" (Footnotes omitted.) The Illinois courts have found no abuse of process even in the following cases involving dubious practices: (1) A garnishment demand was served upon the plaintiff and her employer before any judgment was obtained (Ammons v. Jet Credit Sales Inc. 34 Ill. App.2d 456, 181 N.E.2d 601 (1962)); (2) A confession of judgment was followed by garnishment of a bank account for rent in futuro although the lease contained no acceleration clause March v. Cacioppo, 37 Ill.App.2d 235, 185 N.E.2d 397 (1962)); (3) Misrepresentation, concealment and perjury allegedly hid the equitable owner's interest in real estate (John Allan Co. v. Brandow, 59 Ill.App. 2d 328, 207 N.E.2d 339 (1965)); (4) A wrongful levy was made pursuant to a void judgment (Keller v. Continental Dist. Co., 105 Ill.App.2d 327, 245 N.E.2d 513 (1969)); (5) Cause of action wrongfully charged plaintiff with misuse of corporate funds (Nemanich v. Long Grove Country Club Estates, Inc., 119 Ill.App.2d 169, 225 N.E.2d 466 (1970)); and (6) Cause of action sought declaratory judgment that defendants' rezoning of their property to build a high-rise apartment building was invalid (Siegel v. City of Chicago, 127 Ill. App.2d 84, 261 N.E.2d 802 (1970)). See also Alberto-Culver Co. v. Andrea Dumon, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1155 (N.D.Ill. 1969) at 1160: "Regular and legitimate use of process, though with bad intentions, is not a malicious abuse of process."
In order to support an action for malicious prosecution there must be both malice and want of probable cause, and they must concur. ( Mangus v. Cock Robin Ice Cream Co., at 117; Keller v. Continental Distributing Co. (1969), 105 Ill. App.2d 327, 245 N.E.2d 513.) Malice may be inferred from want of probable cause when the circumstances are inconsistent with good faith by the prosecutor and where the want of probable cause has been clearly proved. ( Mangus v. Cock Robin Ice Cream Co., at 117; Hughes v. New York Central System (1959), 20 Ill. App.2d 224, 230, 155 N.E.2d 809.)
In order to support an action for malicious prosecution there must be both malice and want of probable cause, and they must concur. ( Keller v. Continental Distributing Co. (1969), 105 Ill. App.2d 327, 245 N.E.2d 513; March v. Cacioppo (1962), 37 Ill. App.2d 235, 185 N.E.2d 397.) Malice may be inferred from want of probable cause when the circumstances are inconsistent with good faith by the prosecutor and where such want of probable cause has been clearly proved. ( Hughes v. New York Central System (1959), 20 Ill. App.2d 224, 155 N.E.2d 809.)
( Holiday Magic, Inc., at 967.) The test in such cases is whether process has been used to accomplish some end which is beyond the purview of the process, or which compels the party against whom it is used to do some collateral thing which he could not legally and regularly be compelled to do. Alberto-Culver Co.; Keller v. Continental Distributing Co., 105 Ill. App.2d 327, 245 N.E.2d 513; Coplea. • 3 In the instant case, World has alleged no acts of Ewert or his attorneys other than the mere institution of a civil action.