Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ. James C. McGuire, Judge. Petition denied.Super.Ct.No. J213758
Gloria Gebbie for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Ruth E. Stringer, County Counsel, and Danielle E. Wuchenich, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
OPINION
Hollenhorst Acting P.J.
Petitioner Kelly B. (mother) challenges the juvenile court’s denial of reunification services with respect to her daughter J.M. She argues that the child did not fall within a category authorizing the denial of services; that if denial was legally authorized, it was an abuse of discretion; and that Jesus M., the alleged father, should have been found to be a presumed father and awarded services. We reject all contentions and deny the petition.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
J.M. was born in February 2006 when mother was 16 years old. Mother had used marijuana and methamphetamines during the pregnancy, but both she and J.M. tested negative when the child was born. In March 2007, the San Bernardino County Department of Children’s Services (department) received a referral that J.M. was being neglected and being “hit, smacked on her arms, hands and legs . . . .” The referral also indicated that mother had been heard “saying she does not want the child anymore.”
When the investigating social worker informed mother of the reason for her visit, mother and her boyfriend, Carlos, both became upset. Mother then “screamed” at Carlos, “if my child is taken away, I’ll kill you.”
The social worker observed that J.M. had bruises on her face, which mother explained as possibly having been caused from struggling to avoid taking medication. When the social worker saw additional bruises on the child’s leg, including what appeared to be a bite mark, mother suggested that Carlos’s younger brother may have caused it. Law enforcement was called and J.M. was taken into protective custody, which mother allegedly thought “funny.” Taken to a hospital for evaluation, J.M. was found to have multiple bruising on her legs, arms, trunk, head, and perineal region. She had what appeared to be more bite marks on her face, an injury to her gum, and a chipped front tooth. Questioned further, mother commented that she would never leave J.M. alone with Carlos because he was “mean.” She also stated that Carlos admitted biting J.M. on the leg.
Jesus M. was living in Mexico; he had allegedly agreed to be deported rather than face criminal charges arising from his sexual relationship with mother. Mother asserted that she was certain Jesus M. was the father and that he was subject to a child support order, although he had never helped support J.M.
Most of the evidence in the case was adduced at the jurisdictional and dispositional hearings. At the former, held on June 8, 2007, the primary witness was Dr. Young, who testified as an expert in the fields of medicine, pediatrics, and forensic pediatrics. She described the multiple bruises on J.M. and gave the opinion that most of the bruises were not the type of bruising or in locations resulting from accidental injury. In describing the bruises along J.M.’s jawline and the bruises resulting from bite marks, Dr. Young used the terms “deep bruising” and “bruising deep layers.” She also gave the opinion that the bite marks had not been inflicted by a small child and that the bruises had been inflicted on different occasions.
Dr. Young testified that the term “deep bruising,” which appears in Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (e), is not a term “typically” used as a medical definition. She defined her understanding of the term by comparing “superficial” bruises that “look just like blood under the surface” with a bruise that “has a lot of color to it or is very large,” and that the term “[d]eep bruising implies greater force.”
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
Mother testified that she was no longer living with Carlos because they had been arguing and fighting, although she denied he ever struck her. She admitted having seen the bite marks and bruises during the week before J.M. was removed, but with respect to the bruises, testified that “I didn’t think she got hurt by someone.” Mother admitted to some concern over the bite marks and stated that she had “asked around the house,” but learned nothing at the time. She again admitted that she had probably caused the bruising around J.M.’s face by forcefully holding her to administer medication, although she testified that the injury to J.M.’s mouth was due to a fall.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found that J.M. came within the jurisdiction of the court pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), (e) and (g) (the latter with respect to Jesus M.). The court also made a specific finding according to section 332, subdivision (c), that J.M. had suffered severe physical abuse.
The transcript reflects that the juvenile court made a finding under section “322,” but this was clearly a misstatement.
The dispositional hearing was held two months later, on August 2, 2007. The first issue addressed was the status of Jesus M. He testified that he had had a relationship with mother, although he was hazy on the dates; at one point, he denied that he had sexual relations with mother in the year 2005—which J.M.’s father must have done, as she was born in February 2006. His name is on J.M.’s birth certificate, but he never married or attempted to marry mother. He had never received J.M. into his home or paid child support. At the time of the hearing, he was in the country illegally, having returned after being deported. He also testified that he had signed a document—perhaps a birth certificate or declaration of paternity—at the hospital when J.M. was born.
There was some suggestion that Jesus M. was concerned that his relationship with the underage mother could lead to criminal charges.
Mother testified that Jesus M. was the biological father and that their relationship actually ended in June 2005. She also testified that there had been “pushing and shoving” during the relationship and that he had signed a declaration of paternity. However, no such document was ever produced.
Mother also testified that she had been living with Carlos and his mother for about a month when J.M. was removed; prior to that time, she lived at home with her family, as she was doing at the time of the hearing. J.M. had received all of her “baby checkups” and immunizations. Mother had begun counseling, having had four or five visits with the counselor, and had filled out paperwork for a parenting class—but only the week before the hearing. She had also signed up for an anger management program—also the week before the hearing.
Mother also admitted that she had been given referrals for services no later than May. Her response to questions concerning the delay in commencing with services was “I don’t know,” although she later described a series of telephone calls “like sometimes I didn’t get through. Sometimes they put me on hold. . . . And then like it took me a while to call them.” She also admitted that her relationship with Carlos had involved physical abuse.
The last witness was the social worker. She testified that she originally gave mother a list of services available in Victorville, where mother was then living, but mother moved to Riverside without notifying the social worker until a hearing in April, necessitating the provision of a new list of services. The social worker testified that it was her understanding that mother’s visits with J.M. went well and that she had observed one visit where mother behaved “appropriately” with the child. Somewhat grudgingly, the social worker agreed that mother seemed to be “improving” in her interaction with the child.
The juvenile court found that Jesus M. was only an alleged father, not a presumed father, and was not entitled to reunification services. (See § 361.5, subd. (a).) With respect to mother, the court determined that services should not be provided. Although counsel had argued that mother was merely “a very young mom . . . an immature mom” who could benefit from services, the juvenile court’s remarks reflect a very different view of mother. The court first indicated that both mother and Jesus M. appeared to be either “under the influence or there’s severe medical or mental disabilities. . . . I thought she was in another part of the world. . . . [T]he demeanor of both witnesses while they testified was very, very strange.” The juvenile court disagreed with the argument that mother was “extremely desirous to get this child back.” On the contrary, the court stated, “I don’t see where mother even takes it all that seriously.” Acknowledging that at times it had been inclined to agree with counsel’s assessment of mother, the court concluded that mother had “severe limitations that we just don’t know about.” Services to mother were denied.
DISCUSSION
Mother’s first contention is that the evidence did not support the finding of “severe physical abuse” under section 300, subdivision (e). This finding was crucial, as it was the only basis under section 361.5 where the juvenile court could deny reunification services to mother.
A court may apply section 300, subdivision (e), and make a finding of “severe physical abuse” if, inter alia, the child has suffered “more than one act of physical abuse, each of which causes bleeding [or] deep bruising . . . .” Mother argues that Dr. Young did not describe any of the bruises as “deep bruises,” but this is not correct. Dr. Young expressly testified that “definitely the jawline bruising was deep bruising and the bite marks . . . that takes a lot of force . . . and that’s bruising deep layers.” She also distinguished “deep” and “superficial” bruises, defining the latter as having “blood just under the surface of the skin,” and testified that “none of those bruises look like blood just under the surface of the skin.” The facts cited by mother—that none of the bruises was extremely large, that most of the bruises were brown, and that the doctor could not assign an exact date to the bruises—does not affect the specific testimony that the child suffered multiple deep bruises.
There is no contention that other qualifying injuries (such as fractures) apply here.
Mother also quotes the juvenile court’s comment at the jurisdictional hearing, “[c]ould be that we got this child sooner than we should have,” clearly with the meaning that J.M. was lucky to have come to the attention of the authorities before she suffered even more serious injuries. However, the court also made the express finding that J.M. had already suffered “severe physical abuse” within the meaning of the statute. The fact that it also believed she might have suffered even worse abuse without intervention is irrelevant.
We are not persuaded by the department’s contention that the bruises qualified as “bleeding” injuries as described by the statute. By definition, all “bruises” involve the rupture of small blood vessels into the surrounding tissues. (See Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (1993) p. 285.) If the Legislature had considered all bruises to be “bleeding” injuries, it would have had no need to add the category of “deep bruising.”
Mother argues that section 300, subdivision (e), was intended to cover only more serious injuries, not just a pattern of small bruises. However, the language of the statute is clear. When the Legislature has chosen to use clear language, it is not for the courts to modify or interpret that language; the language used establishes the meaning of the statute. (People v. Palacios (2007) 41 Cal.4th 720, 727-728.) Dr. Young’s testimony established that deep bruising is distinguishable from minor, superficial bruising, and that the child had suffered such bruises. The finding of “severe physical abuse” was proper under the statute.
Mother’s next argument is that even if denial of reunification services was theoretically possible, the court should have ordered the department to provide her with such services. However, where section 300, subdivision (e), applies, the court’s discretion to authorize services is limited to cases where the court can (and does) make a finding that “based on competent testimony, [reunification] services are likely to prevent reabuse or continued neglect of the child or that failure to try reunification will be detrimental to the child because the child is closely and positively attached to that parent.” (§ 361.5, subd. (c).)
On the latter point, the juvenile court made a specific finding that J.M. was not “closely or positively attached” to mother and there was certainly no compelling evidence to the contrary. As for the probable success of services, we note that with respect to a child of J.M.’s age, the presumptive limit for services is “six months from the date the child entered foster care.” (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(2).) The record indicates that J.M. was in foster care at least by March 29, 2007; hence, six months had almost elapsed by the time of the dispositional hearing. Although services can be extended if there appears to be a “substantial probability” of success (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3)), the juvenile court clearly felt there would be no such likelihood. We will not disagree with this implied finding.
Mother was unable to commence services in a prompt manner and her testimony at the dispositional hearing was extremely vague as to what she was learning or discussing. The juvenile court was of the opinion that mother was either unable or unwilling to take the matter of her child’s future seriously. Insofar as this view involved an evaluation of mother’s credibility, we routinely defer to the determination of the trier of fact. (Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 959, 968.) When it comes to evaluating the testimony of a witness, this court has recognized that “a great deal of that highly delicate process we call evaluating the credibility of a witness is based on what might be called, for lack of a better word, ‘intuition’—that intangible, inarticulable capacity of one human being to evaluate the sincerity, honesty and integrity of another human being with whom he comes in contact.” (Meiner v. Ford Motor Co. (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 127, 141.) In this case, the juvenile court was obviously disconcerted by mother’s demeanor and manner of testifying. The court was entitled to take its observations and conclusions into account in determining whether there was any reason to offer reunification services.
Finally, mother asserts that the juvenile court incorrectly found that Jesus M. was not a presumed father entitled to services. The department first argues that mother does not have standing to raise any such issue because she is not directly aggrieved by the ruling. Aggrieved, in the dependency context, means that the ruling “injuriously affects the parent-child relationship.” (In re Paul W. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 37, 62.) The same case suggests that a parent will have standing to raise errors affecting the other parent; arguably, mother was aggrieved because if Jesus M. had been granted reunification services, the matter would not have been scheduled for a permanency planning hearing. (Ibid., citing Abbott et al., Cal. Juvenile Dependency Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 2006 supp.) Appeals and Writs, § 10.44, p. 514.) However, on the merits, her arguments fail.
Although mother testified that Jesus M. was the biological father, Jesus M. himself testified that he did not have sexual relations with mother during the possible period of conception and there was no scientific evidence of parentage. (See Fam. Code, § 7550 et seq.) Furthermore, Jesus M. failed to establish that he met any of the criteria of Family Code section 7611 with respect to “presumed father” status. Jesus M. had neither married mother nor attempted to marry her; he never received the child into his home or held the child out as his natural child; and he did not establish that he signed a declaration of paternity. (Fam. Code, §§ 7611, subds. (a)-(e), § 757.) Accordingly, the juvenile court’s ruling with respect to Jesus M. was correct.
DISPOSITION
We concur: Gaut J., Miller J.