See Isely v. Capuchin Province, 877 F.Supp. 1055 (E.D. Mich. 1995); Hoult v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1995); Shahzade v. Gregory, 923 F.Supp. 286 (D. Mass. 1996); Commonwealth v. Shanley, 919 N.E.2d 1254 (Mass. 2010); Keller v. Maccubbin, 2012 WL 1980417 (Del. Super. May 16, 2012) (listing decisions of Delaware courts that found expert testimony on repressed memory to be admissible to prove the applicability of a discovery rule); Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113 (Ariz. 2000); Wilson v. Phillips, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 204 (Cal.App. 4th Dist. 1999).
Although there is a split of authority, other state courts have admitted expert testimony on dissociative amnesia, memory repression, and PTSD for purposes of proving that a victim of sexual trauma repressed and then later recovered memory of the abuse. See, e.g., Keller v. Maccubbin, 2012 WL 1980417, 2012 Del.Super. LEXIS 229 (May 16, 2012) (listing decisions of Delaware courts that found expert testimony on repressed-memory theory to be admissible to prove the applicability of a discovery rule); Logerquist v. McVey, 196 Ariz. 470, 482, 1 P.3d 113 (2000) (reversing an order to exclude testimony on repressed memories for statute-of-limitations purposes); Wilson v. Phillips, 73 Cal.App.4th 250, 252, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 204 (Cal.App.4th Dist.1999) (affirming the admission of expert testimony on repressed-memory theory for statute-of-limitations purposes); Doe v. Archdiocese of New Orleans, 823 So.2d 360, 363 (La.App. 4th Cir.2002) (same); State v. Ali, 233 Conn. 403, 434, 660 A.2d 337 (1995) (affirming the admission of expert testimony on rape syndrome, including testimony regarding rape victims' tendency to delay reporting). Discepolo v. Gorgone, 399 F.Supp.2d 123, 128 (D.Conn.2005), was an action for sexual assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant sexually assau
McClements, 820 A.2d at 381; see also Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp. of Am., 500 A.2d 1357, 1361 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985) ("The Court . . . does not recognize mere delay in obtaining discovery ... as [a] circumstance[] which would toll the statute of limitations."). See, e.g., Coleman v. Pricewaterhousecoopers, LLC, 854 A.2d 838, 842 (Del. 2004) ("This Court has applied the above-described 'discovery rule' in cases claiming accounting and attorney malpractice, because of the special character of the relationship between the professional and the client, and the inability of a layperson to detect the professional's negligence."); Keller v. Maccubbin, 2012 WL 1980417, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. May 16, 2012) (applying the time of discovery rule to an action brought by a victim of sexual trauma with repressed memory); Rudginski v. Pullella, 378 A.2d 646, 649 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977) (finding the time of discovery rule applied where "[i]t would be harsh and unjust to hold that the cause of action accrued from the date of the allegedly negligent installation of the septic tank when there was no way to know that the buried negligence had taken place."); Stagg v. Bendix Corp., 472 A.2d 40, 43 (Del. Super. Ct.), aff'd, 486 A.2d 1150 (Del. 1984) (holding the statute of limitations accrued when plaintiff "was chargeable with knowledge that his physical condition was attributable to asbestos exposure" because of "the prolonged and inherently unknowable latency of plaintiff's disease."). Similarly, Plaintiff's position that Defendant Moffit's fraudulent concealment tolls the limitations period must also fail. Fraudulent concealment requires "something affirmative in nature designed or intended to