The trial court also could have denied the petition on the basis that Abou-Trabi did not come into court with clean hands. See Kelton v. Kelton, 448 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, no writ) (stating a bill of review is an equitable remedy and the petitioner must come into court with clean hands). In his deposition, Abou-Trabi admitted the petition contained untrue statements, which he had sworn, in an affidavit, were true.
Texas courts have consistently held where a property division is made in a divorce case it must be presumed that the trial court exercised its discretion properly, and reversal should only result upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion. At this point we should also note we have before us no statement of facts, and absent a statement of facts or findings of fact an appellate court will assume the trial court had before it and passed upon all the facts required to support the judgment it did render. Roye v. Silver Dollar Financing, Inc., 432 S.W.2d 123, 124 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1968, no writ); Kelton v. Kelton, 448 S.W.2d 569 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston (14th Dist.) 1969, no writ); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Smith, 143 Tex. 612, 187 S.W.2d 363 (1945). While we are mindful of our standard of review, we note the final paragraph of the enumerated portion of the decree concerning "all other personal property, furniture, automobiles, etc."
It must therefore be presumed that the trial court properly heard evidence to support its judgment. Kelton v. Kelton, 448 S.W.2d 569 (Tex.Civ.App. Houston (14th Dist.) 1969, no writ). Were we to conclude that no hearing was held on Hibbler's evidence, we must yet uphold the judgment.
Appellants fail to allege one of these essential elements, namely, fraud, accident or wrongful act of the opposite party. The only `accident' alleged occurred in the office of their own attorneys. See Shook v. Shook, 145 S.W. 699, 704 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1912, writ ref'd); Mackay v. Charles W. Sexton Co., 469 S.W.2d 441, 445 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1971, no writ), and Kelton v. Kelton, 448 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston (14th Dist.) 1969, no writ). Appellants' counsel is presumed to have received notice of the dismissal provided for by Rule 306d, and they offer no excuse for their failure to file a motion for reinstatement within thirty days after receiving such notice. Appellants argue that they need not allege all of the elements of a bill of review in view of their allegations of the court's failure to follow strictly the procedure for dismissal provided by Rule 165a.
In the absence of a statement of facts, findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a bill of exceptions, this Court must presume that the trial court properly heard evidence of these facts and found them to be true. Kelton v. Kelton, 448 S.W.2d 569 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston (14th Dist.) 1969, no writ). The hearing on appellee's bill of review was set for June 11, 1973.