Kelley v. Ellis

7 Citing cases

  1. Reed v. Wadsworth

    553 P.2d 1024 (Wyo. 1976)   Cited 23 times
    Rejecting the argument that a land contract was indefinite because "it was silent as to the time of possession" and noting, "in the absence of a provision as to the time of performance, a reasonable time is implied"

    A contract of sale should, if possible, be rendered operative in that the parties are supposed to have intended something by their agreement. Kelley v. Ellis, 1956, 272 Wis. 333, 75 N.W.2d 569, reh. den. 76 N.W.2d 540. Where, as here, the parties reduce their understanding to writing and it may in some respects appear to be indefinite, the resulting contract does not necessarily fail. The Reeds take the position that the contract lacked an essential element, namely, it was silent as to the time of possession.

  2. Suttle v. Seely

    94 Ariz. 161 (Ariz. 1963)   Cited 13 times
    Holding that stipulated dismissal was claim preclusive

    It is generally true that where time of performance of an agreement for the sale of realty is not made the essence of the contract, a failure to specify the time of performance will not necessarily defeat specific performance, since it will be implied that performance may be required within a reasonable time. Greenstone v. Claretian Theological Seminary, 173 Cal.App.2d 21, 343 P.2d 161 (1959), citing Pierce v. Avakian, 167 Cal. 330, 139 P. 799 (1914); Mahoney v. Beebe, 334 Mass. 165, 134 N.E.2d 126 (1956); Kelley v. Ellis, 272 Wis. 333, 75 N.W.2d 569, 76 N.W.2d 540, 56 A.L.R.2d 1267 (1956); Ray v. Wooster, 270 S.W.2d 743 (Mo. 1954). This rule applies here.

  3. Lewis v. Lockhart

    379 P.2d 618 (Alaska 1963)   Cited 16 times
    Holding that purchasers who were entitled to specific performance had to pay interest on the purchase price, taxes, and other costs

    Pegg v. Olson, 31 Wyo. 96, 223 P. 223 (1924). See also Kelley v. Ellis, 272 Wis. 333, 75 N.W.2d 569, 76 N.W.2d 540, 56 A.L.R.2d 1267 (1956). There is evidence in the record that the appellants had actual knowledge of the respective obligations of the parties in applying for an FHA loan inasmuch as they had received correspondence from FHA informing them of those obligations.

  4. Gerruth Realty Co. v. Pire

    17 Wis. 2d 89 (Wis. 1962)   Cited 24 times
    Holding that a "contract is certain which may be made certain from the surrounding circumstances"

    See also Aiken, "Subject to Financing" Clauses In Interim Contracts For Sale of Realty, 43 Marquette Law Review (1960), 265, 290.George v. Oswald (1956), 273 Wis. 380, 78 N.W.2d 763; Kelley v. Ellis (1956), 272 Wis. 333, 75 N.W.2d 569, 76 N.W.2d 540; Taylor v. Bricker (1952), 262 Wis. 377, 55 N.W.2d 404; Inglis v. Fohey (1908), 136 Wis. 28, 116 N.W. 857. In Locke v. Bort, supra, this court pointed out "subject to financing" clauses could not be construed solely by the language of the contract and without consideration of the surrounding circumstances.

  5. Dunlop v. Laitsch

    16 Wis. 2d 36 (Wis. 1962)   Cited 27 times
    Holding that contract is void and unenforceable where there is an "absence of a meeting of the minds as to an essential term"

    "At best it [the document in question] is nothing more than an agreement to make a future agreement as to an essential term, which cannot be supplied by implication of law. Under the circumstances, because there has been no meeting of the minds as to an essential term, there can be no recovery. [Cases cited.]" Machesky v. Milwaukee (1934), 214 Wis. 411, 413, 253 N.W. 169, cited with approval in Kelley v. Ellis (1956), 272 Wis. 333, 336, 75 N.W.2d 569, 76 N.W.2d 540. The learned trial court ignores any effect which Agreement "B" has on the controversy other than to dismiss it from consideration as being unenforceable and void.

  6. Flores v. State Fair

    2002 WI App. 27 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 8 times
    Recognizing an implied term for performance within a reasonable time where no such term was specified in the parties' contract

    17A Am. Jur. 2d § 195 (1991). See alsoKelley v. Ellis, 272 Wis. 333, 337, 75 N.W.2d 569 (1956) (citing 12 Am. Jur. Contracts § 64) ("Where an agreement contains no express provision as to some matter, the meaning in respect of such matter will be implied if an implication is warranted by the facts and circumstances of the particular case, as where a provision for performance in a reasonable time is sometimes implied."). Here, it is clear that everyone knew that Board approval was necessary.

  7. In re Estate of Thiede

    Case No. 98-2597 (Wis. Ct. App. May. 13, 1999)

    And, where a contract for the sale of land is silent as to time of change of possession, the law will imply a reasonable time. SeeKelleyv. Ellis, 272 Wis. 333, 336, 75 N.W.2d 569, 570 (1956). As the trial court properly determined, however, the length of Margaret's post-sale occupancy was not simply a matter of an unstated time of performance.