Opinion
Civil No. 3:17-CV-1882
01-28-2019
DAVID KELLY-BEY, Petitioner v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, et al., Respondents
(Judge Brann)
( ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Factual Background
On October 16, 2017, the petitioner in this case, David Kelly-Bey, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) Kelly-Bey's petition for writ of habeas corpus challenged the 60-day sentence which had been imposed upon the petitioner in state court in 2015 following his conviction for driving while his license privileges were suspended due to a prior DUI conviction. It appeared from Kelly-Bey's petition, and related court records in Commonwealth v. Kelly-Bey, CP-21-SA-77-2015, that this 60-day sentence was re-imposed by the Court of Common Pleas on October 3, 2017, after the petitioner withdrew and abandoned his summary state court appeal of this 2015 Magisterial District Judge conviction. (Id.)
The district court ordered the Commonwealth to respond to this petition and on May 2, 2018, the Commonwealth filed a response which reported that Kelly-Bey was no longer in custody in this case, and requested that the petition be dismissed as moot. (Doc. 11.) For his part, Kelly-Bey never filed a traverse in response to the Commonwealth's suggestion of mootness demonstrating he would suffer some collateral consequences if his conviction was allowed to stand.
On January 9, 2019 this case was referred to the undersigned, and on January 15, 2019 a written notice of this referral was sent to Kelly-Bey at the address which he provided to the court. (Doc. 12.) That notice has now been returned as undeliverable. (Docs. 13 and 14.) Kelly-Bey's failure to provide an address where we may communicate with the petitioner violates the rules of this court, specifically Local Rule 83.18, which directs pro se litigants to provide the court with notice of any change of address and warns pro se parties that the failure to provide these means of communication may result in the party being deemed to have abandoned the litigation. Accordingly, Kelly-Bey's whereabouts are unknown, and we lack any means of communicating with the petitioner.
On these facts, for the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that Kelly-Bey's petition for writ of habeas corpus now be dismissed.
II. Discussion
A. This Petition is Moot and Should Be Dismissed
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), a federal court "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A state prisoner must meet exacting substantive standards to obtain habeas corpus relief. As amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 sharply limits the power of a federal court to grant a state prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). A federal court may not grant habeas relief with respect to any claim that has been adjudicated on the merits unless the adjudication in a state proceeding (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or (2) resulted in a decision that was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is highly deferential and difficult to meet. Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181. It "reflects the view that habeas corpus is a 'guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102-03 (2011).
Further, it is a basic principle of constitutional law that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to decide an issue unless it presents a live case or controversy. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998); Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2009). In order to meet this standard, and "[t]o invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, a litigant must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Burkey, 556 F.3d at 147 (quoting Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)). "This case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings . . . . The parties must continue to have a 'personal stake in the outcome' of the lawsuit." Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7 (quoting Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477-78). Accordingly, "[i]f developments occur during the course of adjudication that eliminate a plaintiff's personal stake in the outcome of a suit or prevent a court from being able to grant the requested relief, the case must be dismissed as moot." Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996).
There is a necessary corollary to the mootness doctrine that applies in cases such as the instant case, where it appears that a petitioner has long since completed service of any sentence which he challenged in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. In this setting: "After a petitioner's release from custody, we consider his habeas case moot unless he 'can demonstrate he will suffer some collateral consequences if his conviction is allowed to stand.' DeFoy, 393 F.3d at 441-42, 442 n. 3." Leyva v. Williams, 504 F.3d 357, 363 (3d Cir. 2007). See e.g., Kozak v. Commonwealth of PA, No. 3:14-CV-984, 2017 WL 4413193, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2017)(dismissing petition); Nalls v. Superintendent Sci-Dallas, No. 1:16-CV-0098, 2016 WL 6995517, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2016)(same).
These principles apply here and are fatal to Kelly-Bey's petition since it is evident that Kelly-Bey is no longer in custody in this case, and Kelly-Bey has not demonstrated that he will suffer some collateral consequences if his conviction is allowed to stand. Accordingly, this petition should now be dismissed as moot.
Further, under the Local Rules of this Court, the petitioner should be deemed to have abandoned this case by failing to provide the court with an address where he can be reached, a direct violation of Local Rule 83.18. The petitioner's violation of Local Rule 83.18 permits the court to find that he has abandoned this litigation, a finding which further bolsters the conclusion that Kelly-Bey suffers no significant collateral consequences as a result of this conviction, and his petition is now moot. In this circumstance, dismissal of this action is fully justified. See, e.g., Juaquee v. Pike County Corr. Facility Employees, 3:12-CV-1233, 2013 WL 432611 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2013); Kuhn v. Capitol Pavilion, 1:11-CV-2017, 2012 WL 5197551 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2012); Educ. Mgmt. Services, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 1:10-CV-00441, 2012 WL 2389874 (M.D. Pa. June 25, 2012); Olguin v. Burgerhoff, 1:12-CV-0003, 2012 WL 1580935 (M.D. Pa. May 4, 2012); Nowland v. Lucas, 1:10-CV-1863, 2012 WL 10559 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2012); Binsack v. Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney's Office, 3:08-CV-1166, 2011 WL 5840314 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2011); Washington v. Columbia County Prison, 3:CV-10-45, 2011 WL 98547 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2011). In this case, the petitioner has failed to comply with Local Rule 83.18 by providing an address where we can communicate with this litigant. This failure now compels us to apply the sanction called for under Rule 83.18 and deem the petitioner to have abandoned this case.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this case be DISMIISED as moot, and that a certificate of appealability should not issue, as Kelly-Bey has not demonstrated "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C § 2253(c)(2); see also Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 773-75 (2017); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set
forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 28th day of January 2019.
/s/ Martin C . Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge