Opinion
20-cv-07821-LB
08-31-2022
DANA PRESTON KELLY, Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING THE PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES Re: ECF No. 31
LAUREL BEELER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INTRODUCTION
In this Social Security appeal, the court previously granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and remanded the action to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings.On remand, the plaintiff received a past-due benefits award. His counsel now seeks fees of $13,500, which is within the twenty-five-percent limit in 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and the representation agreement with his client. The court can decide this matter without oral argument. See N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). The court grants the motion.
Order - ECF No. 27. Citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File (ECF); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents.
Notice of Award - ECF No. 31-3 at 1-6.
Mot. - ECF No. 31.
STATEMENT
The Commissioner withheld twenty-five percent of the retroactive benefits, or $17,437.53.The plaintiff has a fee agreement with his lawyer that provides for a twenty-five-percent contingency fee of the award as of the final decision. The plaintiff's attorney has already received $3,222 in attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). He agreed that he will reimburse the plaintiff the EAJA fees.
Notice of Award - ECF No. 31-3 at 3.
Soc. Sec. Representation Agreement - ECF No. 31-1.
Order - ECF No. 30.
Mot. - ECF No. 31 at 6.
The Commissioner filed a response to the plaintiff's motion stating that he “does not assent or object to” the fee request.
Resp. - ECF No. 32 at 2.
ANALYSIS
Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), “[w]henever a court renders a judgment favorable to a [social security] claimant . . ., the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee” for the claimant's counsel, which can be no more than twenty-five percent of the total of past-due benefits awarded to the claimant. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). A court may award such a fee even if the court's judgment did not immediately result in an award of past-due benefits; where the court has rendered a judgment favorable to a claimant by reversing an earlier determination by an ALJ and remanding for further consideration, the court may calculate the twenty-five-percent fee based upon any past-due benefits awarded on remand. See, e.g., Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
In considering a motion for attorney's fees under § 406(b), the court must review counsel's request “as an independent check” to ensure that the contingency fee agreement “yield[s] reasonable results.” See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). Section 406(b) “does not displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs courts to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements.” Id. at 808-09. To evaluate the reasonableness of a fee request under § 406(b), the court considers the character of the representation and the results achieved. Id. at 808; see also Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151. This includes analyzing whether substandard representation justifies awarding less than twenty-five percent in fees; any delay in the proceedings attributable to the attorney requesting the fee; whether the benefits of the representation are out of proportion to time spent on the case; and the risk counsel assumed by accepting the case. See Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151-52 (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). If an attorney “is responsible for delay . . . a reduction [of fees] is in order so that the attorney will not profit from the accumulation of benefits during the pendency of the case in court.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808 (cleaned up); see also Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151.
The court must offset an award of § 406(b) attorney's fees by any award of fees granted under the EAJA. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796; Parrish v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 698 F.3d 1215, 1218 (9th Cir. 2012).
The twenty-five-percent contingency-fee agreement is within § 406(b)(1)(A)'s ceiling, and the amount is reasonable.
CONCLUSION
The court holds that a fee award of $13,500 is reasonable under § 406(b). The plaintiff's counsel must refund the plaintiff the EAJA fees, which results in a net (remaining) fee award of $10,278.
IT IS SO ORDERED.