It passes no title to real estate situated in another State. Nor, as to personal property, will the title acquired by it prevail against the rights of attaching creditors under the laws of the State where the property is actually situated. Harrison v. Sterry, 5 Cranch, 289, 302; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213; Booth v. Clark, 17 How. 322; Blake v. Williams, 6 Pick. 286; Osborn v. Adams, 18 Pick. 245; Zipcey v. Thompson, 1 Gray, 243; Abraham v. Plestoro, 3 Wend. 538, overruling Holmes v. Remsen, 4 Johns. Ch. 460; Johnson v. Hunt, 23 Wend. 87; Hoyt v. Thompson, 5 N.Y. 320; Willitts v. Waite, 25 N.Y. 577; Kelly v. Crapo, 45 N.Y. 86; Barth v. Backus, 140 N.Y. 230; Weider v. Maddox, 66 Tex. 372; Rhawn v. Pearce, 110 Ill. 350; Catlin v. Wilcox Silver Plate Co., 123 Ind. 477. As was said by Mr. Justice McLean in Oakey v. Bennett, 11 How. 33, 44, "A statutable conveyance of property cannot strictly operate beyond the local jurisdiction.
achment of his property there, after knowledge of his embarrassment and actual insolvency, which property the insolvent law of the State of the debtor's residence requires him to convey to his assignee in insolvency, for distribution with his other assets โ there being nothing in the law or policy of the state in which the attachment is made, opposed to those of the State of the creditor and of the insolvent debtor. Mr. Henry D. Hyde and Mr. M.F. Dickinson, Jr., (with whom was Mr. Hollis R. Bailey on the briefs,) for plaintiffs in error, cited: Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290, 300; Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139, 145; Warner v. Jaffrey, 96 N.Y. 248, 259; Sartwell v. Field, 68 N.Y. 341; Dunlop v. Patterson Fire Ins. Co., 74 N.Y. 145; Anthony v. Wood, 29 Hun, 239; McGinn v. Ross, 11 Abb. Pr. (N.S.) 20; Hibernian Nat. Bank v. Lacombe, 84 N.Y. 367, 385; Jenks v. Ludden, 34 Minn. 486; Kidder v. Tufts, 48 N.H. 121, 126; Paine v. Lester, 44 Conn. 196, 204; Rhawn v. Pearce, 110 Ill. 350; Kelly v. Crapo, 45 N.Y. 86; Fuller v. Cadwell, 6 Allen, 503; Crapo v. Kelly, 16 Wall. 610; Hervey v. R.I. Locomotive Works, 93 U.S. 664; Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 583; Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714; Whipple v. Robbins, 97 Mass. 107; S.C. 93 Am. Dec. 64; American Bank v. Rollins, 99 Mass. 313; Garity v. Gigie, 130 Mass. 184; Wallace v. McConnell, 13 Pet. 136, 151; Nicoll v. Spowers, 105 N.Y. 1; Keller v. Paine, 107 N.Y. 83, 90; Bicknell v. Field, 8 Paige, 440; Harris v. Pullman, 84 Ill. 20; Dehon v. Foster, 4 Allen, 545; Dehon v. Foster, 7 Allen, 57; Lawrence v. Batcheller, 131 Mass. 504. Mr. Eugene M. Johnson, for defendants in error, cited: Dehon v. Foster, 4 Allen, 545; Keyser v. Rice, 47 Md. 203; Quidnick Co. v. Chaffee, 13 R.I. 367; Snook v. Snetzer, 25 Ohio St. 516; Vermont Canada Railroad v. Vermont Central Railroad, 46 Vt. 792, 797; Great Falls Manfg. Co. v. Worster, 23 N.H. 462; Bushby v. Munday, 5 Madd. 297, 307; Beckford v. Kemble, 1 Sim. Stu. 7; Attwood v. Banks,
The court say: "The existence and the powers of any foreign corporation coming into this state to do business are at all times subject to the law of its creation and of its domicile and, additionally, to our laws relating to it, and the terms laid down by our legislature as conditions of allowing it to transact business here." The cases specially relied upon by the appellant are Hibernia National Bank v. Lacombe ( 84 N.Y. 367); Hammond v. National Life Insurance Company ( 58 App. Div. 453, 455); Willitts v. Waite ( 25 N.Y. 577, 581), and Kelly v. Crapo ( 45 N.Y. 86, 90). In the Hibernia Nat. Bank case the commissioners appointed were simply receivers in an action by a creditor or auditor of public accounts and not persons designated by the statute to take over the title of the corporate property as statutory liquidators.
The plaintiff, by the process of our courts, has acquired a right, of which no principle of national comity requires us to deprive it. It is said by Chancellor KENT, in Holmes v. Remsen (4 Johns. Ch. 470), to be "admitted in all the cases that every country may by positive law regulate as it pleases the disposition of personal property found within it, and may prefer its own attaching creditor to any foreign assignee, and no other authority has a right to question the determination;" and to the same effect are the observations of PLATT, J., in Holmes v. Remsen (20 Johns. 254); and so it has been held through various intermediate cases to that of Kelly v. Crapo ( 45 N.Y. 86), in which the late chief judge of this court regards the doctrine that a title acquired under foreign bankrupt or insolvent proceedings will not prevail against the rights of attaching creditors under the laws of the State, where the property is actually situated, so well settled, as to make it quite unnecessary to review the authority or the history of the decisions on that subject. The question, then regarded as too fully settled to be open for review, we see no reason to again discuss.
We are of opinion that there is nothing in the Florida statutes indicating that the Florida bank was dissolved. This being so, the appellant has no title superior to that of an attaching creditor who is a resident of this State. ( Willitts v. Waite, 25 N.Y. 577, which is approvingly cited in Deschenes v. Tallman, 248 id. 33, 38.) (See, also, Kelly v. Crapo, 45 N.Y. 86, 90.) Martyne v. American Union Fire Ins. Co. ( 216 N.Y. 183) involved a foreign corporation that had actually been dissolved, and the distinction is pointed out between that case and the Willitts Case ( supra) and cognate cases by Judge Chase, writing in the Martyne case. The order should be affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements. Lazansky, P.J., Young, Kapper, Hagarty and Tompkins, JJ., concur.
In the Hoyt Case ( supra) it was held not taxable because its actual situs was not within the State, and, therefore, it was not brought within the terms of the statute; and that to uphold the tax in that particular case would result in double taxation. This case was commented upon in Kelly v. Crapo ( 45 N.Y. 86), where the rule above announced was approved. The rule was again approved in People ex rel. Pacific M.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Taxes ( 58 N.Y. 242).
It is well settled that a court may refuse to regard the lex loci contractus if it be immoral or unjust, or if it harm our own citizens. (Story Confl. Laws [8th ed.], ยง 244; Kelly v. Crapo, 45 N.Y. 86; King v. Sarria, 69 id. 24.) In Teel v. Yost ( 128 N.Y. 387, 394) the court, per RUGER, Ch. J., say: "It should, in any event, be for the gravest reasons alone, and those demanded by the clearest rules of public policy and justice, that the courts of one State should deliberately deny to the decisions of the courts of another State the authority which they possess in the State where rendered."
The domiciliary receiver urges that in view of his readiness to furnish a large bond to insure the equitable treatment of New York creditors at his hands, this court as a matter of courtesy to the decree of a sister State, might direct that the fund be surrendered for administration in Delaware. But to paraphrase the language in Kelly v. Crapo ( 45 N.Y. 86, 95) the question is whether we ought to deprive the domestic creditor of the benefit of our laws, subordinate his rights to those of foreign creditors, and subject him to the inconvenience and expense of seeking dividends in a foreign State. There the Court of Appeals said: "There is no rule of comity requiring such complaisance. If it was a mere question of courtesy, we should promptly require the creditor to yield his claim, and render suitable indemnity for the delay and inconvenience which he had occasioned; but the question is one of far graver import.