Summary
holding that voluntarily quitting one's job in order to further one's education does not constitute a necessitous and compelling cause under section 402(b) of the Law, even where a claimant is dissatisfied with the wages he is receiving from his employment
Summary of this case from Montgomery v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of ReviewOpinion
April 11, 1962.
June 13, 1962.
Unemployment Compensation — Voluntary termination of employment — Burden of proof — Cause of necessitous and compelling nature — Dissatisfaction with wages — Desire to further education — Desire to assist father in political campaign — Unemployment Compensation Law.
1. In an unemployment compensation case, in which it appears that claimant voluntarily terminated his employment, the burden is upon him to establish that his cause for doing so was of a necessitous and compelling nature.
2. The cause for an employe's leaving his employment must meet the test of ordinary common sense and prudence.
3. Dissatisfaction with wages is not a cause of a necessitous and compelling nature to leave work.
4. Leaving employment to further one's education does not constitute leaving work for a cause of a necessitous and compelling nature under § 402(b) (1) of the Unemployment Compensation Law.
5. The Unemployment Compensation Law must be read in the light of its purpose to assist those who are unemployed through no fault of their own.
6. In this case, in which it appeared that claimant, hired as a manager trainee and assigned to a local office, knew at the time he was hired that he might be transferred at the end of his training period to the home office in another city; and that claimant, who was receiving $410 per month, was informed that he was to be transferred to the home office and given an increase of $75 per month, but refused the assignment, stating that he could not possibly leave the city without a definite salary increase of $350 per month; it was Held that claimant had voluntarily terminated his employment without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature.
7. Claimant's reasons for his refusal to continue his employment, that (a) he considered the increase in pay as a pay cut, because it would have cost him more to live in the other city than in his home city, (b) he was about to start his final year in law school and preferred not to transfer from the county, and (c) his father was running for office and he wanted to remain home to help in the campaign, were Held not to constitute cause of a compelling and necessitous nature for his leaving his employment.
Before RHODES, P.J., ERVIN, WRIGHT, WOODSIDE, WATKINS, MONTGOMERY, and FLOOD, JJ.
Appeal, No. 124, April T., 1962, by claimant, from decision of Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, No. B-69209, in re claim of Raymond F. Keisling. Decision affirmed.
Raymond F. Keisling, appellant, in propria persona.
Sydney Reuben, Assistant Attorney General, with him David Stahl, Attorney General, for Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, appellee.
Argued April 11, 1962.
The claimant in this unemployment compensation case was denied benefits by the bureau, the referee and the board because his unemployment was due to voluntarily leaving work without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. See § 402(b)(1) of the Unemployment Compensation Law, 43 P. S. § 802 (b)(1). He contends that he did not voluntarily leave work, and that even if he did, it was with cause of a necessitous and compelling nature.
The claimant was hired by the Benefit Association of Railway Employees as a manager trainee in August of 1959 and was assigned to the Pittsburgh office. The home office of his employer is in Chicago. He knew at the time he was hired that he might be transferred there at the end of his training period. Last summer, the claimant was informed that he was to be transferred to Chicago, and would receive an increase in the salary of $410 per month which he had been receiving. Upon receipt of the information, he wrote to his employer that without a definite salary increase of $350 per month he "could not possibly leave Pittsburgh." Quite understandably, his employer replied that he was "somewhat more than flabbergasted". He told the claimant that the increased salary would be $75 per month, and asked him to "report to the Home Office as directed." The employer advised the claimant that if this was unacceptable, he should resign effective August 1, 1961. The claimant replied that "the increase is not acceptable" and that he was "resigning as of August 1, 1961."
The claimant could have continued his employment in Chicago at a salary of $485 per month. He chose to resign. His unemployment was due to "voluntarily leaving work." Lirakis Unemployment Compensation Case, 194 Pa. Super. 342, 168 A.2d 647 (1961); Zahorchak Unemployment Compensation Case, 191 Pa. Super. 229, 156 A.2d 367 (1959); Kinter Unemployment Compensation Case, 180 Pa. Super. 529, 119 A.2d 639 (1956).
Having voluntarily terminated his employment, the burden is upon the claimant to establish that his cause for doing so was of a necessitous and compelling nature. Fenstersheib Unemployment Compensation Case, 181 Pa. Super. 289, 124 A.2d 375 (1956); Johnson Unemployment Compensation Case, 192 Pa. Super. 283, 284, 161 A.2d 626 (1960). The cause for leaving his employment must meet the test of ordinary common sense and prudence. Kaylock Unemployment Compensation Case, 165 Pa. Super. 376, 378, 67 A.2d 801 (1949); Horning Unemployment Compensation Case, 177 Pa. Super. 618, 112 A.2d 405 (1955).
The claimant gave three reasons for his refusal to continue his employment. First, he considered the increase in pay as a pay cut, because it would have cost him more to live in Chicago than in Allegheny County; second, he was about to start his final year in law school and preferred not to transfer from Allegheny County, and third, his father was running for the office of Justice of the Peace in Carnegie, and he wanted to remain home to help in the campaign. These reasons do not constitute a cause of a necessitous and compelling nature for his leaving his employment.
The claimant was single and lived with his parents in Allegheny County. By going to Chicago, he could have continued his employment with a salary of $485 per month. The fact that his parents would not have been there to help reduce his cost of living was not a good cause for his resigning from a position which would have paid him over $5800 a year. Dissatisfaction with wages is not a cause of necessitous and compelling nature to leave work. Morris Unemployment Compensation Case, 196 Pa. Super. 68, 173 A.2d 651 (1961).
The claimant has been attending law school in Pennsylvania. However praiseworthy we may consider the thirst for knowledge to be, it has become abundantly clear that leaving employment to further one's education does not constitute leaving work for a cause of necessitous and compelling nature under the provisions of § 402(b)(1), supra. Fenstersheib Unemployment Compensation Case, 181 Pa. Super. 289, 292, 124 A.2d 375 (1956); Kaminski Unemployment Compensation Case, 174 Pa. Super. 242, 101 A.2d 132 (1953). This rule is not affected by Wiley Unemployment Compensation Case, 195 Pa. Super. 256, 171 A.2d 810 (1961).
The filial loyalty of the claimant and his desire to assist his father in the political campaign merits admiration but not compensation.
The unemployment compensation law must be read in the light of its purpose to assist those who are unemployed through no fault of their own. The law was not intended to compensate those who, rather than work for wages, prefer to live at home, go to school and help their parents.
Decision affirmed.