Opinion
2001-03652
Submitted January 3, 2002.
January 22, 2002.
In an action, inter alia, for specific performance of an option agreement, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (DiBlasi, J.), entered March 8, 2001, as granted the defendants' respective cross motions to dismiss the complaint.
Robert A. Sternbach, New York, N.Y., for appellant.
McCarthy, Fingar, Donovan, Drazen Smith, LLP, White Plains, N.Y. (Robert H. Rosh of counsel), for respondents James De Peyster Todd and Louise Todd Ambler.
George J. Calcagnini, Mount Kisco, N.Y., for respondents Scott Kurnit and Abbe Heller Kurnit.
Before: GLORIA GOLDSTEIN, J.P., LEO F. McGINITY, DANIEL F. LUCIANO, STEPHEN G. CRANE, JJ.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.
Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the description set forth in the 1997 draft option agreement does not identify the subject property to be conveyed with the degree of certainty necessary to satisfy the Statute of Frauds (see, General Obligations Law § 5-703; J J Bldrs. Developers v. John D'Alesio Sons, 158 A.D.2d 674; Cohen v. Swenson, 140 A.D.2d 407). To comply with the writing requirement, "a memorandum, signed by the party to be charged, must designate the parties, identify and describe the subject matter, and state all of the essential terms of a complete agreement" (Sheehan v. Culotta, 99 A.D.2d 544, 545; see, 160 Chambers St. Realty Corp. v. Register of City of NY, 226 A.D.2d 606).
The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit.
GOLDSTEIN, J.P., McGINITY, LUCIANO and CRANE, JJ., concur.