A proper grant of power to the executive is the result of a legislative act that creates in the executive branch the power to execute the new law. See Kelsh v. Jaeger , 2002 ND 53, ¶ 21, 641 N.W.2d 100 ("When reasonable guidelines are given, the delegated power to ascertain facts for operation of a law is not unconstitutional, because that power pertains to execution of the law.").2. [¶ 46] "Unless expressly authorized by the State Constitution, the Legislature may not delegate its purely legislative powers to any other body."
[¶ 11] Under N.D. Const. art. VI, § 2, this Court also has discretionary authority to exercise original jurisdiction to issue remedial writs as may be necessary to properly exercise its jurisdiction. RECALLND v. Jaeger, 2010 ND 250, ¶ 7, 792 N.W.2d 511;Bolinske v. Jaeger, 2008 ND 180, ¶ 4, 756 N.W.2d 336;Kelsh v. Jaeger, 2002 ND 53, ¶ 2, 641 N.W.2d 100;State ex rel. Kusler v. Sinner, 491 N.W.2d 382, 384 (N.D.1992); State ex rel. Wefald v. Meier, 347 N.W.2d 562, 564 (N.D.1984). Under that constitutional provision, we determine in the first instance whether or not a proceeding is within our original jurisdiction.
We determine the intent and purpose of a constitutional provision, 'if possible, from the language itself.' Kelsh v. Jaeger, 2002 ND 53, ¶ 7, 641 N.W.2d 100. 'In interpreting clauses in a constitution we must presume that words have been employed in their natural and ordinary meaning.'
See also N.D.C.C. § 27-02-04. This Court’s power to issue original writs is discretionary and may not be invoked as a matter of right. RECALLND v. Jaeger , 2010 ND 250, ¶ 7, 792 N.W.2d 511 ; Bolinske v. Jaeger , 2008 ND 180, ¶ 4, 756 N.W.2d 336 ; Kelsh v. Jaeger , 2002 ND 53, ¶ 2, 641 N.W.2d 100 ; State ex rel. Kusler v. Sinner , 491 N.W.2d 382, 384 (N.D. 1992). It is well settled that the power to exercise our original jurisdiction extends only to those cases where the questions presented are publici juris and affect the sovereignty of the state, the franchises or prerogatives of the state, or the liberties of its people. RECALLND , at ¶ 7 ; Kelsh , at ¶ 2 ; Sinner , at 384.
The exercise of this power is left to this Court's discretion and cannot be invoked as a matter of right. Bolinske v. Jaeger, 2008 ND 180, ¶ 4, 756 N.W.2d 336. "It is well-settled that our power to exercise original jurisdiction extends only to those cases in which the questions presented . . . affect the sovereignty of the state, the franchises or prerogatives of the state, or the liberties of its people." Kelsh v. Jaeger, 2002 ND 53, ¶ 2, 641 N.W.2d 100; see also N.D.C.C. § 27-02-04. We exercise original jurisdiction in this case because the State has a primary interest in the outcome and the sovereign rights of its citizens are affected.
"Except as otherwise provided in the constitution, the Legislature may not delegate legislative powers to others . . . ." Kelsh v. Jaeger, 2002 ND 53, ¶ 21, 641 N.W.2d 100. "However, the Legislature may delegate powers which are not exclusively legislative and which the Legislature cannot conveniently do because of the detailed nature." Stutsman Cty. v. State Historical Soc'y of N.D., 371 N.W.2d 321, 327 (N.D. 1985) [¶29] When determining whether there has been a proper delegation of power from the legislature to the executive branch, this Court has recognized that the "distinction between a delegable and non-delegable power was whether the power granted gives the authority to make a law or whether that power pertains only to the execution of a law which was enacted by the Legislature."
Every case cited by Brown, however, addressed the legislature's power to delegate legislative authority to executive branch agencies or officials, or private persons, organizations, or cooperatives. See Kelsh v. Jaeger, 2002 ND 53, 641 N.W.2d 100; MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Heitkamp, 523 N.W.2d 548 (N.D. 1994); Stutsman County v. State Historical Soc'y, 371 N.W.2d 321 (N.D. 1985); Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Johanneson, 153 N.W.2d 414 (N.D. 1967); Anderson v. Peterson, 78 N.D. 949, 54 N.W.2d 542 (1952); State ex rel. City of Fargo v. Wetz, 40 N.D. 299, 168 N.W. 835 (1918); State ex rel. Miller v. Taylor, 27 N.D. 77, 145 N.W. 425 (1913); State ex rel. Rusk v. Budge, 14 N.D. 532, 105 N.W. 724 (1905); People v. Grant, 242 A.D. 310, 275 N.Y.S. 74 (1934). Brown cites no authority suggesting the legislature may not delegate legislative power to the governing bodies of political subdivisions, which are themselves legislative bodies with the power to enact ordinances within their local jurisdiction.
[¶37] Severability is a question of statutory and constitutional interpretation by which we seek to determine legislative intent first and foremost by reference to the ordinary meaning of the enacted text. Kelsh v. Jaeger, 2002 ND 53, ¶¶ 7, 20, 641 N.W.2d 100. When legislation conflicts with the constitution, the enacted text cannot be taken at face value because it is "without effect." Home of Econ. v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R., 2005 ND 74, ¶ 5, 694 N.W.2d 840.
We determine the intent and purpose of a constitutional provision, "if possible, from the language itself." Kelsh v. Jaeger, 2002 ND 53, ¶ 7, 641 N.W.2d 100. "In interpreting clauses in a constitution we must presume that words have been employed in their natural and ordinary meaning."
We determine the intent and purpose of a constitutional provision, "if possible, from the language itself." Kelsh v. Jaeger , 2002 ND 53, ¶ 7, 641 N.W.2d 100. "In interpreting clauses in a constitution we must presume that words have been employed in their natural and ordinary meaning." Cardiff v. Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. , 263 N.W.2d 105, 107 (N.D. 1978).