Opinion
C.A. No. 05C-02-272 (RBY).
Submitted: April 27, 2007.
Decided: May 7, 2007.
Upon Consideration of Plaintiff's Motion for Reargument.
DENIED.
Kevin W. Gibson, Esq., Gibson Perkins, P.C., Wilmington, Delaware for Plaintiff.
John A. Elzufon, Esq., Elzufon, Austin, Reardon, Tarlov Mondell, Wilmington, Delaware for Defendants Henry A. Heiman, Esq., and Heiman, Aber, Goldlust Baker.
George A. Sioris, Esq., pro se.
ORDER AND OPINION
The Plaintiff, Roger Keith, moves for reargument of this Court's January 10, 2007 decision, which denied the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing and granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on all counts of the Complaint. The Plaintiff limits its Motion to the Court's decision to grant summary judgment. For the following reasons, the Motion is DENIED.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The purpose of a motion for reargument made pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 59(e) is to request that the trial court reconsider its findings of fact, conclusions of law, or judgment in order to correct errors prior to appeal. A motion for reargument should not rehash the arguments already decided by the court. Moreover, a motion for reargument is not a "device for raising new arguments or stringing out the length of time for making an argument." Generally, reargument will be denied unless movant can demonstrate that the trial court "overlooked a precedent or legal principle that would have controlling effect, or that it has misapprehended the law or the facts such as would affect the outcome of the decision.'"DISCUSSION
The Plaintiff argues that this Court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. The Plaintiff does not cite any controlling legal precedent overlooked by the Court that would demand a different outcome than the one that occurred in this matter. Instead, the Plaintiff seemingly suggests that the Court somehow erred by addressing arguments made in the Parties' 50 pages of briefing on the motion for summary judgment instead of confining its inquiry to the 15 minutes of factually driven oral argument by the Parties. Additionally, the Plaintiff argues that the Court erred by misapprehending the facts of the relationship between the actors in the Bankruptcy Court action.First, while the Court found the hearing on the motion for summary judgment extremely enlightening and counsel for the Parties well versed in the case, the Court would do a disservice to the Parties, and the law, if it ignored the Parties' substantial briefing, resting its decision merely on 15 minutes of oral argument. Turning to the briefing, the Court notes that the moving Defendant, Heiman/HAGB, spent a portion of its Opening Brief discussing the legal reasons the Plaintiff could not prevail on his claim of legal malpractice related to the Defendants' alleged failure to file a breach of fiduciary claim and the law surrounding a third party's claim of legal malpractice. Contrary to the Plaintiff's suggestion, its Answering Brief did not confine itself to the topic of causation. Instead, the Plaintiff seized upon the moving Defendant's argument that the law did not support the Plaintiff's claims, and dedicated significant portions of his Brief to responding to that argument. Regardless, under the standard of review of a motion for reargument, this argument is not a valid basis for the Court to grant a motion for reargument.
Def.'s Opening Br. at 13-15. The Court notes that this is the same number of pages the Defendant devoted to the lack of causation argument.
Pl.'s Answering Br. at 7-14.
Second, the Plaintiff argues that the Court misapprehended the state of the facts, contending that, in actuality, there were not sufficient facts to support the Court's decision. The Plaintiff asks the Court to vacate its decision, and to allow limited discovery on the relationship between Ernest Keith, the Koutoufarises, and Norris Wright/Morris James Hitchens Williams (MJHW). The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff's argument. In support of its Motion, the Plaintiff attaches a Power of Attorney given by Ernest Keith to Glenn E. Hitchens of MJHW. He then argues that this document demonstrates that the relationship between the Ernest Keith and Norris Wright/MJHW was based on more than the creditor-debtor relationship with the Koutoufarises. While this was attached as an exhibit to the Plaintiff's Opening Brief, the Plaintiff never argued that this document stood as anything other than a document to release a mortgage. Now, the Plaintiff attempts to use this document to create a relationship between himself and the Norris Wright/MJHW. However, as stated above, a motion for reargument is not a device for raising new arguments. Thus, this argument is not properly before the Court in this context. Even if the Court did consider it, the Court does not find that this document has any effect other than to allow an attorney at MJHW to enter satisfaction of a mortgage. That does not create the relationship the Plaintiff asserts. This issue was fully addressed in the original decision.
See Id. at 3, 9.
Third, the Plaintiff stated, in his Amended Complaint, that John and Marlene Koutoufaris were clients of Norris Wright and MJHW, portraying the relationship between them and Ernest Keith as a creditor-debtor relationship. The Plaintiff argued, in his Answering Brief, that Ernest Keith was an intended beneficiary of the attorney-client relationship between the Koutoufarises and Norris Wright. Furthermore, the Plaintiff himself contributed to the Court's addressing the relationship of the actors in the Bankruptcy Court action by arguing that this relationship was somehow different from the normal creditor-debtor relationship. The Court finds that it apprehended the facts accurately. Therefore, the Plaintiff's request for more discovery is DENIED as unwarranted. It would not effect the original determination.
Pl.'s Am. Compl. at ¶ 9
Id. at ¶ 9 et seq. See also Pl.'s Answering Br. at 3 ("On October 6, Norris Wright reassured all of Debtors'creditors, including the Decedent, that the loan proceeds were forthcoming.").
Pl.'s Answering Br. at 12.
Id. at 9.
Finall y, the Court did not address the Defendant's arguments regarding lack of causation and collateral estoppel in its previous decision for the sake of brevity. In drafting its opinion, the Court determined that the grounds contained within the opinion, and today attacked by the Plaintiff, provided full support for its decision. Given this opportunity to revisit its decision, this Court holds that, in addition to the grounds stated in that decision, the Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment based on their lack of causation argument.
Briefly, in order for the Plaintiff to prevail on the claim of legal malpractice arising from the Defendants' failure to undertake certain acts and the Defendants' failure to file a Breach of Fiduciary Duty claim against Wright, he must demonstrate that the Defendants' failures caused his loss in the underlying action. In the underlying malpractice lawsuit brought against Wright and MJHW in the Bankruptcy Court, the Plaintiff argued that Ernest Keith relied on Wright's assurances of the impending nature of the refinancing loan when he released the mortgage. The Court finds that, because of the uniquely drafted mortgage provision, Ernest Keith was required to release the mortgage upon the payment of $25,000. Because of that requirement, there could be no reliance on statements made by Wright. Thus, when Keith received $50,000 at closing on the mortgaged property, he had no choice but to sign the release, thereby accepting the Koutoufarises' personal guarantee in place of the mortgage. In open court, the Bankruptcy Court judge concluded, just as this Court has, that the underlying mortgage provision was so abundantly clear and simple that the release was only a formality once the $25,000 was paid. Based on that the Bankruptcy judge stated, "I'm not sure how there could be any reliance even if there was malpractice."
In Delaware, to prevail in a legal malpractice case, a plaintiff-client must meet each prong of a three element test, which includes proving: (1) the employment of the attorney; (2) the attorney's neglect of reasonable duty; and (3) the fact that such negligence resulted in and was the proximate cause of loss to the client. Weaver v. Lukoff, 1986 WL 17121, at *1 (Del. 1986). To prove the third element, the damages element, the plaintiff in a legal malpractice action mustdemonstrate that "but for his lawyer's negligence, [he] would have been successful" in the underlying action. Trader v. Streett, 1997 WL 528043, at * 2 (Del.Super. 1997).
Therefore, this Court's January 10, 2007, decision aside, the Defendant is still entitled to summary judgment because there is simply no reliance. In the absence of reliance, the Plaintiff was unable to prove the "but for" causation necessary to survive a summary judgment motion by Wright and MJHW in the Bankruptcy Court action. Without a victory in the underlying action, it becomes legally impossible for the Plaintiff to prevail in the case at bar because he cannot demonstrate that the acts of the Defendants, even if they rose to the level of malpractice, caused him any injury. Accordingly, the Court finds the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants inescapable.
Based on this Court's determination that the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the basis of two of its arguments, the Court finds it unnecessary to address the Defendants' third argument, their collateral estoppel argument.
In concluding, the Court notes that this case is essentially one in which a father, Ernest Keith, allowed familial ties to cloud his business judgment; and that his son, Roger Keith, through his role as co-executor of the estate, dedicated the last ten years trying to overturn that judgment through the courts of law. That unfortunate, though family-based, decision is not subject to judicial review.
Accordingly, because the Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the Court has overlooked controlling legal precedent or has misapprehended the law or the facts so as to change the outcome of its decision, the motion for reargument is DENIED. The request for limited discovery is, therefore, MOOT.
SO ORDERED.