Culbreth v. Hall, 159 N.C. 588, 75 S.E. 1096. The price for reconveyance was not the value of the land but exactly the amount the grantees had advanced, plus interest, insurance and taxes. Kemp v. Earp, 42 N.C. 167. The defendants' answer shows (1) the consideration for the deed was exactly the amount paid in discharge of the plaintiffs' debts; (2) the contract price for repurchase was the exact amount of that indebtedness, plus interest, insurance and taxes; (3) the second contract was for the purpose of giving the plaintiffs additional time to redeem; (4) in case of further default, provision was made for a sale, private by agreement, public otherwise; and the satisfaction of the debt from the proceeds.

Tansil v. McCumber, 201 Iowa 20, 206 N.W. 680 (1925), O'Briant v. Lee, 214 N.C. 723, 200 S.E. 865 (1939); 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 40; 36 Am.Jur. Mortgages § 148. Greene v. Bride Son Const. Co., 252 Iowa 220, 106 N.W.2d 603 (Iowa 1960); Kemp v. Earp, 42 N.C. 167 (1850); 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 42. Tansil v. McCumber, supra, note 3.

Tansil v. McCumber, supra; 41 C.J., Mortgages, § 100 (1927). Kemp v. Earp, 42 N.C. 167 (1850). In Tansil v. McCumber, the Iowa court found that it was the typical case of a debtor in distress applying to a money lender for assistance and the lender advancing enough money to pay off the debtor's indebtedness.

Askew v. Reynolds, 18 N.C. 370; Hall v. Gully, 3 Minn. 151; McCanless v. Reynolds, 67 N.C. 268. Also cited and relied on Kemp v. Earp, 42 N.C. 166; Moore v. Joy, 43 N.C. 197; Blount v. Carroway, N.C. 400; 2 Story's Eq. Pl., sec. 1,200, p. 443. PEARSON, C. J.

But the creditor was under no such disability; for it (55) was not his duty to sell, and there was nothing growing out of the relation in which he stood to the debtor, to prevent him dealing with the debtor, and making a bargain by which, upon the advance of a further sum of money, the deed of trust was cancelled, and an absolute deed executed — and the plaintiff must stand or fall upon his being able to bring the case within the two principles applicable to bills of this kind, although it may be that the fact of there having been a prior deed of trust securing the larger part of the purchase money, would be allowed some weight when only a slight matter was necessary to "kick the beam." Kemp v. Earp, 42 N.C. 170. PER CURIAM. Bill dismissed with costs.

The grounds on which it rests are summed up in the late case of Blackwell v. Overby, 41 N.C. 38, as accurately, perhaps, as it is in the power of the Court to do it. And in that case and the still more recent one of Kemp v. Earp, 42 N.C. 167, it was acted on by relieving against such deeds. The case under consideration presents, as it seems to the Court, facts and circumstances dehors, which leave no doubt that this instrument, as far as the interest of the apparent vendee was involved, was originally intended as a security merely for the sum mentioned in it as the consideration; and that the possession of the slave was delivered to Mr. Deberry, and the deed put into the form of an absolute conveyance for the purpose simply of vesting in him such a formal title as would enable him the more conveniently to make an advantageous private sale and conveyance of the slave without calling on Moore to join in it.