Opinion
1: 22-cv-10923 (JGLC) (SDA)
2023-10-11
Peter KELLY, Plaintiff, v. COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, et al., Defendants.
Corey Scott Stark, Corey Stark PLLC, New York, NY, for Plaintiff. Amy S. Young, CWA Legal Department, New York, NY, Atul Talwar, Semel, Young & Norum, New York, NY, for Defendant Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO. Cliff LaFemina, Ian B. Bogaty, Jackson Lewis P.C., Melville, NY, Ryan Christopher Chapoteau, Jackson Lewis P.C., New York, NY, for Defendant Verizon New York Inc.
Corey Scott Stark, Corey Stark PLLC, New York, NY, for Plaintiff. Amy S. Young, CWA Legal Department, New York, NY, Atul Talwar, Semel, Young & Norum, New York, NY, for Defendant Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO. Cliff LaFemina, Ian B. Bogaty, Jackson Lewis P.C., Melville, NY, Ryan Christopher Chapoteau, Jackson Lewis P.C., New York, NY, for Defendant Verizon New York Inc. OPINION AND ORDER STEWART D. AARON, United States Magistrate Judge:
Before the Court is a motion by Plaintiff Peter Kelly ("Plaintiff" or "Kelly"), pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint to add a Fourth Count against Defendant Verizon New York Inc. ("Verizon") under the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"). (Pl.'s 10/6/23 Ltr. Mot., ECF No. 43.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This is an action by Kelly against his former employer, Verizon, and his union, Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO (the "Union") (together, the "Defendants"), arising out of the termination of his employment. The Amended Complaint alleged that Verizon breached its collective bargaining agreement with the Union by terminating Kelly's employment without cause (First Count); that the Union unlawfully discriminated against him with respect to the terms and conditions of his employment in violation of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (Second Count); and that the Union breached its duty of fair representation owed to Plaintiff (Third Count). (Am. Compl., ECF No. 22, ¶¶ 55-74.) The underlying factual allegations were recited in a prior Report and Recommendation issued in this case, which recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint be denied. See Kelly v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, No. 22-CV-10923 (GHW) (SDA), 2023 WL 5105482, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 5108756 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2023).
Kelly filed his Amended Complaint as of right in response to initial motions to dismiss that had been filed by Defendants.
Following adoption of the Report and Recommendation, the Court held an initial pretrial conference on September 18, 2023, and entered a Case Management Plan the same day. (Case Mgt. Plan, ECF No. 42.) The Case Management Plan set a deadline of October 18, 2023 for any amended pleadings. (See id. at 3.)
On October 6, 2023, Kelly timely filed the motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint that currently is before the Court. (See Pl.'s 10/6/23 Ltr. Mot.) In the Second Amended Complaint, Kelly seeks to add as a Fourth Count a NYSHRL claim against Verizon. (See Proposed SAC, ECF No. 43-1, ¶¶ 78-81.) On October 9, 2023, Verizon filed its opposition to Kelly's motion (Verizon Ltr. Resp., ECF No. 44) and on October 11, 2023, Kelly filed his reply. (Pl.'s 10/11/23 Ltr., ECF No. 45.)
LEGAL STANDARDS
A motion to amend is governed by Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that "[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Notwithstanding the liberality of the general rule, "it is within the sound discretion of the court whether to grant leave to amend." John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Amerford International Corp., 22 F.3d 458, 462 (2d Cir. 1994). Regarding the use of this discretion, the Supreme Court has stated:
In the absence of any apparent or declared reason—such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.—the leave should . . . be freely given.Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (internal quotation marks omitted). "The party opposing a motion to amend typically bears the burden of establishing that the amendment should be denied." Pickett v. Migos Touring, Inc., 330 F.R.D. 140, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
The Court finds, in its discretion, that Verizon has not met its burden to establish that the motion to amend should be denied. Verizon opposed Plaintiff's motion to amend to add an NYSHRL claim on three grounds, i.e., undue delay, bad faith and prejudice. (See Verizon Ltr. Resp. at 2-3.) Plaintiff's proposed pleading will not cause much delay since discovery only recently commenced. In any event, "[m]ere delay, . . . absent a showing of bad faith or undue prejudice, does not provide a basis for a district court to deny the right to amend." Williams v. Epic Sec. Corp., 358 F. Supp. 3d 284, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting State Teachers Ret. Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 856 (2d Cir. 1981)).
Even if one were to measure the period of delay from December 2022, when this case commenced, until October 2023, when the motion to amend was filed, such delay is not a reason to deny Plaintiff's motion. Courts in this Circuit routinely allow plaintiffs to amend their complaint after much longer delays. See, e.g., Richardson Greenshields Sec., Inc. v. Lau, 825 F.2d 647, 653 (2d Cir. 1987) (collecting cases where leave to amend was granted after delays ranging from two to five years).
Moreover, Verizon has not made a plausible showing that Plaintiff acted in bad faith in adding a NYSHRL claim. As Verizon notes, Plaintiff's prior pleadings already contained allegations that Verizon had discriminated against Plaintiff. (See Verizon Ltr. Resp. at 2.) In his proposed Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff now is adding a legal claim based upon such allegations.
Finally, while some prejudice does exist, inasmuch as discovery likely will need to be conducted regarding the added NYSHRL claim, such disadvantage "is not so substantial as to . . . bar the amendment." See S.E.C. v. DCI Telecommunications, Inc., 207 F.R.D. 32, 35 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). An "adverse party's burden of undertaking discovery, standing alone, does not suffice to warrant denial of a motion to amend a pleading.' " United States v. Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co., 889 F.2d 1248, 1255 (2d Cir. 1989); accord Perez v. Escobar Constr., Inc., 342 F.R.D. 378, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) ("the need for new discovery is not sufficient to constitute undue prejudice on its own") (citation omitted). Fact discovery does not close until January 31, 2024, and Verizon has ample time to take any additional discovery it needs. Thus, the Court finds no undue prejudice imposed on Verizon by permitting the amendment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for leave to file his Second Amended Complaint is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall file the Second Amended Complaint within seven days of the date of this Order.