Here, Ms. Patchey was an emergency temporary guardian appointed by the Florida Circuit Court, with a duty to "faithfully perform the duties of a guardian" for the period of her appointment. Fla. Stat. § 744.3031; ECF No. 17-2 at 5. See also In re Guardianship of Beck, 204 So. 3d 143, 148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) ("The fact that the statutory title... is 'emergency temporary guardian' ... establish[es] that unless or until a plenary or limited guardianship is established or the emergency temporary guardianship expires, Ms. Yates is a guardian."). In Florida, guardians are required to "act as they feel the wards themselves would act. This ['substituted judgment'] standard places the guardian in the shoes of the ward when making decisions."

The additional case the mother relies on is also inapplicable, because that case involved an emergency temporary guardian. See In re Guardianship of Beck, 204 So.3d 143 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). In contrast with Beck, here the mother was never a guardian, not even temporarily. Rather, she is a guardian advocate and thus does not fall within the purview of section 744.108.

§ 744.521, Fla. Stat. (2020) ; see also Fla. Prob. R. 5.680(a) ("A guardian of the person is discharged without further proceeding upon filing a certified copy of the ward's death certificate."); In re Guardianship of Beck , 204 So. 3d 143, 146 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) ("The parties agree that [the ward's] death rendered moot any further proceedings with respect to a determination of whether he was incapacitated or whether a plenary guardian should be appointed."). However, the ward's death does not render a motion for rehearing moot as to the appointment of a guardian of the property if the guardian of the property handled the ward's property for a period of time or engaged in any transactions affecting the ward's property to a significant degree.

Regarding the trial court's denial of the motion for rehearing as moot due to the Ward's death, we write to remind guardianship judges that the death of the ward renders a motion for rehearing moot as to the incapacity determination and the appointment of the guardian of the person. That is because "[a] guardian of the person is discharged without further proceeding upon filing a certified copy of the ward's death certificate." § 744.521, Fla. Stat. (2020); see also Fla. Prob. R. 5.680(a) ("A guardian of the person is discharged without further proceeding upon filing a certified copy of the ward's death certificate."); In re Guardianship of Beck, 204 So.3d 143, 146 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) ("The parties agree that [the ward's] death rendered moot any further proceedings with respect to a determination of whether he was incapacitated or whether a plenary guardian should be appointed.").

Therefore, any issue regarding that claim has been abandoned, and we affirm the summary judgment as to that count without further comment. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.210(b)(5) (requiring parties to brief each appellate issue); see also In re Guardianship of Beck, 204 So. 3d 143, 147 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (considering abandoned an issue not briefed by the appellant); Weaver v. Weaver, 95 So. 3d 1029, 1030 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (deeming unbriefed issues abandoned for purposes of appellate review). As to the other two counts, however, we agree with Vogel that summary judgment was improper.

PER CURIAM.AFFIRMED. See In re Guardianship of Beck, 204 So.3d 143, 152 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). ORFINGER, LAMBERT and SASSO, JJ., concur.

Our jurisdictional conclusion would also appear to align with recent decisions that have addressed the substantive merits in appeals of orders denying motions or petitions to recover guardians' fees. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Beck, 204 So.3d 143, 153 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (reviewing the denial of petitions to recover attorney's fees and costs); Karr v. Vitry, 135 So.3d 372, 373 n.1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (concluding that an order denying a ward her guardian's fees was appealable under rule 9.170 ).III.