¶ 11 Thus, except in "most unusual circumstances," the choice of a Colorado forum by a resident plaintiff will not be disturbed. McDonnell-Douglas , 192 Colo. at 201, 557 P.2d at 374 (concluding that an out-of-state injury, inconvenience, and expense did not provide a basis to dismiss the action on forum non conveniens grounds); see also Kelce v. Touche Ross & Co. , 192 Colo. 202, 203-04, 557 P.2d 374, 375 (1976) (concluding that, given Colorado's constitutional access to courts provisions, the expense of securing witnesses, the location of the evidence, and the availability of another court were not a basis for dismissal under this doctrine); Casey v. Truss , 720 P.2d 985, 986 (Colo. App. 1986) (deciding that the applicability of non-Colorado law to the controversy, inconvenience, and expense did not justify a dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds). Although Colorado courts have yet to find "unusual circumstances" in a case by a resident plaintiff, other jurisdictions with a similar legal standard have concluded that if the "resident" plaintiff is only a nominal party, such unusual circumstances may exist.
Therefore, states bear the ultimate responsibility for providing their citizens with a forum in which to resolve their differences. Ferreira v. Ferreira, 9 Cal.3d 824, 512 P.2d 304, 109 Cal.Rptr. 80 (1973); Bechtel Corporation v. Industrial Indemnity Co., supra; Kelce v. Touche Ross Co., 191 Colo. 202 [ 192 Colo. 202], 557 P.2d 374 (1976). When a litigant properly presents his concerns before a state court, that court should not lightly sweep those concerns under the putative judicial carpet of another state. Connecticut's constitution specifically assures the citizens under its protection that the state's courts will be open for the resolution of their disputes.
Those terms preserve to the defendant any limitations defense in the convenient forum which was available there prior to suit in the inconvenient forum. See Farmanfarmaian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 437 F. Supp. 910 (S.D.N Y 1977), aff'd, 588 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1978); Kelce v. Touche Ross Co., 37 Colo. App. 352, 549 P.2d 415, rev'd on other grounds, 192 Colo. 202, 557 P.2d 374 (1976); MacLeod v. MacLeod, 383 A.2d 39 (Me. 1978). In other cases the order of dismissal is conditioned on a waiver of limitations which is unlimited.
Accordingly, it was there held that the doctrine of forum non conveniens "has only the most limited application in Colorado courts, and except in most unusual circumstances the choice of a Colorado forum by a resident plaintiff will not be disturbed." 192 Colo. at 201, 557 P.2d at 374; accord, Kelce v. Touche Ross Co., 192 Colo. 202, 557 P.2d 374 (1976). While McDonnell-Douglas clearly indicates that the power of a Colorado court to dismiss an action on the basis of forum non conveniens is severely limited, the case was not intended to render a Colorado court powerless to grant a motion to change venue to another judicial district within the state merely because the action has been commenced by a Colorado resident in a Colorado court. Rather, motions to change venue are to be resolved within the framework of C.R.C.P. 98.
McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Lohn, supra, 192 Colo. at 201, 557 P.2d at 374 (noting inconvenience and expense are inherent in all litigation and these factors are insufficient to oust a resident plaintiff from the chosen forum). Similarly, in Kelce v. Touche Ross Co., 192 Colo. 202, 557 P.2d 374 (1976), the supreme court concluded that the expense of securing witnesses, the location of the evidence, and the availability of another court did not approach the circumstances necessary to deprive a resident of access to the state's court system. Finally, in Casey v. Truss, 720 P.2d 985 (Colo.App. 1986), a division of this court stated that the applicability of Alaskan law was insufficient to oust the resident plaintiff from his chosen forum.