Keller v. Keller

5 Citing cases

  1. Butler v. Butler

    239 A.2d 616 (D.C. 1968)   Cited 16 times
    Affirming the trial court's determination of alimony amount even though we believed it to be "generous" because the relevant factors were applied

    We would add that although reversal is not required here the rule should be followed in every case since it not only places the entire factual pattern in perspective for the ensuing judgment and for appellate review, but evokes care on the part of the trial judge in ascertaining the facts. Cf. Ridgely v. Ridgely, D.C.App., 188 A.2d 296 (1963); Keller v. Keller, D.C. Mun.App., 171 A.2d 511 (1961). The findings cover eight pages of a transcript which is subscribed to by the trial judge.

  2. Gindes v. Gindes

    180 A.2d 495 (D.C. 1962)

    Subsequently the Court granted the wife's motion to amend the original judgment "so as to strike therefrom the finding, conclusion and judgment denying the Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees" and directed the husband to pay his wife's counsel for services performed by him. In doing so the trial judge announced that he saw no difference between this case and the case of Keller v. Keller, D.C.Mun.App., 171 A.2d 511. With this conclusion we are not in agreement. The language of the separation agreement interpreted in the Keller case is quite different from that in the contract here under consideration.

  3. In re Davenport

    627 B.R. 705 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2020)   Cited 4 times
    Applying the Travelers rule to allow post-petition fees and costs

    Eagle Maint. Servs., Inc. v. D.C. Contract Appeals Bd. , 893 A.2d 569, 577 (D.C. 2006). See alsoKeller v. Keller , 171 A.2d 511, 514 (D.C.Mun.App. 1961) ("If the parties intended [such] a waiver ..., it was an easy matter for them to state such intention"). Djourabchi and Welt presented as a witness an accountant, Dmitri Velin, who merely assumed based on the language of the Note that interest was payable in advance despite the Note containing no provision clearly requiring that interest be paid in advance.

  4. Eagle Maintenance v. Contract Appeals Bd.

    893 A.2d 569 (D.C. 2006)   Cited 17 times
    Giving deference to the CAB's credibility determination

    Had the parties actually intended to place sole financial responsibility on Eagle for construction of the District facility, the bilateral modification could have — and should have — declared that intention in plain, unambiguous language. See, e.g., Keller v. Keller, 171 A.2d 511, 514 (D.C. 1961) ("If the parties intended a waiver . . . in all circumstances, it was an easy matter for them to state such intention"). It did not do so, however, and for this reason we hold that the CAB's interpretation of the bilateral modification stretches its meaning too far.

  5. Raabe v. Raabe

    191 N.W.2d 551 (Iowa 1971)   Cited 13 times

    Jackson v. Jackson, 248 Iowa 1365, 85 N.W.2d 590 (1957). We hold the stipulation of these parties in district court respecting fees was intended only to govern the litigation there, not on appeal. As support for this holding, see Haldane v. Haldane, 210 Cal.App.2d 587, 26 Cal.Rptr. 670 (1962); Keller v. Keller, 171 A.2d 511 (D.C.Mun.App. 1961); Drespel v. Drespel, 56 Nev. 368, 45 P.2d 792, 54 P.2d 226 (1935). Defendant was obligated to defend trial court's decision and is entitled to an allowance for attorney fees on appeal. Such an allowance depends upon the wife's financial needs and ability of the husband to satisfy them. Hand v. Hand, 257 Iowa 643, 133 N.W.2d 63 (1965); 24 Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation § 595, p. 718, 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 222, p. 973.