This section imposes upon the court the same standard of proof, which is "beyond a reasonable doubt," as is required for conviction in criminal cases involving adults when the court rules on delinquency or unruliness. Where the court as here recited its findings of fact adversely to the juvenile, he is not required to use the words "beyond a reasonable doubt." In fact, as is pointed out by appellant's able counsel, this court had imposed this standard of proof well before passage of the Juvenile Court Code. Thomas v. State, 121 Ga. App. 91 ( 172 S.E.2d 860); Kelly v. State, 122 Ga. App. 185 ( 176 S.E.2d 468). The United States Supreme Court in the case of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 ( 90 SC 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368), had done likewise. But our statute in legislatively decreeing such standard of proof in delinquency and unruliness hearings does not require the court to include this as an abracadabra statement in the adjudication order.

A few cases illustrating the intended application of the statute according to Georgia courts are the following:         An early opinion written by Justice Bleckley of the Georgia Supreme Court on March 18, 1889, to-wit: Kelly v. State of Georgia, 82 Ga. 441, 9 S.E. 171, 172, made the following statement: The court admitted in behalf of the State, a conversation of one witness with a third person, as mere inducement, to account for investigation by the witness.