowry v. McDuffie, 269 Ga. 202, 204(2), 496 S.E.2d 727 (1998) (citation and punctuation omitted); Kendall v. Griffin-Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 242 Ga.App. 821, 822(2), 531 S.E.2d 396 (2000) (A statute " should be read according to the natural and most obvious import of the language, without resorting to subtle and forced constructions to limit or extend [its] operation." ).
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Kendall v. Griffin-Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 242 Ga. App. 821, 822 (2) ( 531 SE2d 396) (2000). If we agree with the Board of Tax Assessors, a tenant in common with even a tiny undivided interest in a 2,000-acre tract receiving the current use assessment afforded to conservation use property could not hold any interest, either directly or indirectly, in any other property receiving this benefit. A single owner, on the other hand, would be "[free] to enter into more than one covenant under this Code section for bona fide conservation use property, provided that the aggregate number of acres of qualified property of such owner to be entered into such covenants does not exceed 2,000 acres."
See also O.C.G.A. § 33-36-10 (a) (1) ("[T]he sole recovery . . . with respect to a workers' compensation claim, shall be under the insolvency fund or its equivalent of the state of residence of the claimant.") (emphasis supplied). See O.C.G.A. § 33-36-10 (a); see also Kendall v. Griffin-Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 242 Ga. App. 821, 822 (2) ( 531 S.E.2d 396) (2000) (Statutes "should be read according to the natural and most obvious import of the language, without resorting to subtle and forced constructions to limit or extend their operation"). See Cherokee Warehouses, supra.