See " Discrimination in Ownership and Occupancy of Property since Shelley v. Kraemer," U.C.L.A. Intramural Law Rev. June, 1952. See Kemp v. Rubin, 298 N.Y. 590 [ 81 N.E.2d 325]; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 [38 S.Ct. 16, 62 L.Ed. 149, L.R.A. 1918C 210, Ann.Cas. 1918A 1201]. [13] The contention that an action for damages against an original covenantor is to be distinguished from a suit in equity because in the former the defendant, by his covenant, consents to suit whereas in the latter he does not consent, is ingenious but faulty.

) This conclusion follows from the plain meaning of plain words. It is strongly reinforced, however, by the fact that the chairman of the Bill of Rights Committee of the New York State Constitutional Convention of 1938, at which convention the section in question was approved, stated at the convention that the first sentence of section 11 "in effect embodies in our Constitution the provisions of the Federal Constitution which are already binding upon our State and its agencies" (2 Rev. Record of N.Y. State Constitutional Convention, 1938, p. 1065). It is significant that in previous New York cases arising under the equal protection clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions it has not been suggested that the reach of the latter differed from that of the former ( Kemp v. Rubin, 298 N.Y. 590; Madden v. Queens Co. Jockey Club, 296 N.Y. 249). The second sentence of section 11 is a civil rights clause and, although applicable to private persons and private corporations, protects only against "discrimination in * * * civil rights".

In February, 1947, it was held that no new civil rights were created by this amendment; it was merely permissive in character. ( Kemp v. Rubin, 188 Misc. 310, 314, affd. 273 App. Div. 789, revd. on other grounds 298 N.Y. 590.) It was felt that the courts should not judicially legislate; it was for the legislative to speak on the subject.