Opinion
October 1, 1930.
November 20, 1930.
Evidence — Admissibility of — Testimony of general manager — Conversation with an agent — Personal knowledge of transaction.
In an action of assumpsit to recover for merchandise sold and delivered to the defendant, the latter admitted the amount of the claim. It introduced, however, a set-off and counter-claim in which it was averred that the plaintiff was indebted to it on an alleged contract for commissions earned in giving to the plaintiff the name of a prospective customer who would place its order with the plaintiff for certain machinery. The plaintiff in its reply denied that the alleged contract had been made. At the trial the plaintiff's general manager testified over the defendant's objection, that his agent had informed him that he had had a conversation with the prospective purchaser about the machinery. The general manager further testified that pursuant to his conversation with his agent, he personally called on the prospective buyer and secured an order.
In such circumstances the general manager merely testified to his own personal knowledge of the transaction and the admission in evidence of what the agent told the general manager was not a material error and a judgment for the plaintiff will be affirmed.
Appeal No. 22, October T., 1930, by defendant from judgment of M.C., Philadelphia County, September T., 1928, No. 703, in the case of E.B. Kelley Company, Inc. v. Edelen Boyer Company.
Before TREXLER, P.J., LINN, GAWTHROP, CUNNINGHAM, BALDRIGE, and WHITMORE, JJ. Affirmed.
Assumpsit to recover for merchandise. Before CRANE, J., without a jury.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Superior Court.
Finding for the plaintiff in the sum of $290.34 and judgment entered thereon. Defendant appealed.
Error assigned, among others, was the refusal of the defendant's motion for a new trial.
Abraham Friedman, for appellant.
A.S. Longbottom of Byron, Longbottom, Pape and O'Brien, for appellee.
Argued October 1, 1930.
Plaintiff brought this action to recover for merchandise sold and delivered to the defendant. Defendant introduced a set-off and counter-claim alleging that in consideration of the defendant's giving to the plaintiff the name of a prospective customer, who would place its order with the plaintiff, the plaintiff promised to give the defendant half the commission earned by the plaintiff.
We quote from the opinion of Judge CRANE: "Plaintiff's general manager testified that as a result of a conversation had with the salesman, no longer in plaintiff's employ, he ascertained that the Pennsylvania Brick Tile Company were in the market for rack cars. He did not state the subject matter of such conversation, which would have violated the hearsay rule, but testified that in pursuance of such conversation he personally called on the Pennsylvania Brick Tile Company, and secured the order. As general manager of the plaintiff company, he had knowledge that this salesman had been supplying quotations for these rack cars, and he merely testified to his own personal knowledge of the transaction."
The manager testified that his agent informed him that he "was talking with them [the Pennsylvania Brick Tile Company] about block machinery and equipment in general, among which was the cars." The admission of what the agent told the manager he had done was of doubtful propriety, but as this was followed by testimony of the manager himself that he had personally seen the customer's officer, it lost its importance. It was not a material error and does not call for a reversal.
The judgment is affirmed.