Opinion
No. 2-808 / 01-1891.
Filed November 15, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, CARL D. BAKER, Judge.
Plaintiffs appeal the district court's denial of their motion for new trial. AFFIRMED.
Steven Crowley of Crowley Bunger, Burlington, and Tito Trevino of Trevino Law Offices, Fort Dodge, for appellant.
Mark Fransdal of Redfern, Mason, Dieter, Larsen Moore, P.L.C., Cedar Falls, for appellee.
Considered by SACKETT, C.J., and MILLER and EISENHAUER, JJ.
Plaintiffs appeal the district court's denial of their motion for new trial following a jury verdict finding defendants negligent, but finding no proximate cause. Plaintiffs contend the district court erroneously submitted the affirmative defenses of sudden emergency and sole proximate cause to the jury. They argue the jury's verdict was inconsistent with the law and the evidence, requiring a new trial on the sole issue of damages. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings. On the afternoon of October 23, 1998, five-year-old Brandon Kelly attempted to cross West Madison Street in Marshalltown. At that time, Ronald Webster was driving a 22,000-pound empty dump truck back from the local landfill on his last run of the day. As Webster approached from the west, Brandon ran out into the street. Webster applied his brakes immediately. Brandon ran across the street and was struck four feet south of the curb. The dump truck came to rest on Brandon's legs.
Brandon's mother, Cindy Kelly, brought a negligence suit against Webster and his employer, Con-struct, Inc., on her son's behalf. Plaintiffs alleged Webster was driving too fast for conditions, failed to maintain a proper lookout, and failed to keep his truck under control. Defendants denied negligence, alleging comparative fault on the part of Brandon and his mother. Defendants also pled the affirmative defense of "sudden emergency" and alleged that the speed in which Brandon appeared in the street constituted the sole proximate cause of any damages suffered by Brandon or his mother.
At trial, Webster testified he had lived in the neighborhood in which the accident occurred from 1984 until 1990. He had previously seen young children in the area crossing the street. He also testified he knew the braking system on the dump truck he drove was not as responsive as that of a car.
West Madison Street is a truck route with a posted speed limit of 30 mph. Webster estimated he was traveling between 25 and 30 mph just before the accident. A motorist traveling behind Webster estimated his own speed to be between 30 and 35 mph, and testified he was driving at the same speed as Webster. Both parties hired reconstruction experts who calculated speed ranges based on physical evidence. Plaintiff's expert estimated Webster's speed between 28 and 34 mph. The defense expert estimated Webster was traveling within the range of 27 and 32 mph.
Webster testified that he did not see Brandon before he appeared in front of his truck in the eastbound lane of traffic, almost across the street. Following the accident, Webster stated, "I didn't see him, I didn't see him."
The jury was instructed on the defenses of sudden emergency and sole proximate cause. The jury was not instructed on comparative fault. In response to interrogatories, the jury found Webster negligent, but found his negligence was not a proximate cause of plaintiffs' damages. The court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiffs filed a motion for new trial, which the court denied.
II. Jury Instructions. Plaintiffs contend the district court erred in submitting the jury instructions on sudden emergency and sole proximate cause. We review errors in jury instructions for corrections of errors at law. Cato v. American Suzuki Motor Corp., 622 N.W.2d 486, 492 (Iowa 2001). Error in giving a jury instruction does not merit reversal unless the complaining party has been prejudiced. Hoskinson v. City of Iowa City, 621 N.W.2d 425, 426 (Iowa 2001).
A. Sudden Emergency. Plaintiffs argue the instruction on sudden emergency was not warranted. However, we find the plaintiffs have failed to show they were prejudiced by submission of the jury instruction on sudden emergency because the jury, by finding the defendant negligent, rejected this defense.
B. Sole Proximate Cause. Plaintiffs next contend the court erred in submitting the instruction on sole proximate cause because Brandon was not a third party, and because the parties stipulated that neither Brandon nor his mother could be culpable.
A plaintiff has the burden to prove the requisite causal connections between the defendant's alleged negligence and the injury, but when the defendant asserts that a third party's conduct or an independent event was the sole proximate cause of the accident, the defendant has the burden of proof on the defense. Chumbley v. Dreis Krump Mfg. Co., 521 N.W.2d 192, 194 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993). Once the sole proximate cause defense is proven, defendant is insulated from liability because its fault, if any, cannot be a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. Id. Although there can be more than one proximate cause of an injury or damages, there can be only one sole proximate cause. Id.
The sole proximate cause defense is not limited to situations of alleged negligent conduct by third parties. Sponsler v. Clarke Elec. Coop., Inc., 329 N.W.2d 663, 665 (Iowa 1983). Any event not chargeable to the defendant that constitutes the sole proximate cause of the injury will insulate the defendant from liability. Id. Brandon's action of running into the street is not chargeable to the defendants. Therefore, the sole proximate cause defense was available.
The parties stipulated that Brandon could not be culpable for his actions. This does not mean, however, that his conduct could not be deemed the sole proximate cause of his injuries. See id. (finding an employer's actions could be the sole proximate cause of injury, even though the employer could not be held at fault under the workers' compensation laws); see also Smith v. Air Feeds, Inc., 556 N.W.2d 160, 162-64 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996).
Parties to lawsuits are entitled to have their legal theories submitted to a jury if they are supported by the pleadings and substantial evidence in the record. Sonnek v. Warren, 522 N.W.2d 45, 47 (Iowa 1994). Iowa law requires a court to give a requested jury instruction if it correctly states the applicable law and is not embodied in other instructions. Id. We find no error in instructing the jury as to the sole proximate cause defense.
C. Cumulative Error. Finally, plaintiffs argue the submission of both the sudden emergency and sole proximate cause instructions cumulatively caused error because together they overemphasized Brandon's conduct. They contend that even though the jury rejected the sudden emergency defense, it may have influenced the jury on the issue of sole proximate cause. We reject this argument.
The jury was instructed to consider the defense of sole proximate cause only if they found the plaintiffs had proved all the elements of a negligence claim. The jury found Webster's conduct was not a proximate cause of the plaintiffs' damages. Accordingly, the jury did not need to reach the issue of sole proximate cause.
III. Substantial Evidence. Plaintiffs contend the jury's finding Webster negligent but not the proximate cause of Brandon's injuries is inconsistent with the evidence at trial. We review the granting or denial of a motion for new trial for abuse of discretion. Magnusson Agency v. Public Entity Nat. Company-Midwest, 560 N.W.2d 20, 30 (Iowa 1997). If a jury verdict is not supported by sufficient evidence and the verdict fails to effectuate substantial justice, a new trial may be ordered. Id. We find substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict and, therefore, the district court did not err in denying the plaintiffs' motion for new trial.
In determining whether Webster proximately cause the plaintiffs' injuries, we consider (1) whether the harm would not have occurred but for the negligence of the defendant, and (2) whether the negligence of the defendant was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. Scoggins v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 560 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Iowa 1997). We find substantial evidence supports the defendants' theory that the plaintiffs' injuries would have occurred even had Webster not acted negligently. The eyewitnesses to the accident agreed that it occurred very quickly. Both the lay witnesses and the defendants' expert opined that the accident was unavoidable. It was within the jury's purview to conclude that even if Webster had been traveling at a slower rate of speed and been paying close attention, the accident would still have occurred.