Opinion
Supreme Court No. S-12488.
September 24, 2008.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Palmer, Beverly W. Cutler, Judge, Superior Court No. 3PA-04-865 CI.
Appearances: Leonard T. Kelley, Kelley Canterbury, LLC, Anchorage, for Appellant. James L. Walker, Matanuska Electric Association, Inc., Palmer, for Appellee.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Eastaugh, Carpeneti, and Winfree, Justices. [Matthews, Justice, not participating]
Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited for any proposition of law or as an example of the proper resolution of any issue.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
Entered pursuant to Appellate Rule 214.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Matanuska-Susitna Borough foreclosed tax liens and after the redemption period expired, obtained title to real property near Sutton. The Borough then sold the property to Leonard T. Kelley. In a later quiet title action, Kelley contended that he had fee simple title to the property and that a right-of-way easement affecting the property, granted to Matanuska Electric Association, Inc. (MEA) in 1949 and recorded in 1961, was invalid, abandoned, or subject to reformation. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of MEA and issued final judgment that Kelley had fee simple title to the property subject to MEA's 1949 easement. Kelley appeals portions of the summary judgment ruling, the denial of Kelley's request for Alaska Civil Rule 37(c)(2) sanctions, and the determination that MEA was the prevailing party for an Alaska Civil Rule 82 fee award. Because Kelley has not demonstrated: (1) any genuine issues of material fact barring judgment as a matter of law in favor of MEA; (2) that the superior court abused its discretion in declining to grant declaratory judgment on the scope and limits of the easement; or (3) that the superior court abused its discretion in its Rule 82 prevailing party and Rule 37(c)(2) sanctions determinations, we affirm.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. Facts
Sometime before 1949 Rodney Johnson made a homestead entry on 170 acres of land near Sutton. In January 1949 Rodney and Edna Johnson granted MEA a right-of-way easement over the entire 170 acres. The easement granted MEA entry rights and the right "to construct, operate and maintain on the above-described lands and/or in or upon all streets, roads or highways abutting said lands, an electric transmission or distribution line or system, and to cut and trim trees and shrubbery that may interfere with or threaten to endanger the operation and maintenance of said line or system."
We referred to a similar easement as a "blanket `right-of-way easement'" in Gerstein v. Axtell, 960 P.2d 599, 600 (Alaska 1998).
In May 1949 Rodney Johnson was granted a federal patent for the 170-acre parcel. The 1949 blanket easement in favor of MEA was recorded in 1961. In 1962 Edna Johnson granted MEA another right-of-way easement covering the entire 170-acre parcel for access to a specific lot within the parcel. The record does not reflect Edna Johnson's position in the chain of title; the 1962 easement was not recorded.
Some time later, ownership of another lot (Lot B2) within the original 170-acre parcel apparently was conveyed to Nelson and Opal Smith, although the record does not reflect their chain of title. In 1968 the Smiths granted MEA a right-of-way easement over Lot B2. This easement was not recorded. MEA apparently provided service to Lot B2 until 1971 when the Smiths' trailer was damaged by a flood; MEA then removed its service poles and lines from Lot B2.
In 1975 the Johnsons jointly granted MEA a right-of-way easement over all of the original 170-acre parcel except Lot B2 and at the same time signed a Letter of Permission for MEA to provide service to the property covered by the easement. These documents were not recorded.
In December 1995 the Borough obtained a judgment and decree of foreclosure for tax and special assessment liens affecting Lot B2. The statutory redemption period expired and a Clerk's Deed was issued to the Borough in February 1997. In 2000 the Borough sold Lot B2 to Kelley, conveying title without warranty by a Tax Foreclosure Sale Deed. B. Proceedings
Kelley states that Lot B2 then was owned by someone other than the Smiths, but the record does not reflect the chain of title or who actually owned Lot B2 at the time of the Borough's tax lien foreclosure.
The Clerk's Deed provides that:
the grantor, Clerk of the Superior Court . . . pursuant to A.S. 29.45.450, does hereby convey to the Matanuska-Susitna Borough . . . all right, title and interest in the properties not redeemed as provided by law, which properties are located in the Matanuska-Susitna Borough. . . .
This instrument is executed without covenants of any character, expressed or implied, and the execution thereof shall not impose any liability on the undersigned.
The Tax Foreclosure Sale Deed provides that the Borough "conveys and quitclaims, without warranty of any kind, to the GRANTEES, LEONARD T KELLEY . . . all interest which it has, if any, by virtue of [the] Clerk's Deed[.]"
Kelley filed a quiet title action in June 2004 against MEA and seven other defendants, alleging that the tax lien foreclosure and/or time had extinguished the defendants' interests in Lot B2. Kelley claimed "exclusive title" to Lot B2 and stated his intent to quiet title to Lot B2 under AS 09.45.010. Kelley sought judgment quieting "legal title" in his name and extinguishing the defendants' claims or interests in the property. MEA answered in September 2004 by asserting that it held three separate easements affecting Lot B2 and denying that the Borough's tax lien foreclosure had extinguished its easements.
AS 09.45.010 states: "A person in possession of real property, or a tenant of that person, may bring an action against another who claims an adverse estate or interest in the property for the purpose of determining the claim."
The seven other defendants either disclaimed any interest in Lot B2 or were defaulted.
In response to Kelley's discovery requests, MEA twice identified its three easements as the unrecorded 1962 easement granted by Edna Johnson, the unrecorded 1975 easement granted by the Johnsons, and the unrecorded 1975 permission letter signed by the Johnsons. MEA denied Kelley's requests for admission that MEA did not have an "estate interest" in Lot B2 and that Kelley had "the sole fee interest" in Lot B2. MEA indicated that it did not understand what Kelley meant by "estate interest" or "sole fee interest" and therefore generally denied the requests for admission. MEA further responded that if Kelley was asking for an admission that he had "fee simple title" to Lot B2, MEA specifically denied it because Kelley's title was "at least limited by the easements" in MEA's favor.
Kelley moved for summary judgment. He submitted evidence demonstrating: (1) his chain of title from the Borough and his five years' possession of Lot B2; (2) that MEA apparently had no recorded easements affecting Lot B2; and (3) that there were no existing MEA service lines on Lot B2. Kelley argued that he was the "fee simple" owner of the property, that MEA had no recorded easements affecting the property, and that MEA was wrongfully clouding his title.
MEA then discovered the recorded 1949 blanket easement from the Johnsons and the unrecorded 1968 easement for service to Lot B2 from the Smiths and provided copies to Kelley. Kelley supplemented his summary judgment motion to address the new information, arguing that the 1949 easement "was recorded 12 years after it was executed and contains typographical changes. It is not likely [applicable to Lot B2]." He further argued that the unrecorded 1968 easement was a limited easement either never utilized or abandoned. Kelley reiterated that there were no actual service lines on Lot B2, that any easements MEA may have had were abandoned, and that if any of the valid easements applied to the property they would be for limited use and "subservient to [Kelley's] fee simple estate" (emphasis in original).
MEA opposed Kelley's motion and cross-moved for summary judgment with respect to the validity of the recorded 1949 blanket easement. MEA argued that: (1) the Borough's tax lien foreclosure did not extinguish the easement; (2) Kelley had inquiry notice of the easement, recorded or not, when he purchased the property; and (3) the easement affected Lot B2 and had not been abandoned. But MEA noted that easements "do not adversely affect the transfer of fee title[,]" and that if summary judgment were granted in its favor, there would be no need to determine the specific status of Kelley's title or the validity of the unrecorded easements.
In reply, Kelley argued that the main issue in the case was about who had fee simple title to the property. He claimed that as an easement holder MEA never had "title" or a "fee interest" in Lot B2, and also asserted that the tax lien foreclosure was effective against "any person or entity that claimed legal title to [Lot B2.]" Thus, Kelley concluded, "[w]hether MEA has an easement and the extent of the easement has no bearing on the main issue of Plaintiff's Quiet Title Action. Is Leonard T. Kelley seized of the estate? Is Leonard T. Kelley the legal owner of the land? Does Leonard T. Kelly have a fee simple estate?" But Kelley also asked that if the superior court found in favor of MEA, the easement be reformed to be far more limited in scope. Kelley later opposed MEA's cross-motion, arguing that the 1949 easement was not valid, was vague and unenforceable, and had been abandoned or superseded.
After oral argument and additional briefing on the extent of actual or possible harm from MEA's intended future use of the 1949 easement, the superior court denied Kelley's motion, granted MEA's cross-motion, and declined to enter any declaratory relief limiting or modifying the scope of the easement. Kelley filed an objection and moved for reconsideration. Kelley also moved for entry of final judgment and submitted a proposed judgment reflecting that Kelley held fee simple title to the property subject to MEA's recorded 1949 easement. After court invitation, MEA opposed Kelley's reconsideration motion but not his request for entry of the proposed final judgment. The court denied reconsideration but granted Kelley's motion for entry of final judgment. Final judgment in the form proposed by Kelley was entered October 23, 2006.
Both parties moved for post-judgment relief. MEA claimed to be the prevailing party because the superior court upheld the validity of its recorded easement; MEA sought a Rule 82 award of full reasonable attorney's fees. Kelley claimed to be the prevailing party because judgment was entered that he held fee simple title to the property; he sought a Rule 82(b)(2) attorney fee award and Rule 79 costs. MEA opposed Kelley's request for fees and costs, arguing that Kelley was not the prevailing party. On reply Kelley requested that even if the court found MEA to be the prevailing party, it should still award Kelley some fees and costs under Alaska Civil Rule 37(c)(2) for MEA's failure to admit that Kelley held fee simple title to the property.
The superior court found MEA to be the prevailing party, awarded MEA attorney's fees, and denied Kelley's request for Rule 37(c)(2) fees and costs. The court explained and reaffirmed these rulings after Kelley's motion for reconsideration.
Kelley appeals portions of the summary judgment rulings, the determination that MEA was the prevailing party entitled to a Rule 82 fee award, and the denial of Rule 37(c)(2) sanctions against MEA.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the superior court's grant of summary judgment de novo, drawing all factual inferences in favor of, and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to, the non-prevailing party. We review a denial of a request for declaratory judgment on prudential grounds for abuse of discretion.
State v. Jeffery, 170 P.3d 226, 229 (Alaska 2007).
Brause v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., 21 P.3d 357, 358 (Alaska 2001).
Questions regarding the interpretation and application of a statute are questions of law to which we apply independent judgment. We will adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.
In re Life Ins. Co. of Alaska, 76 P.3d 366, 368 (Alaska 2003).
Id.
We review for abuse of discretion the superior court's prevailing party determination when awarding attorney's fees. Prevailing party determinations will ordinarily be overturned only if they are manifestly unreasonable. Exceptions to Civil Rule 37(c)(2) sanctions that raise legal questions are reviewed de novo; exceptions relying on factual findings are reviewed for clear error; the exception for "other good reason for the failure to admit" is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Interior Cabaret, Hotel Rest. Retailers Ass'n v. Fairbanks, 135 P.3d 1000, 1002 (Alaska 2006).
Id.
Dobos v. Ingersoll, 9 P.3d 1020, 1026 (Alaska 2000).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Kelley's Argument that the Superior Court Erred When It Failed To Grant Summary Judgment Confirming His Fee Simple Title Is Mooted by the Entry of His Proposed Final Judgment.
Kelley originally moved the superior court for judgment as a matter of law that he held fee simple title to the property and that MEA had no interest whatsoever in the property. After MEA provided Kelley with information about the recorded 1949 easement, Kelley stated that the updated information did "not change the nature of the relief" he sought and that if MEA had a valid easement, it "would be subservient to [his]fee simple estate" (emphasis in original).
The superior court denied Kelley's summary judgment motion:
The court finds as a matter of law that [Kelley] is not entitled to the relief sought. The court will not "quiet [his] title by confirming [his] fee simple interest" in the subject property, "declare that MEA has no easement on [his] property" or alternatively limit the nature of such easement to a service easement on the front of the subject property. (Footnote omitted.)
. . . [T]he court finds as a matter of law that MEA's blanket easement over the subject property remains valid and enforceable.
Kelley objected to the superior court's refusal to issue a quiet title judgment confirming his fee simple interest in the property. He also submitted a proposed final judgment reflecting that he had fee simple title to Lot B2 subject to MEA's 1949 easement, and that any other interests of the eight defendants in Lot B2 were extinguished. MEA did not oppose the entry of that judgment, and the court ultimately entered Kelley's proposed judgment.
Kelley asserts on appeal that the superior court erred in failing to confirm his fee simple title to the property on summary judgment, but states in his brief that he "is unsure" if the entry of his own proposed final judgment declaring his fee simple ownership of the property moots his point on appeal. MEA does not contest the final judgment, and none of the other defendants in the underlying action contested Kelley's fee simple title to the property.
Kelley maintained below and continues to maintain on appeal that the declaration of his fee simple title to the property is his main objective in this litigation. Kelley received a final judgment establishing, at least as to the eight defendants in the case, that he is the fee simple owner of Lot B2. We see no reason to examine the superior court's summary judgment ruling in light of the superseding and uncontested final judgment providing the exact declaration sought by Kelley.
B. The Superior Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment to MEA on the Validity of the 1949 Easement.
Kelley first argues that the 1949 easement was invalid because it was superseded by later easements or abandoned. Alternatively, he argues that even if the easement has not been superseded or abandoned, it is unreasonably broad and should be judicially limited.
1. The 1949 easement was not superseded or abandoned.
Kelley pointed to the various unrecorded easements that followed the recording of the 1949 easement and briefly argued to the superior court that these superseding easements invalidated the prior recorded easement; he makes the same argument on appeal. Yet nothing about the unrecorded easements from the Johnsons supports Kelley's argument. The unrecorded 1962 easement granted a specific right-of- way easement across the original parcel to provide service to a specific area of the original parcel and had no connection to Lot B2. The unrecorded 1975 right-of-way easement and permission letter covered all of the original parcel except Lot B2; by that time the Johnsons apparently no longer owned Lot B2.
Nothing in the language of the unrecorded 1968 right-of-way easement granted by the Smiths for service to Lot B2 suggests an agreement by and between the Smiths and MEA to supersede or extinguish the recorded 1949 easement, nor has Kelley pointed to any extrinsic evidence that suggests such an agreement. We do not believe that the mere existence of the unrecorded 1968 easement gives rise to a reasonable inference of an agreement to extinguish the 1949 easement, and Kelley has cited no legal authority to the contrary. The superior court properly rejected this argument.
Kelley also briefly argued below that MEA abandoned its easement rights to Lot B2 in 1971 when it removed its transmission lines and poles from the property after terminating service to the Smiths, and that MEA made no showing of a continued need for an easement. On appeal, Kelley cites the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY, asserting that "the servitude is for the benefit of [MEA's] customer [and w]hen the benefit [is] extinguished or the circumstances change, the servitude should be terminated or abandoned." We first note that although MEA's easements do ultimately benefit MEA's customers, MEA, not Kelley, is the beneficiary of the 1949 easement granted to MEA by the Johnsons. We then look to section 7.4 of the RESTATEMENT.
Section 7.4 ("Modification or Extinguishment by Abandonment") provides that "[a] servitude benefit is extinguished by abandonment when the beneficiary relinquishes the rights created by a servitude." MEA's removal of transmission facilities from Lot B2 when service was terminated to the Smiths may reflect a relinquishment of the specific (unrecorded) easement rights granted to MEA by the Smiths, but that action does not create a reasonable inference that MEA intended to relinquish its blanket easement rights under the recorded 1949 easement. It may be true that MEA has not conducted any easement-related activity on Lot B2 for over thirty-five years, but as MEA points out the weight of authority indicates that mere non-use of a servitude, even for long periods of time, is not alone sufficient to result in an abandonment of the servitude. In the absence of any specific facts giving rise to a reasonable inference that MEA intended to relinquish its 1949 easement rights, even if only to Lot B2, the superior court must be affirmed.
The comment to this section notes that although the unilateral act of abandonment may result in extinguishment of a servitude, because abandonment "creates a windfall to the owner of the servient estate, often without any corresponding benefit to the abandoning beneficiary, abandonment is difficult to establish." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 7.4 cmt. a (2000).
See, e.g., Jakobsen v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 397 S.E.2d 435, 437 (Ga. 1990); Rutland v. Mullen, 798 A.2d 1104, 1109-10 (Me. 2002); Tauber v. Spring Valley Water Co., 641 N.Y.S.2d 104, 104-105 (N.Y.App. Div. 1996); Fisher v. WTG-Cent., Inc., 641 A.2d 681, 684 (Pa.Commw. 1994); Hall v. Pippin, 984 S.W.2d 617, 620-21 (Tenn.App. 1998); Netherlands Am. Mortgage Bank v. E. Ry. Lumber Co., 252 P. 916, 918-19 (Wash. 1927).
2. The superior court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Kelley's request for declaratory judgment modifying or limiting the 1949 easement.
Kelley argues that the superior court erred by "adopting the term `blanket easement' and . . . stating that [the] easement applied to [Lot B2] without limitations[,]" rather than calling it a "floating easement" and judicially designating the location and dimensions of a reasonable and appropriate service line easement accessing Lot B2 from an adjacent highway. Kelley asserts that because the easement is not limited to a "specific or definite area" and has "no reasonable width, length, or access points," allowing it to affect Lot B2 in its entirety constitutes an "unreasonable restraint on [his] property rights."
The superior court solicited information from MEA and Kelley about MEA's current and projected use of the easement and actual or potential harm to Kelley. MEA responded that since MEA currently had no facilities on Lot B2, it could not imagine a circumstance warranting maintenance work on that parcel. MEA further responded that: (1) the easement (as applied to adjacent parcels) was the "only easement held by MEA under which service could be extended to [Lot B2] from MEA's existing distribution system"; (2) "MEA generally avoids placing its facilities in highway rights-of-way" because, while MEA may apply for a permit to use the highway right-of-way if the right-of-way is not fully occupied by highway infrastructure, such permits are granted subject to such terms and conditions as the state might in its discretion impose on MEA; and (3) under its tariffs, MEA could not utilize every square inch of Lot B2 to the exclusion of all other uses because its easement is for facilities to provide requested service, and therefore the owner of Lot B2 would control the timing and location of MEA's facilities. For his part, Kelley claimed the easement placed an unreasonable cloud on his title to the property and that MEA was attempting "to make a land grab" without adequately compensating him.
The superior court refused to modify or limit the easement. By ultimately entering judgment that Kelley had fee simple title subject to the easement, the court granted Kelley all the relief to which he was entitled in the context of this quiet title action. Kelley's request for modifications to or limitations on the easement was essentially a request for declaratory judgment over and above the relief sought in his quiet title complaint, raised only as "alternative" relief in connection with the cross-motions for summary judgment. But Kelley cites to Alaska case law holding that use of an easement must be reasonable and appropriate to the nature of the land and the purpose of the easement, and Kelley is entitled to the use of his property as long as it does not unreasonably interfere with MEA's use of its easement. Kelley did not present any evidence that MEA actually was planning to use the easement in a specific manner that would harm Kelley or that Kelley actually was planning to use his property in a specific manner prohibited by MEA's easement and to which MEA would not acquiesce. In the absence of an actual controversy about specifically planned use of Lot B2, the superior court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant declaratory judgment about the scope and limits of the easement. C. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion when It Determined that MEA Was the Prevailing Party and that Kelley Was Not Entitled to Sanctions Under Civil Rule 37(c)(2).
However, the court did correctly identify the easement as a "blanket easement." See supra note 1.
See Simon v. State, 996 P.2d 1211, 1214-16 (Alaska 2000); Lake Colleen Enter., Inc. v. Estate of Mark, 951 P.2d 427, 430-31 (Alaska 1997) (citing Andersen v. Edwards, 625 P.2d 282, 286-87 (Alaska 1981)). See also JON W. BRUCE JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND § 8.3 (2008).
BRUCE ELY, JR., supra note 17, § 8.20 (owner of servient estate may use easement area in any manner and for any purpose that does not unreasonably interfere with easement holder's rights); 7 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 60.04(b) (David A. Thomas ed. 2d ed. 2006) (same); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.17 cmt. a (2000) (owner of property burdened by servitude is entitled to any use of the property that does not interfere with use of the servitude).
Cf. AS 22.10.020(g) (superior court granted power to issue declaratory judgments in case of actual controversy).
Civil Rule 82(a) provides that the "prevailing party in a civil case shall be awarded attorney's fees calculated under this rule." We have consistently noted that "a party does not have to prevail on all the issues in the case to be a `prevailing party[,]'" but the "party must be successful with regard to the main issues in the action" even if it does not prevail "on every subsidiary issue."
Hickel v. Se. Conference, 868 P.2d 919, 925 n. 7 (Alaska 1994) (quoting Day v. Moore, 771 P.2d 436, 437 (Alaska 1989) and Cooper v. Carlson, 511 P.2d 1305, 1308 (Alaska 1973)).
Kelley argued below that the main issue in the case was whether he had fee simple title to Lot B2 and claimed to be the prevailing party because the final judgment established that he did have fee simple title, albeit subject to MEA's easement. MEA argued that the main issue in the case was the status of its 1949 blanket easement affecting Lot B2 and claimed to be the prevailing party because the final judgment established the continuing validity of its easement. The superior court determined that MEA was the prevailing party.
Alaska Statute 09.45.010 allows two distinct avenues of relief — one to quiet title and one to remove a cloud on title. A quiet title action is aimed "at the pretensions of all individuals claiming adversely . . . to enable the plaintiff to quiet his title as against unfounded claims of all nature." An action to remove a cloud on title is more narrowly directed against a particular instrument, with the plaintiff required to point to grounds for invalidating the "menace to title."
Davis v. Tant, 361 P.2d 763, 765 (Alaska 1961) (construing predecessor statute, § 56-1-91 Alaska Compiled Laws Annotated (ACLA) (1949)).
Id. at 765-66.
Id. at 765.
Kelley's complaint was crafted as a limited quiet title action, not as to the world but only as to the named defendants. MEA never claimed an interest in Lot B2 beyond its easements. Once the focus of the litigation narrowed to the validity of the 1949 easement recorded in 1961, Kelley sought relief in the form of extinguishing (or modifying) that specific cloud on his title. In this context, the only issue of import to MEA was the preservation of its easement; the specific nature of Kelley's title was unimportant to MEA. After reviewing the record, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the superior court mistakenly determined that the status of the 1949 easement was the main issue decided in the case, or that it was manifestly unreasonable for the court to determine that MEA was the prevailing party; we therefore affirm the superior court on this issue.
See id. at 763, 765-66 (action against "six named defendants and `all other persons or parties unknown'" was quiet title action).
Kelley alternatively argued that even if the court ultimately determined MEA was the prevailing party, he still was entitled to at least some of his costs and fees because MEA wrongfully failed to admit "his legal title/fee simple interest." Kelley argued that MEA's failure to admit these facts needlessly caused him to litigate issues that should not have been in dispute and urged sanctions under Civil Rule 37(c)(2). The superior court denied Kelley's request.
Civil Rule 37(c)(2) provides:
(2) If a party fails to admit the . . . truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the . . . truth of the matter, the requesting party may apply to the court for an order requiring the other party to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make the order unless it finds that . . . (D) there was other good reason for the failure to admit.
In exercising its discretion to deny Kelley's request based on exception (D), the superior court noted the complexity of the applicable law and the important interests at stake, further noted the arguably imprecise and vague language of Kelley's requests for admission, and expressly found that MEA made it sufficiently clear to Kelley that MEA sought only to defend its easement rights to Lot B2. That finding is not clearly erroneous and is consistent with the court's determination that as to MEA the status of the easement, and not the specific nature of Kelley's title, was the main issue in the litigation. Moreover, the two depositions taken by Kelley do not reveal any cause and effect relationship between MEA's denial of the requests for admission and the evidence taken at the depositions. Kelley's deposition questioning focused almost exclusively on MEA's easements, not on the nature of Kelley's title to Lot B2. After reviewing the record, we are not left with a firm and definite conviction that the superior court made a mistake in denying Kelley's request for Rule 37(c)(2) sanctions; we therefore affirm the superior court on this issue.
V. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the superior court's Rule 37 and Rule 82 determinations and the final judgment ultimately entered by the superior court at Kelley's request and with the consent of MEA.