Kelly v. Mile Hi Single Ply, Inc.

17 Citing cases

  1. Pulsifer v. Pueblo Professional Contractors

    161 P.3d 656 (Colo. 2007)   Cited 9 times
    Holding that "another not in the same employ" refers to those individuals who are "not a direct party to the agreement for services for pay," and that the damage limitation applies to those who are "the principal parties to the agreement"

    The third sentence applies the statutory limitation on damages to any "such individual" who would otherwise have been compensated under the WCA. Therefore, it refers to "any individual" described in the first sentence. Thus, the statutory limit applies to "any individual who is excluded from the definition of employee pursuant to section 8-40-202(2)(b), or § 8-41-401(3); see Kelly v. Mile Hi Single Ply, Inc., 890 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Colo. 1995) (holding that a rejecting officer is subject to the statutory limitation on damages in section 8-41-401(3)). This interpretation is also consistent with the legislative history. In 1987, the General Assembly amended the WCA and created what is now section 8-41-401(3). 1987 Colo. Sess. Laws 399. The first sentence began, as the version of the statute we now interpret does, with a list of persons who "shall not have any cause of action [under the WCA]."Id. The third sentence began, as it does now: "[t]he total amount of damages recoverable by such individual . . .," but then repeated the list and applied the statutory limitation to the individuals listed.

  2. Continental v. Dickinson

    179 P.3d 202 (Colo. App. 2007)   Cited 9 times

    " As to independent contractors, among others, § 8-41-401(3) limits the "total amount of damages recoverable pursuant to any cause of action resulting from a work-related injury," otherwise compensable under the Act, to $15,000, "except in any cause of action brought against another not in the same employ." See Kelly v. Mile Hi Single Ply, Inc., 890 P.2d 1161 (Colo. 1995); Stampados v. Colo. D S Enters., Inc., 833 P.2d 815 (Colo.App. 1992). Section 10-4-609(1)(a), C.R.S. 2006, prohibits delivery of an automobile liability insurance policy in Colorado unless either the policy provides "for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury," or the insured waives this coverage.

  3. Ryser v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co.

    480 P.3d 1286 (Colo. 2021)   Cited 22 times
    Holding that WCA precluded lawsuit against employer's UIM insurance carrier

    In addition, we have interpreted the foregoing WCA exclusivity provisions to extend immunity from any common law liability arising out of a work-related injury to the injured worker's co-employees. See Kelly v. Mile Hi Single Ply, Inc., 890 P.2d 1161, 1163 (Colo. 1995) (noting that an employer who has complied with the WCA's insurance provisions, as well as an injured worker's co-employees, are immune from common-law liability for such injuries); Kandt, 645 P.2d at 1305 (noting that the WCA quid pro quo by which an employer gives up its normal defenses and assumes liability in exchange for the employee's giving up common-law verdicts extends as well to co-employees who are also involved in this compromise of rights); see also § 8-40-102(1), C.R.S. (2020) (recognizing that "the workers' compensation system in Colorado is based on a mutual renunciation of common law rights and defenses by employers and employees alike"). ¶22 The question now before us is whether the WCA's co-employee immunity rule bars Ryser from recovering UM/UIM benefits from his co-worker Babion's insurer, Shelter.

  4. Malek v. Hankins

    911 P.2d 1127 (Mont. 1996)   Cited 2 times

    We conclude that the Workers' Compensation Act provides immunity to a covered employee for work-related injuries to a co-employee, regardless of the employer's election not to cover the injured co-employee under workers' compensation. The Supreme Court of Colorado considered an identical issue in Kelly v. Mile Hi Single Ply, Inc. (Colo. 1995), 890 P.2d 1161. Mile Hi had opted out of workers' compensation coverage for Kelly, a corporate officer, as allowed under Colorado law. Kelly was injured in an automobile accident in which James, an employee of Mile Hi, was the driver. Kelly sued James and Mile Hi to recover damages for his injury.

  5. Shepherd v. United States Olympic Committee

    94 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (D. Colo. 2000)   Cited 20 times
    Denying Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss Rehabilitation Act claim, holding that plaintiff "should be allowed the benefit of discovery, particularly with reference to the issue of whether Congress or any federal agency, by providing direct or indirect financial assistance to [defendant], has or had the requisite intent to subsidize it"

    USOC asserts such request is barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Colorado Workmen's Compensation Act, recovery under which is meant to be the exclusive remedy for workers covered by its provisions. See Kelly v. Mile Hi Single Ply, Inc., 890 P.2d 1161, 1163 (Colo. 1995). It cites no authority, however, for the proposition that the Colorado act precludes compensatory damages for emotional pain and suffering under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (a)(1) or under the ADA to which Title VII extends the right to such damages, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(1)(2).

  6. Pinnacol Assurance v. Hoff

    375 P.3d 1214 (Colo. 2016)

    ¶53 The “comprehensive insurance scheme” set forth in the WCA is designed to protect injured workers by ensuring the quick and efficient payment of benefits. See Kelly v. Mile Hi Single Ply, Inc. , 890 P.2d 1161, 1163 (Colo. 1995) ; see also § 8–40–102(1). To that end, any “employer” subject to the Act must “secure compensation for all employees” by maintaining workers' compensation insurance. § 8–44–101(1)(a)–(d).

  7. Pinnacol Assurance v. Hoff

    375 P.3d 1214 (Colo. 2016)

    ¶53 The “comprehensive insurance scheme” set forth in the WCA is designed to protect injured workers by ensuring the quick and efficient payment of benefits. See Kelly v. Mile Hi Single Ply, Inc. , 890 P.2d 1161, 1163 (Colo. 1995) ; see also § 8–40–102(1). To that end, any “employer” subject to the Act must “secure compensation for all employees” by maintaining workers' compensation insurance. § 8–44–101(1)(a)–(d).

  8. Cavaleri v. Anderson

    298 P.3d 237 (Colo. App. 2012)   Cited 1 times

    " Kelly v. Mile Hi Single Ply, Inc., 890 P.2d 1161, 1164-65 (Colo. 1995) (citations and footnote omitted) (quoting Hearings on H.B. 1215 before the S. Comm. on Business Affairs & Labor (comments of Mary Ann Tebedo, bill sponsor)). ¶8 Although the principles articulated in Kelly and Snook apply here, the factual situation before us is somewhat different from that presented in those cases.

  9. Snook v. Joyce Homes, Inc.

    215 P.3d 1210 (Colo. App. 2009)   Cited 12 times
    Upholding damages cap imposed by the Workers’ Compensation Act

    Id. Kelly v. Mile Hi Single Ply, Inc., 890 P.2d 1161, 1164-65 (Colo. 1995) (footnote omitted). Thus, "[t]he General Assembly has shifted the risk of work-related injuries costing more than fifteen thousand dollars to individuals who have the choice to participate in the workers' compensation system."

  10. Newsom v. Frank M. Hall Co.

    101 P.3d 1107 (Colo. App. 2004)   Cited 2 times

    Workers' compensation is an employee's exclusive remedy against his or her employer for work-related injuries. Thus, an employer who has complied with the insurance provisions of the Act is immune from any common law liability for such injuries. Kelly v. Mile Hi Single Ply, Inc., 890 P.2d 1161 (Colo. 1995). That immunity extends to actual employers and to "statutory" employers of the injured worker.