It has been repeatedly held that if a party voluntarily accepts the benefits of a decree, such acceptance constitutes a release of errors and he will not afterward be heard to allege errors no matter how obvious they may be. Where a party has obtained the benefit of the order appealed from he is not entitled to have the record reviewed. Among the cases so holding are Morgan v. Ladd, 7 Ill. 414; Gridley v. Wood, 305 Ill. 376; Scott v. Scott, 304 Ill. 267; Boylan v. Boylan, 349 Ill. 471; Holt v. Rees, 46 Ill. 181; Trapp v. Off, 194 Ill. 287; Fishburn v. Green, 291 Ill. 350; Langher v. Glos, 276 Ill. 342; Kellner v. Schmidt, 237 Ill. App. 428. It is also the rule that one cannot avail himself of that part of a decree which is favorable to him, accepting its benefits, and then prosecute an appeal to reverse such portion of the decree as is against him when the acceptance of the benefit from the one part of the decree is totally inconsistent with the appeal from the other part. Kellner v. Schmidt, 237 Ill. App. 428; Gridley v. Wood, 305 Ill. 376; Paine v. Woolley, 80 Ky. 568.

So in this case, when Mr. Hall petitioned for allowance of fees, and the evidence was adduced and the litigants presented their claim that Mr. Hall had been guilty of misconduct and had been overpaid, it was the duty of the court to make stern and searching inquiry into the facts and to inform itself fully what the conduct of its officer had been, and, where satisfied of the guilt of its officer, no halfway measures should be considered, but the court officer must be held to strict accountability. Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 259 U.S. 101, 42 S. Ct. 438, 66 L. Ed. 844; Business Men's Assur. Co. v. Campbell (C.C.A. 8) 18 F.2d 223, 225; In re Gilbert, 276 U.S. 6, 48 S. Ct. 210, 72 L. Ed. 441; Kellner v. Schmidt, 237 Ill. App. 428, 435; Pleasants v. Southern Ry. Co. (C.C.A. 4) 93 F. 93. Mr. Hall failed to comport himself with reserve and dignity, and he also disqualified himself as master by trying to get some patent privilege for himself in the patent field involved in the case before him.

[2, 3] A legatee who accepts his share of an estate, as shown by the final report and account, after he has had notice thereof together with a copy of the report, cannot challenge an order of court approving the report and account. Kellner v. Schmidt, 237 Ill. App. 428, 433; Marshall v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. of Baltimore, 318 Ill. App. 636 (not published in full, p. 19 of the opinion); In re: Black's Estate, 32 Mont. 51, 79 P. 554. In Marshall v. New Amsterdam, supra, the court said:

In other words, appellant Grace Lee has released all errors which she now complains of. We think this holding is fully born out by the following authorities: Langher v. Glos, 276 Ill. 342; Kellner v. Schmidt, 237 Ill. App. 428; Thomas v. Negus, 2 Gilm. (Ill.) 700; Morgan v. Ladd, 2 Gilm. (Ill.) 414; Hartshorn v. Potroff, 89 Ill. 509; Scott v. Scott, 304 Ill. 267; Gridley v. Wood, 305 Ill. 376; Boylan v. Boylan, 349 Ill. 471; Chicago Title Trust Co. v. Stut, 271 Ill. App. 32; Trapp v. Off, 194 Ill. 287; Fishburn v. Green, 291 Ill. 350. The appeal is dismissed.

One of the contentions urged by the defendants is that the plaintiff having accepted the benefits of the decree and received from the defendants the amount found to be due upon an accounting cannot prosecute a writ of error or take an appeal to reverse the decree entered in the above entitled cause. The rule that one who accepts the benefits of a decree cannot prosecute a writ of error to reverse it has been passed upon by the Supreme Court of this State, and in a case entitled Kellner v. Schmidt, 237 Ill. App. 428, we follow this rule in its application to the facts in that particular case, and we there said: "That one who has accepted the benefits of a decree cannot afterwards prosecute a writ of error to reverse it has been frequently passed on by the Supreme Court of this State. ( Thomas v. Negus, 7 Ill. 700; Morgan v. Ladd, 7 Ill. 414; Holt v. Rees, 46 Ill. 181; Corwin v. Shoup, 76 Ill. 246; Moore v. Williams, 132 Ill. 591; Trapp v. Off, 194 Ill. 287; Scott v. Scott, 304 Ill. 267; Gridley v. Wood, 305 Ill. 376.) That being so we need not consider cases cited from other jurisdictions. Many of them are to the effect that a party who has received and accepted a part of a judgment or decree to which he is absolutely entitled, and whose right thereto will not be affected by a reversal, may have the judgment or decree reviewed as to parts that are controverted. . . .

Such power is vested in the trial court. Metropolitan Trust Sav. Bank v. Perry, 194 Ill. App. 277 -287; Kellner v. Schmidt, 237 Ill. App. 428-440. In view of the state of the record and of section 20, ¶ 38, ch. 53, Smith-Hurd Rev. St., Cahill's St. ch. 53, ¶ 34, we are of the opinion that the court had jurisdiction to enter the character of order as was entered herein; that the court was authorized by reason of said statute to make the order directing the appellant to pay the costs, and that the court in making such order, the same was subject to the final order of the court in taxing costs.